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PROACTIVE BIOMETRIC-ENABLED FORENSIC IMPRINTING SYSTEM 
ABDULRAHMAN ALRUBAN (MSc) 
Insider threats are a significant security issue. The last decade has witnessed 
countless instances of data loss and exposure in which leaked data have become 
publicly available and easily accessible. Losing or disclosing sensitive data or 
confidential information may cause substantial financial and reputational damage 
to a company. Therefore, preventing or responding to such incidents has become 
a challenging task. Whilst more recent research has focused explicitly on the 
problem of insider misuse, it has tended to concentrate on the information itself—
either through its protection or approaches to detecting leakage. Although digital 
forensics has become a de facto standard in the investigation of criminal activities, 
a fundamental problem is not being able to associate a specific person with 
particular electronic evidence, especially when stolen credentials and the Trojan 
defence are two commonly cited arguments. Thus, it is apparent that there is an 
urgent requirement to develop a more innovative and robust technique that can 
more inextricably link the use of information (e.g., images and documents) to the 
users who access and use them. Therefore, this research project investigates the 
role that transparent and multimodal biometrics could play in providing this link by 
leveraging individuals’ biometric information for the attribution of insider misuse 
identification. 
This thesis examines the existing literature in the domain of data loss prevention, 
detection, and proactive digital forensics, which includes traceability techniques. 
The aim is to develop the current state of the art, having identified a gap in the 
literature, which this research has attempted to investigate and provide a possible 
solution. Although most of the existing methods and tools used by investigators 
to conduct examinations of digital crime help significantly in collecting, analysing 
and presenting digital evidence, essential to this process is that investigators 
establish a link between the notable/stolen digital object and the identity of the 
individual who used it; as opposed to merely using an electronic record or a log 
that indicates that the user interacted with the object in question (evidence). 
Therefore, the proposed approach in this study seeks to provide a novel 
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technique that enables capturing individual’s biometric identifiers/signals (e.g. 
face or keystroke dynamics) and embedding them into the digital objects users 
are interacting with. This is achieved by developing two modes—a centralised or 
decentralised manner. The centralised approach stores the mapped information 
alongside digital object identifiers in a centralised storage repository; the 
decentralised approach seeks to overcome the need for centralised storage by 
embedding all the necessary information within the digital object itself. Moreover, 
no explicit biometric information is stored, as only the correlation that points to 
those locations within the imprinted object is preserved. 
Comprehensive experiments conducted to assess the proposed approach show 
that it is highly possible to establish this correlation even when the original version 
of the examined object has undergone significant modification. In many scenarios, 
such as changing or removing part of an image or document, including words and 
sentences, it was possible to extract and reconstruct the correlated biometric 
information from a modified object with a high success rate. A reconstruction of 
the feature vector from unmodified images was possible using the generated 
imprints with 100% accuracy. This was achieved easily by reversing the 
imprinting processes. Under a modification attack, in which the imprinted object 
is manipulated, at least one imprinted feature vector was successfully retrieved 
from an average of 97 out of 100 images, even when the modification percentage 
was as high as 80%. For the decentralised approach, the initial experimental 
results showed that it was possible to retrieve the embedded biometric signals 
successfully, even when the file (i.e., image) had had 75% of its original status 
modified. The research has proposed and validated a number of approaches to 
the embedding of biometric data within digital objects to enable successful user 
attribution of information leakage attacks.  
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Insider threats to enterprises have become widespread in the last decade (Liu et 
al., 2018; Safa et al., 2018) and have, therefore, been considered as a crucial 
security issue by many recent research studies (Shabtai, Elovici and Rokach, 
2012a; Collins et al., 2013; Huth et al., 2013; L. Liu et al., 2018; Nourian and 
Madnick, 2018). In addition, insiders who have legitimate access to an 
organisation’s internal systems and databases have the advantage of accessing 
all kinds of information—including those classified as confidential—as they possess 
the appropriate permissions and rights. A study found that more than 300,000 
internal security breaches took place in UK businesses in 2013 (IS Decisions, 
2014). More recently, according to the 2018 Data Breach Investigations Report 
by Verizon, which included 2,216 data breaches, one-quarter of the attacks that 
occurred in organisations were mainly driven by misuse, mistakes, espionage or 
financial gain (Verizon, 2018). Such breaches lead to substantial damage to the 
exploited body as a result of the loss or disclosure of sensitive and confidential 
intellectual property. In particular, when the exposure originates from an 
authorised person (employee, contractor, etc.) who misuses the advantage of 
privileged and legitimate access to the firm’s internal resources, this facilitates 
potential access to restricted areas, in comparison with the approach of outsiders 
who do not have the prior knowledge possessed by insiders. This is because 
insiders are more likely to be able to bypass security controls compared with 
Chapter 1- Introduction 
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outsiders who supposedly have limited knowledge about the internal 
infrastructure. As a result, insiders pose a significantly greater threat to 
organisations than outsiders (Stanton et al., 2005; Colwill, 2009). 
According to Felix Gaehtgens, a research director at Gartner, in 2015, fewer than 
5% of organisations were actually tracking and reviewing privileged activities, 
while the remainder were, at best, controlling access and logging when, where 
and by whom privileged access took place—but not what was actually done. Unlike 
those who monitor and evaluate the privileged activity, those who do not are at 
risk of being blindsided by insider threats, malicious users or errors that create 
significant threats (Gartner Inc., 2016; L. Liu et al., 2018). 
Digital forensics aims to produce and test a hypothesis about who did what, where, 
when and how in relation to the incident under investigation. Indeed, existing 
methods and tools used by investigators to conduct examinations of digital crime 
are of significant help in collecting, analysing and presenting digital evidence 
(Carbone, 2014; Widup, 2014; SANS Institute, 2016a). However, this remains a 
challenging task, because it is currently difficult for digital forensic professionals 
and investigators to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law that a 
specific human being has used the specific identity of a digital subject at a 
particular time (Shavers, 2013; Brown, 2015; Vincze, 2016). In many cases, the 
furthest point that a forensic investigation can reach by analysing electronic 
evidence—with the aim of tracing the origin of the crime committed—is the machine 
or Internet Protocol (IP) address from which the crime was committed. In such 
scenarios, criminals could argue and deny a charge by claiming that someone 
Chapter 1- Introduction 
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else had used their computer, especially knowing that a lot of desk-based 
employees think that there is no security risk to their employer in sharing work 
login credentials (IS Decisions, 2018). 
Having an approach that links information with those using it—beyond simple 
accounts—is required to provide the ability to connect an individual with the data 
being used. Most existing methods, such as digital watermarking or logs-based 
systems, establish correlation solely by a digital record of the object being 
monitored—not with the individual directly (Charbonneau and Simon, 2014; 
Nelson and Xie, 2014). As a possible solution to this problem, research has 
focused upon the use of biometrics that could provide such a link. Moreover, 
transparently capturing the user’s biometrics and instantly generating a biometric 
imprint that correlates the user interaction with the object used could give rise to 
critical information that would help digital forensic investigators in answering the 
“who” question. Upon detection of misuse, the biometric signal can be recovered 
and this will identify the individual who sent or interacted with a given digital 
object—negating the need for expensive and time-consuming investigation of a 
system that could eventually lead to a digital record (e.g., username, IP address, 
computer ID, etc.). 
1.2 Research Aim and Objectives 
The main aim of this research is to develop an efficient and robust proactive 
biometric-based forensic system that can inextricably link the use of information 
(evidence) to the individual users who access and use it. In order to achieve this 
aim, the following research objectives were established: 
Chapter 1- Introduction 
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1. To establish a current state-of-the-art understanding of data loss 
prevention, detection and proactive digital forensic techniques focusing 
on insider misuse, with a view to identifying and assessing the necessary 
attributes to enable a proactive and innovative digital forensic approach. 
2. To propose a novel biometric-based technique that works proactively to 
establish a correlation between a digital object and the individual who 
interacts with it. The following investigations were carried out: 
2.1. Investigation of differing embedding processes, including 
leveraging steganographic techniques such as null and grille 
cipher methods. 
2.2. Investigation of how the correlation between the biometric signal 
acquired and the object being monitored could be established with 
different file types, including images and text-based files.  
2.3. Investigation of the impact on biometric retrieval given differing 
levels of file modification (i.e., having a partial image, the removal 
of paragraphs, sentences, and words, and file format conversion). 
2.4. Investigation of the volume of biometric data that can be 
embedded and the impact upon retrieval (single and multimodal). 
3. To identify the strengths and limitations of the proposed approach based 
upon the series of conducted investigations and experiments. 
Chapter 1- Introduction 
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1.3 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is organised into nine chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research 
problem and outlines the overall research aim and its objectives, along with the 
structure of this report. The chapter concludes with a list of the works published 
during this research project. 
Chapter 2 explores the definition of ‘an insider’ and the scale and cost of insider 
misuse. This chapter also provides background information about digital forensics 
in general, including the investigation process and the models that most forensic 
professionals follow when conducting a digital crime investigation. An overview 
of the current challenges in digital forensics is presented and the role of 
biometrics within digital forensics discussed.  
Chapter 3 provides a literature review of related studies in the domain of data loss 
detection, prevention and proactive digital forensic techniques. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion section that identifies a gap that exists in the 
literature. 
Chapter 4 identifies system actors, use cases and a relevant scenario to define, 
investigate, and evaluate how the system would react in normal operation. The 
chapter form the bases for the design requirement of the proposed system. 
Chapter 5 introduces a proactive digital forensic biometric-based approach to the 
attribution of misuse via information leakage using biometrics and steganography. 
Two main methods (i.e., null cipher and grille cipher imprinting techniques) are 
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discussed in this chapter. The chapter ends with the main research questions to 
be investigated experimentally in the subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 6 is the first of three chapters that consider an experimental investigation 
and presents a biometric-based null cipher technique using images by 
embedding individuals’ biometric signals into image files, with a particular focus 
upon the ability to recover the biometric information under varying degrees of 
modification attack. The chapter also provides a detailed analysis in evaluating 
the performance of the approach used.  
Chapter 7 presents an investigation conducted into a biometric-based grille cipher 
technique using images by linking a subject (i.e., computer user) with an object 
of interest (e.g., images) using the individual’s biometric sample, such as a facial 
biometric, without modifying the object being imprinted. This investigation also 
develops a set of experiments that employ a grille cipher technique to generate 
the correlation that could identify the individual. 
Chapter 8 presents an investigation into a biometric-based grille cipher technique 
using documents to attribute document misuse via information leakage using 
biometrics and a locality sensitive hashing scheme. A comprehensive set of 
experiments for the proposed approach are conducted, such as changing the file 
format and removing parts of the document, including words and sentences, to 
measure the effectiveness of the developed technique. 
Chapter 9 provides conclusions and highlights the main contributions and 
achievements of the research project. The chapter also describes the limitations 
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identified during the project. The chapter ends with suggestions and scope for 
possible future work. 
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2 Insider Misuse and Digital Forensics 
This chapter provides information about insiders and the problem of insider 
misuse, together with a brief background to the digital forensic investigation 
processes and models that most forensic professionals follow when conducting 
digital crime investigations. An overview of the current challenges in digital 
forensics is also presented, together with an analysis of the role that biometrics 
plays within the domain.  
2.1 Introduction 
It is deeply concerning for organisations when data exposure originates from an 
authorised individual (e.g., an employee or contractor) who misuses their 
legitimate access and the potential for adverse impacts is, in this case, typically 
higher than for access by outsiders (Moshinsky, 2017; Titcomb, 2017; WikiLeaks, 
2017). Insiders are more likely to bypass security controls than outsiders, as the 
latter typically have limited knowledge of the internal infrastructure in a given case. 
Therefore, insiders pose a significant threat and identifying criminals, especially 
if the digital forensic process leads to the presentation of findings in legal 
proceedings, is a challenging and crucial task. 
2.2 Insider Misuse 
There is no unified definition of an ‘insider’ since it depends heavily upon the 
nature of the organisation and how its security perimeters are defined. It becomes 
even more complicated when an organisation has a range of employees who are 
involved in an incident. For instance, a company might have contractors, 
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subcontractors, part-time employees, business partners, and even outsourcers. 
The US Department of Homeland Security defines an ‘insider’ as “an individual 
with privileged access to an information technology system” (Hunker and Probst, 
2011). This definition is acceptable when the insider threat occurs in an 
information technology (IT) context. However, it seems to ignore the question of 
whether the individual is trusted or not (Bishop and Gates, 2008). It also ignores 
other aspects of the issue, in addition to the IT resources. For instance, an 
employee might work in a testing laboratory, where it is possible to leak 
intellectual property (e.g., a documentary design or a prototype of a new secret 
product). This type of malicious activity can be carried out without the need for 
privileged access to IT resources. Therefore, limiting the definition simply to 
having privileged access to IT resources is excessively specific and is not 
necessarily appropriate to many other relevant scenarios. 
Another definition defines an insider as any person who works within the security 
boundaries of an organisation (Patzakis, 2003). However, the revolution in mobile 
devices has enabled individuals to be freed from such security perimeters, and 
their tasks may be accomplished outside the organisation’s physical site. 
Therefore, legitimate users might work inside or outside their institution’s site via 
modern technology. Hence, it is difficult to have a generic definition of an insider, 
although the definition should be consistent with the context and environment. 
2.2.1 Insider Threats 
According to Cappelli et al. (2012) and Elmrabit, Yang and Yang (2015), insider 
threats can be categorised into three main types: insider Internet technology 
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sabotage, insider theft of intellectual property, and insider fraud. Most insider 
threat cases that occurred in the past can fit into one of these three areas, 
depending upon the intent of the malicious activity. Insider IT sabotage mostly 
includes those incidents in which the crime is committed by a technical user, for 
instance, a database, network or system administrator. In most documented 
cases, it was found that insider IT sabotage crimes, such as causing denial of 
service, were conducted as revenge against the victim organisation (Clark, 2016; 
Jackson, Choi and Gelfand, 2019).  
The underlying motivation for insider theft of intellectual property is typically to 
steal something that belongs to the criminal’s institution. Such a crime is typically 
committed by someone who has access to sensitive information and seeks to 
gain personal benefit from stealing intellectual property. For instance, an 
employee moving from one job to another in a different organisation might steal 
a software source code or novel product design in order to use it in a new job. 
The third category of insider threat is insider fraud, which is usually carried out by 
low-level workers, such as a data entry worker, call centre representative or 
secretary. In this case, the individual is trying to gain some benefit from the crime 
committed for themselves or another organisation. An example of this type of 
insider threat is someone leaking confidential financial information, such as 
customer credit card details, to somebody who is not authorised to access those 
data. Typically, the common motivation behind this type of crime is financial gain. 
For the purpose of this research, the main focus is on insider theft of intellectual 
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property, specifically data leakage; the other categories are thus beyond the 
scope of this project. 
2.2.2 Monitoring Users’ Behaviour and the Law 
When it comes to observing employees’ activities, the law varies from one country 
to another. For example, in the UK, it is obligatory to make staff aware that they 
are being monitored (Gov.uk, 2015). Furthermore, employers must explain clearly 
the type of observation that is undertaken and its purpose. However, according 
to human rights law, there are two cases in which employers can monitor their 
staff without their knowledge: when someone is suspected of breaking the law 
and when making them aware of the observation would make it more difficult to 
detect a crime. 
In the US, the laws for monitoring employees differ from state to state. For 
instance, some states, such as Delaware and Connecticut, regulate computer-
use observation and require the employer to notify employees in advance when 
there is an active monitoring system in place. In other states, such as Michigan 
and Illinois, employers are prohibited from monitoring their staff concerning 
information related to “an employee’s associations, political activities, 
publications, or communications of non-employment activities” (Huth, 2013). In 
general, most US states require employers to inform their employees of 
monitoring activity in advance. 
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2.3 Digital Forensic Investigation Processes 
The science of digital forensics has existed for a long time, aiding organisations 
in investigating cybercrime. In the early days of digital forensics, professionals 
and practitioners tended to use the term computer forensics to describe the 
process of investigating a computer crime incident. Not until the emergence of 
other electronic and embedded devices, such as mobiles and smartphones, did 
forensic specialists move to call it the digital forensics domain. A modern and 
trending term that describes wider branches in the domain of digital forensics is 
cyber forensics, which encompasses digital and computer forensics. In general, 
all three terms are likely to be used as synonyms to describe the process and 
science of extracting information and data from electronic devices to serve as 
electronic evidence for proving and legally prosecuting digital crime. This process 
includes, but is not limited to, extracting relevant information from computers, 
smartphones, network devices, databases, and storage media. 
One of the main aims of the digital forensic process is to produce and test a 
hypothesis about who did what, when, where and how in relation to the incident 
under investigation in a way that is legally acceptable to the courts. Indeed, the 
existing methods and tools used by investigators to conduct examinations of a 
digital crime help significantly in collecting, analysing and presenting digital 
evidence (Carbone, 2014; Widup, 2014; SANS Institute, 2016b). However, the 
question of who committed the crime is crucial, especially if the digital forensic 
process leads to the presentation of findings in a court of law (Valjarevic and 
Venter, 2012). Therefore, employing the digital forensic process within an 
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organisation in order to investigate crime incidents successfully is neither a 
straightforward nor trivial task. Such a process involves several practical and 
technical aspects, which, if not conducted properly, will significantly affect the 
forensic value of the investigation and the resulting evidence (Clarke, 2010). Most 
legal forensic practices are often post-incident investigations designed to gather 
and analyse information that assists in building a hypothesis to form a case of the 
law. Such action is typically called a reactive model, whereby the whole 
investigation takes place following the incident. What could help in identifying the 
source of a crime would be to prepare the environment by being proactive in 
putting appropriate processes and technologies in place in order to be proactive 
in aiding the post-incident investigation. This would significantly and effectively 
boost the success of the overall investigation process in proving guilt in a crime. 
2.3.1 Reactive Model 
A reactive investigation acts like a typical digital forensic investigation process. It 
mainly involves seven successive phases that forensic practitioners follow, as 
Figure 2.1 illustrates. The process starts with the identification phase and ends 
with a decision. The main phases are written along the top of the table. Each 
column contains items and steps for the corresponding category to which it 
belongs. However, according to the discussion during the first meeting of the 
Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) in 2001, it was debated that not 
all the classes/phases were to be considered ‘forensic’. Those items in the centre 
of the table (highlighted in grey) are those open to the least confusion, although 
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there is still some argument about the use of the terms collection and preservation, 
and whether one is really a subclass of the other (Palmer, 2001). 
 
Figure 2.1: Generic reactive digital forensic process model (Palmer, 2001)  
Each of the phases is subdivided into various components to give a broad outline 
of the goal that particular phase is trying to achieve. 
Identification includes the detection of an event or incident using existing tools, 
for example, intrusion detection techniques or monitoring systems. However, the 
identification process is not typically a digital forensics role but is required to begin 
the investigation process. 
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Preservation involves gathering relevant data. It is useful for the purposes of 
digital investigations by ensuring that none of the data is lost or tampered with but 
preserved according to the related procedures that are normally followed in an 
accredited digital forensics house. 
Collection consists of reducing the preserved information to relevant data by 
appropriate hardware and software tools, using the right sampling techniques so 
that the target data are much more relevant than the preserved data in terms of 
the digital forensics examination purposes. 
Examination includes close scrutiny of the data to find traces of a crime by 
searching for aspects such as hidden data, pattern matches and validating the 
data. During this phase, the digital evidence is evaluated to disclose data and 
reduce volume. 
Analysis involves examining the context and content of digital evidence to 
determine relevancy. It also consists of following procedures such as statistical 
techniques and data mining in order to achieve results. 
Presentation includes preparing documentation for reporting purposes. 
Since the above phases share and involve common tasks, some of them could 
be grouped into a higher level; for instance, the identification, preservation, and 
collection phases could be grouped under one category called gathering. 
Furthermore, the examination and analysis phases could be grouped within a 
processing phase. 
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2.3.2 Proactive Model 
Although reactive forensic investigation might lead to acceptable results in some 
scenarios, there are many cases in which an organisation could benefit from 
being able to record, gather and analyse intelligence proactively prior to tackling 
an incident. Furthermore, being proactive—also called digital forensics readiness—
with regard to the design of the forensics capability within the organisation will 
ensure that the incident response team is able to respond effectively and 
efficiently (Clarke, 2010). There are several ways to implement such a model, one 
of which was introduced by Alharbi et al. (2011). They proposed a hybrid model 
of both reactive and proactive digital forensics that would operate simultaneously, 
in order to provide a framework that incorporated different forensics analysis 
algorithms to collect, trigger a malicious event, and preserve and analyse 
evidence proactively to identify an incident as it occurs, as Figure 2.2 illustrates. 




Figure 2.2: Proactive and reactive digital forensic investigation system process 
(Alharbi, Weber-Jahnke and Traore, 2011) 
Several areas need to be addressed when an organisation intends to implement 
forensic readiness. These areas include technical actions, such as continuously 
monitoring and triggering responses to suspicious events. Non-technical 
dimensions are also involved in the process of applying proactive digital forensics 
effectively; for instance, staff training and conducting targeted security awareness 
programmes will genuinely boost the organisation’s overall incident readiness. 
Moreover, it is necessary for the organisation’s security policy and strategy to be 
a good fit with its digital forensic goals.   
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2.4 Challenges in Digital Forensics 
Criminals are becoming more aware of digital forensics and investigation 
capabilities. As a result, they can defeat the process of investigation in some 
cases, which makes the analysis and reconstruction of attack scenarios more 
difficult and challenging (Rekhis and Boudriga, 2012). In addition, adversaries are 
even developing ‘anti-forensic’ methods and tools specifically designed to 
conceal their activities and destroy any remaining digital evidence. Privacy/ 
confidentiality-preserving techniques put in place, such as the integration of 
secure encryption into operating systems, are creating further challenges for 
forensic examiners; this has the potential to complicate the recovery of digital 
evidence from a computer, mobile or electronic device (Casey and Stellatos, 
2008). Different encryption algorithms can be used for this task, which relies upon 
the preference of the system designer as to whether a secure encryption 
algorithm is required, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Using a 
combination of a robust cryptographic algorithm and a high-entropy long key 
makes the process of brute-forcing the encryption key or breaking the algorithm 
encryption process a much harder task. This also slows the pace of digital 
investigation operations, as such a task takes an enormous amount of time to 
achieve (if it succeeds) and is sometimes unbreakable; it is here that the term 
‘anti-forensic’ emerges. In the UK, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
(RIPA) 2000 states that it is illegal for a criminal not to reveal the access code 
(e.g., password or encryption key) to the law enforcement agency concerned. 
Failure to do so is considered a criminal offence, with a penalty of two years in jail 
(RIPA, 2014). It can be presumed that the law enforcement agency involved may 
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be able to build enough circumstantial evidence to prosecute. Nonetheless, 
according to Udham Singh (2014), around two-thirds of cases that involve 
encrypted files or devices go without processing, due to their inaccessibility even 
when using advanced forensic tools such as Forensic Toolkit (FTK) or EnCase 
Forensic Software (Eden et al., 2016).  
An interesting example that shows how encryption could pose an extreme 
challenge to law enforcement agencies when conducting investigations is the 
recent case involving the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (Apple, Inc. 2016). 
The FBI had asked Apple to make a new version of its most popular mobile device 
(iPhone) operating system (OS) to circumvent several essential security features, 
including the user’s data encryption, and to install this new OS on the device so 
that the FBI could recover and have backdoor access to locked or encrypted 
mobile devices during investigations. Moreover, the use of biometric signals (e.g., 
face, fingerprint and iris) in encrypting files and for access control introduces 
further barriers to digital forensics investigators when attempting to bypass such 
constraints to complete an investigation process and uncover evidence (Abed et 
al., 2019). 
Other emerging domains in digital forensics that pose technological and legal 
issues are: 
 Cloud computing forensics 
 Big data forensics 
 Internet of things forensics 
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The dynamic nature of cloud computing models includes the different services 
(software, platform and infrastructure as a service) that make it much harder for 
investigators to collect and analyse evidence. For instance, the same cloud 
infrastructure used by a criminal who conducted a massive and destructive 
cybercrime yesterday is being used today by another firm for a legitimate purpose. 
Some of the conventional computer forensic models and approaches are 
insufficient and incompatible with the cloud environment (Grispos, Storer and 
Glisson, 2012; Zawoad and Hasan, 2013). 
One of the biggest challenges in investigating and prosecuting cybercrime is the 
Trojan/Virus defence. The Trojan defence is used when blaming an offence and 
actus reus (guilty act) on a piece of software, known as a Trojan (Brenner, Carrier 
and Henninger, 2004). It has now become common for individuals accused of a 
computer-related crime to claim that the responsibility lies with malware placed 
on their machine without their knowledge (Bowles and Hernandez-Castro, 2015). 
Several cases have ended with the release of suspects without being sentenced 
and walking free from court due to the Trojan/Virus defence (Fox News, 2009; 
Rutherford, 2010; Dalrymple, 2013). The current solution involves a layering of 
security countermeasures, which include the comprehensive logging of servers 
(including authentication requests) so that logs can be correlated in order to 
understand who was using which machine at what time that resulted in specific 
actions in a network (Quick and Choo, 2013; Ho, Kaarst-Brown and Benbasat, 
2018; Khan, Foley and O’Sullivan, 2019). Assuming encryption is in place, proxy-
based network decryption and storage of network traffic is required to identify 
misuse (possibly over prolonged periods of time). If third-party encryption is used, 
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it will not be possible to decrypt and inspect the traffic. An underlying assumption 
is that the computer account identified as being where the misuse occurred 
belongs to the individual who perpetrated the attack. However, with generally 
poor password use (e.g., shared and stolen accounts) and specific malicious 
intent, the assumption is unlikely to be true. Therefore, an approach that could 
biometrically correlate a user-based event/action directly with the individual who 
conducted it is required. Proactive digital forensics approaches—such as the 
method proposed in this research—could play a vital role in such cases and 
identify the real criminal by establishing a correlation between identity and 
evidence, such as a digital object. 
Another major challenge that digital forensic investigators encounter when 
carrying out a deep inspection of an acquired forensic image is that information 
can be hidden inside image or text files. Hiding information is a well-known 
method of transferring knowledge and communicating over an untrusted channel 
that is used by criminals and spies to bypass monitored channels. 
2.5 Digital Steganography 
Steganography is the art of hiding information using a cover object, such as 
embedding a secret message inside a legitimate image, document, audio or video 
file, with the aim of not revealing a secret or leaving any signs that could indicate 
the hidden message, other than to the target recipient. In contrast, cryptography 
encrypts a message in such a way that it becomes unreadable by rendering it a 
meaningless jumble of characters, but it is present, and not hidden. The 
advantage of steganography over the use of cryptography alone is that the 
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intended secret message does not attract attention to itself as an object of scrutiny. 
However, for a long time, the difficulty of constructing the ordinary letter made 
steganography nearly going to be information modification. Traditional 
steganography methods, such as the least significant bit (LSB), which modifies 
the cover data to hide information, did not strictly satisfy the condition of being 
undetected and were vulnerable to being cracked by extensive steganalysis 
techniques (J. Liu et al., 2018). 
There is also a difference between steganography and a related data-hiding field 
called watermarking. Although steganography and watermarking have some 
fundamental similarities, in that they both hide secret information, they address 
distinct applications. In steganography, the carrier object (e.g., image) is a mere 
decoy and has no relationship with the secret message. In comparison, 
watermarking typically carries additional data about the carrier object or some 
other information related to the cover, such as tags classifying the source or the 
destination of the message being sent (Fridrich, 2009). In summary: 
 Steganography is the process of sending a secret message by hiding it in 
a carrier object. 
 Steganography is typically described as the prisoners’ problem, in which 
two prisoners, Alice and Bob, want to hatch an escape plan but their 
communication is monitored by a watcher (Eve), who will halt the 
communication once she suspects an exchange of secret data. 
 The most important property of steganography is that it is statistically 
undetectable, which means that it should be difficult for Eve to notice the 
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presence of a private message in a carrier. Statistically undetectable 
steganographic algorithms are referred to as secure. 
 A warden who merely observes the traffic between Alice and Bob is 
referred to as passive. An active or malicious warden would tamper with 
the communication in order to prevent the prisoners from using 
steganography or to trick them into revealing their communication. 
 Digital watermarking is a data-hiding application that is related to 
steganography but is fundamentally different. Whereas in steganography 
the secret message usually has no relationship with the cover object, 
which merely plays the role of decoy, watermarks typically supply 
additional information about the cover. Moreover, and most importantly, 
watermarks do not have to be embedded undetectably (Fridrich, 2009).  
Figure 2.3 shows a typical steganographic system process flow that incorporates 
encryption when hiding secret data. 
 
Figure 2.3: Typical steganographic system process flow 
The steganographic process typically begins by encrypting a plain secret 
message using a symmetric encryption key, which is shared between the sender 
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and the receiver of the message to encrypt and decrypt the payload (the plain 
message to be embedded). Encryption is a typical practice in such applications; 
however, it is not always necessary. There are different techniques for hiding 
information in digital files. These techniques include four main methods: 
substitution, transform domain, statistical, and distortion.  
2.5.1.1.1 Substitution System 
Substitution-based techniques replace unnecessary or redundant bits of the 
carrier object with the secret message required to be hidden (Chan and Cheng, 
2004). A well-known example of this approach is LSB-based steganography, as 
the LSB mostly has a low affect on the cover object, even when it is being 
removed or replaced with a different value (Chan and Cheng, 2004). A practical 
example of a substitution system with the LSB technique is replacing the last bit 
of each colour band of the pixels of an image with one bit of the secret massage 
(Wang, Lin and Lin, 2001). In the case of an RGB image, each pixel basically 
consists of three bytes: red, green and blue, and each pixel can accommodate 
three bits of the secret message (QL et al., 2018). The secret message can be 
encrypted prior to being hidden within the cover object to preserve its secrecy in 
the case of someone detecting it. However, adding this type of security cover to 
a message introduces noise, as well as increasing the size of the original secret 
message. Another downside of the substitution system, in addition to its being 
naive, is that the secret message must almost always be smaller than the cover 
object (Wang, Lin and Lin, 2001; Chan and Cheng, 2004). OpenStego is an 
example of a software tool that utilises such an approach, in that it provides two 
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main functionalities: data hiding and watermarking (OpenStego, 2017). It can hide 
any data within a cover file (e.g., images). It can also watermark files with an 
invisible signature. This type of approach is useful for detecting unauthorised file 
copying and illegal distribution (Vaidya, 2019). 
2.5.2 Transform Domain 
In the transformation domain, the original space in the cover image is transformed 
into a different space, using, for example, discrete cosine transform (DCT), 
discrete Fourier transform, or wavelet transform (Poljicak, 2011; Cao et al., 2018). 
These transformation techniques help in dividing the original image into parts 
based on their signal strength or importance, whereby those parts with low 
importance can be utilised to accommodate the secret message and reduce the 
possibility of its being visually detected. In the Fourier transform, the original 
image is transformed from the spatial domain into the frequency domain (Kipper, 
2003). Once the cover object (i.e., image) is transformed into the frequency 
domain, the low signals are leveraged to hide the payload and the image is then 
transformed back to its original spatial domain (Cheddad et al., 2010; Poljicak, 
2011). Wavelet transform is very similar to Fourier transform but involves more 
complex mathematical operations (Edward Jero, Ramu and Ramakrishnan, 2014; 
Miri and Faez, 2018). 
2.5.3 Statistical Method 
Statistical methods modify the cover object by changing only a single bit, in which 
the modified object is considered as ‘1’ and the unmodified object is considered 
as ‘0’. Therefore, the approach mainly relies upon the receiver detecting the 
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change and reconstructing the secret message by identifying the sequences of 
modified and unmodified objects to form the whole of the secret. OpenPuff is a 
statistical-based steganographic and watermarking tool that allows users to hide 
data in more than one carrier file (Sloan and Hernandez-Castro, 2018). When 
hidden data are divided between a set of carrier files, a carrier chain is created, 
with no enforced theoretical hidden data size limit (256MB, 512MB, depending 
only on the implementation) that implements three layers of concealed data 
obfuscation (cryptography, whitening and encoding) that extend deniable 
cryptography into deniable steganography.  
2.5.4 Distortion Techniques 
A distortion technique makes a sequenced change in the cover object in a way 
that it is only possible to decode the secret message by having both the original 
and the modified version of the cover and then performing a comparison 
operation to identify the changes. For example, Kim, Duric and Richards (2006) 
proposed an algorithm for hiding information in the LSBs of JPEG coefficients. 
The algorithm uses modified matrix encoding to choose the coefficients whose 
modifications introduce minimal embedding distortion. The expected value of the 
embedding distortion is derived as a function of the message length and the 
probability distribution of the JPEG quantisation errors of the cover images. 
2.6 Digital Watermarking 
Many books, audio and video publishers and distributors use digital watermarking 
to protect copyright and combat piracy. In simple terms, digital watermarking can 
be described as a method of encoding arbitrary information into digital objects, 
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such as using a unique customer ID number or company logo (Shih, 2017). 
Utilising digital watermarking could help in identifying the source of the illegal 
distribution of a watermarked digital object. For example, in the case of music 
piracy, when someone buys an album or song, the producer or distributor can 
leverage watermarking techniques to hide a unique identifier in the song file that 
could lead to the person who buys it and then trace the source of the illegal activity. 
Embedded digital watermarks can be used to verify the authenticity or integrity of 
the carrier signal legitimately or to show the identity of its owners. Figure 2.4 




Figure 2.4: General digital watermarking system (Shih, 2017) 
Overall, watermarking is very similar to a generic steganographic system. Hence, 
steganographic techniques can sometimes be leveraged to perform a 
watermarking task. Some digital watermarking schemes embed a unique 
identifier inside a digital object that needs to be protected in a way that is not 
visible, by using, for example, robust embedding algorithms such as those that 
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work in the spatial or frequency domain. This makes a malicious intent to remove 
the embedded watermarking information a non-trivial task to achieve. 
2.7 Role of Biometric Technology in Digital Forensics 
Biometric technology has various vital applications in forensic science (Gonzalez-
Sosa et al., 2018; Toor and Wechsler, 2018). Biometrics has contributed 
significantly to forensic investigations. For example, it has been used to identify 
missing individuals following natural disasters or accidents, such as fires. 
Moreover, biometrics can help in identifying attackers who are involved in acts of 
terrorism (Gonzalez-Sosa et al., 2018; Toor and Wechsler, 2018). Some of the 
biometrics modalities and traits can be captured physically (e.g., fingerprints, 
palm prints, DNA), and others captured digitally or transparently (e.g., face, voice, 
body measurements, gait). 
The use of facial pictures and video data in an investigation helps investigators to 
track suspects’ faces, their locations, time of the crime, the people who are seen 
with them, and their activities (Carrier, 2003). However, uncooperative subjects, 
the low quality of the pictures and poor illumination make the recognition process 
a challenging task for any digital forensic facial recognition system. For example, 
for the Belgium Zaventem Airport attack in 2016, limitations in the forensic face 
recognition system had a serious impact on the ability to perform successful 
recognition, delaying the identification of the suspects in a time-critical 
investigation (Shoichet, Botelho and Berlinger, 2016). The system failed to track 
a suspect because of the distance between the camera and the individual, 
resulting in low resolution of the face, and variations in illumination. Different 
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expressions and facial poses can also cause a failure in facial recognition (Al-
kawaz et al., 2018). 
Some attributes closely related to the human body, such as clothing and footwear, 
are often treated as biometric modalities in forensic science because they are 
collected, analysed and interpreted in the same way as biometric traces and 
exploited using the same inference models. The stability of a modality over time 
determines the obsolescence of the case-related data for investigation, from a 
lifetime for fingerprints and DNA, to some months or years for face and speaker 
recognition (Meuwly and Veldhuis, 2012). 
In order to be of forensic interest, the biometric modality has to be available as a 
trace and needs to be distinctive. At a crime scene, fingermarks and biological 
traces are searched for as a matter of priority because they are often available 
and can be very distinctive. In comparison, iris pattern, although also very 
distinctive, is only rarely available as a digital trace. Digital traces may embed 
information about the body height of a perpetrator, but this modality is only 
privileged if no other option is available, due to its poor distinctiveness. The 
modality also needs to be stable and robust in forensic conditions. Face 
recognition is commonly exploited for forensic investigation but suffers from 
severe limitations. For example, facial features can change significantly over 
even short periods of time and unconstrained video captures constituting the main 
part of the trace material can lose a substantial part of the distinctiveness of the 
modality (Meuwly and Veldhuis, 2012). 
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Unfortunately, as the use of technology increases, so, too, does digital crime and 
terrorism develop ways to avoid being discovered. Nevertheless, the increased 
use of technology could also provide an opportunity to derive new biometric and 
digital signatures to pursue those who engage in criminal and terrorist activities, 
as some electronic devices have their own unique digital signature (Jain, Flynn 
and Ross, 2008). Human interaction with electronic devices also provides some 
interesting new digital biometrics (Iyengar and Miller, 2015).  
There are several open-source and commercial facial recognition systems that 
can be leveraged for use as a digital forensic tool to aid in identifying and 
matching individual suspects (e.g., AmazonRekognition, 2015; Baltrusaitis, 
Robinson and Morency, 2016; Clarifai, 2018; Neurotechnology, 2018; 
GoogleCloudVision, 2019; MicrosoftFace, 2019; OpenCV, 2019). Such systems’ 
accurate search capability allows investigators to identify (to a certain degree) a 
person in a photo or video, using a private repository of face images. Figure 2.5 
illustrates the performance of three of the commercial systems–-Neurotechnology, 
Microsoft, and Amazon’s Rekognition—as they were examined in identifying 
individual faces based on a public dataset called CAS-PEAL-R1 (Wen Gao et al., 
2008). The dataset consisted of 30,900 images across 1,040 subjects (595 men 
and 445 women). A study by Al-kawaz et al. (2018) included only those images 
that met all conditions (pose, illumination, expression, and accessories) (95 
subjects); the remaining were excluded in order to investigate the performance of 
the three commercial systems in different environmentally realistic conditions. 




Figure 2.5: Performance of three commercial facial recognition systems using 
the CAS-PEAL-R1 dataset (Al-kawaz et al., 2018) 
It can be seen in the above figure that the systems examined mostly achieved a 
more than 80% success rate in matching a given face image with the person to 
whom it belonged. However, in some conditions, such as different lighting 
variability and pose orientation, the performance was much lower. It is important 
to mention that the subjects’ pictures that were examined were captured using a 
professional digital camera, in which the image resolution is high and all the faces 
fully presented. More challenging settings could include a situation in which only 
part of the person’s face can be seen. Identifying someone from partial, unclear 
details of a face could be extremely challenging. 




This chapter presented the concerns regarding threats from insider misuse along 
with the existing challenges and barriers that face a typical reactive digital 
forensics investigation. Forensic practitioners encounter complex challenges, 
including data encryption, information hiding and data destruction. Although much 
research has been undertaken into the detection of insider misuse, and 
particularly information leakage, less focus has been given to linking this to the 
people who are committing the criminal activity. Assuming many will utilise 
credentials stolen from colleagues to perpetrate misuse, there is frequently a 
reliance upon other security controls to verify the identity of the person 
responsible (e.g., through the use of logs, CCTV, etc.) if indeed this is possible at 
all. As a result, much more is required from specialists in the domain in terms of 
incorporating different technologies, such as biometrics, into forensic readiness 
and ensuring that incident response teams and forensic investigators are able to 
respond effectively and efficiently once an incident occurs. Therefore, aligning 
individuals with the data objects with which they are interacting and leveraging 
biometric signals and systems and steganographic techniques could be a useful 
combination to attribute misuse and enable digital forensic investigations to reach 
positive results.   
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3 Data Loss Detection, Prevention and Proactive Digital 
Forensics 
In order to provide a better understanding of the existing literature, this chapter 
provides a review of relevant research and state of the art on data loss detection, 
prevention and proactive digital forensic techniques. The chapter begins by 
describing the methodology used for conducting this review, followed by a 
detailed critical review of related studies. The chapter concludes with a discussion 
section that identifies a gap in the literature. 
3.1 Introduction 
A systematic literature review is used in this chapter as the review methodology 
to identify, evaluate and interpret all published research relevant to the topic area. 
This method follows a specific protocol that makes the result reproducible. 
Applying a systematic review involves three main steps: planning, execution, and 
documentation of the results, as illustrated in Figure 3.1 (Harris et al., 2014; Xiao 
and Watson, 2019). Each step includes several sub-steps that ensure the 
consistency of the search activity. 
 
Figure 3.1: Systematic review methodology 
Planning
1. Specify research question
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In the planning phase, the author identified research questions the review should 
answer. Specifying the research questions was the most important activity, as the 
questions drove the entire literature review. The main research question selected 
is: “What are all the existing data loss detection, prevention and proactive digital 
forensics solutions?” The review was conducted from an academic perspective. 
The next section explains in detail how the systematic literature review was 
undertaken. 
3.2 Literature Review Methodology 
In addition to the main research question referred to above, the following sub-
questions helped to meet the established goals: 
 What are the techniques used to detect data leakage? 
 What are the document classification methods? 
 What are the existing techniques for the identification of guilt? 
 What are the existing proactive digital forensic techniques? 
 What measures are used to evaluate performance? 
 What was the performance achieved? 
A review protocol was also developed to describe how the collected data were 
selected. A protocol establishes predefined methods that reduce the possibility of 
researcher bias (Budgen and Brereton, 2006). For instance, instead of selecting 
review papers based upon the researcher’s expectations (in the absence of a 
predefined protocol), the selection is driven systematically when a protocol is 
used. The review protocol is explained in detail in the next section. During the 
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planning phase, selection criteria are specified to identify original papers that are 
directly related to the research question. Therefore, the criteria are used to 
include as many relevant studies as possible and exclude irrelevant material. Five 
filters were applied to the search results returned in order to identify the most 
relevant studies: 
1. Papers with titles that clearly show no link to the primary question were 
excluded from the review. For instance, many of the titles in the search 
results have the words “water leakage”, “CO2”, and so forth. 
2. Publications of less than two pages (including posters, presentations, 
abstracts or some short theoretical papers) were excluded. 
3. Non-peer-reviewed publications were eliminated. 
4. No studies published prior to 2007 were included, the researcher has 
conducted a preliminary search that resulted in no significant or up-to-date 
research existing before that date. 
5. The literature review focused only on those publications written in the 
English language. 
The systematic literature review was executed in three steps: references search, 
quality evaluation and information extraction. It is essential to mention that the 
search activity was limited to those academic papers that were indexed by 
reference databases available on the Internet. After the research questions were 
specified, four main research repositories were listed as being the most relevant 
to the field of the literature domain. Google Scholar—a public index database—was 
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used as a sanity check. Various carefully chosen search terms and expressions 
relating to the main questions were used during the enumeration activity. The 
following databases were considered in the review: 
1. IEEE Xplore: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/Xplore/home.jsp 
2. ScienceDirect: http://www.sciencedirect.com/ 
3. ACM Digital Library: http://dl.acm.org/ 
4. SpringerLink: http://link.springer.com/ 
5. Google Scholar: http://scholar.google.co.uk/ 
After performing several search tests on the above databases, the following 
composite search expression was formed for the enumeration: 
“(Data OR Information OR Document OR Documents) AND (Loss OR Leak OR 
Leakage) AND (Prevention OR Detection)” 
The use of “OR” and “AND” together facilitated the automation of 24 possible 
phrase combinations. 
Table 3.1 lists the number of publications returned for each database after several 
enumeration rounds using the above query. The table also presents the final 
number of studies selected after applying the inclusion/exclusion criteria. 
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Table 3.1: Number of returned references 
Database Number of references Final selected references 
IEEE Xplore 58 10 
ScienceDirect 18 4 
ACM Digital Library 11 2 
SpringerLink 9 3 
Google Scholar 421 15 
Total 517 33 
In addition to the selection criteria, the primary publications were classified based 
on the quality of each study, as Table 3.2 illustrates. 
Table 3.2: Publication genre and the number of primary studies 
Genre Number of primary studies 
Peer-reviewed journal papers 16 
Peer-refereed book chapters 2 
Peer-reviewed conference papers 15 
Total 33 
 
While reviewing the research papers, the following set of information was 
extracted from each study: 
 Experimental methodology 
Chapter 3- Data Loss Detection, Prevention and Proactive Digital Forensics 
38 
 
 Dataset information 
 Evaluation of performance 
 Contribution of the study 
 Study limitations 
A comprehensive critique and interpretation of the primary studies is presented 
in the next section. 
3.3 Literature Review of Data Loss Detection, Prevention and 
Proactive Digital Forensics 
As part of the literature review, the publications were carefully classified into 
seven main groups based upon the objective each publication was trying to 
achieve. These groups were:  
 Document classification  
 Data loss detection in email  
 Data encryption and access control  
 Biometrics and human behaviour  
 Distributed and host-based solutions  
 Guilt identification 
 Proactive digital forensics  
It is noteworthy that the reviewed studies overlap in several aspects, such as the 
methodology used for detecting leakage (such as a classifier algorithm) or the 
type of action applied once a leak is detected. 
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Shabtai et al. (2012) proposed a taxonomy of existing data loss detection and 
prevention (DLD/P) solutions, as shown in Figure 3.2, which incorporates data 
state, deployment scheme, leakage handling approach, and action was taken 
upon leakage. These attributes answer the questions of what, where, and how to 
protect sensitive data. The taxonomy covers a wide range of aspects and 
technologies of DLD/P. The reason the organisation of this literature review does 
not precisely follow the structure of the Shabtai et al. (2012) taxonomy is that most 
of the studies investigated here contribute to a specific aspect of DLD/P, whereas 
others fall into multiple categories. For instance, some publications propose a 
classification technique to cluster documents based on context, and other studies 
focus on email patterns using machine learning. Therefore, it was not feasible to 
categorise the literature using Shabtai et al. (2012) classification. As a result, the 
reviewed papers are mainly grouped based upon the aim of the study and the 
methodology used. 













































Figure 3.2: Taxonomy of data leakage prevention solutions (Shabtai, Elovici and Rokach, 2012b) 
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3.3.1 Document Classification 
Document classification or categorisation is an active area in which much 
research has been undertaken and many studies have discussed in detail the 
clustering of data for DLD/P. A study by Gessiou et al. (2011) proposed an 
information retrieval-based method for information leakage detection (IRILD). 
Fundamentally, their technique eliminates common phrases—by checking their 
popularity—before performing a fingerprinting process. This results in only 
sensitive phrases being fingerprinted, leading to much faster processing time with 
fewer fingerprints generated. The fingerprint process uses a cyclical hashing 
approach, which splits the document into multiple parts and generates 
fingerprints for those parts. The proposed method provides better performance, 
as it generates fewer fingerprints and reports fewer false positives (as illustrated 
in Figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.3: Accuracy of varying the length of C (Gessiou, Vu and Ioannidis, 
2011) 
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Gessiou, Vu and Ioannidis (2011) conducted their experiment on an Enron email 
dataset that contained around 600,000 emails. IRILD managed to generate 39% 
fewer fingerprints compared with standard cyclical hashing. Unlike other research, 
this method does not rely on a predefined list of keywords given by the user. 
Conversely, the method is able to identify and classify confidential documents 
using the fingerprints it has generated. Thus, the system requires the use of public 
search engines, such as Google, Bing or Yahoo, to determine the common 
phrase score. In confidential environments, submitting such sensitive information 
to a third party could introduce a considerable risk to privacy. Furthermore, using 
phrase or expression popularity to measure document sensitivity is not always an 
accurate method, since not knowing the context in which the phrases appear 
affects classification accuracy. 
Similar to the concept of the elimination of phrases introduced by Gessiou et al. 
(2011), Shapira et al. (2013) proposed an approach that distinguishes between 
non-relevant (non-confidential) and relevant (sensitive) sections of a given 
document. Their solution comes as an extension to the common fingerprinting 
approach, except that it uses k-skip-n-grams. The proposed method employs 
different "k" values to skip n-grams, which enables the system to conduct 
contextual analysis. This approach was more robust against content manipulation 
activities, such as rewording, paraphrasing, word deletion, and changing word 
order. Evaluation of the proposed method shows that the sorted k-skip-n-grams 
achieved higher detection accuracy than the traditional fingerprinting approach.   
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Likewise, Alneyadi et al. (2014) investigated the effectiveness of using n-gram-
based statistical analysis for the purpose of document classification. The 
proposed method utilises n-grams to measure the frequency of a given word 
within a document. In this experiment, the system achieved an overall 
classification accuracy of 92% and scored an average recall of 91%, with 92% 
precision. Precision gives the fraction of the system prediction that is true; recall 
is the fraction of the relevant result that is successfully retrieved or detected 
(Davis and Goadrich, 2006). 




𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
 




𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
 
Although the system is able to attain a high level of accuracy in detecting sensitive 
documents, the length of a document (especially minimal and very large 
documents) can have a significant adverse effect on the accuracy of the 
classification. This is due to the proposed technique depending upon the 
frequency of a phrase, and frequency can be directly affected by the size of the 
document. 
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Katz et al. (2014) proposed an approach that leverages the advantages of both 
keyword-based and statistical methods. This approach consists of two phases: 
learning and detection. The learning phase generates a context-based 
confidential terms graph for all the types of the confidential document an 
organisation possesses. In the detection phase, the system calculates the 
confidentiality score by matching the document concerned to one or more clusters 
which have been identified in the learning phase, as Figure 3.4 illustrates. 
 
Figure 3.4: Detection phase (Katz et al., 2014) 
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The system does not simply rely upon content or predefined keywords, but also 
takes context into account, as does the Shapira et al. (2013) approach, both of 
which are robust against rephrasing attacks. The system also detects small 
sections of confidential information embedded in non-confidential documents. 
The experiment was conducted on three datasets: Reuters news articles, the 
Pan-PC-11 Plagiarism dataset (containing 22,186 documents), and the Enron 
emails dataset. The authors collected a total of 6,102 news articles from Reuters. 
The result was compared with other methods, such as support vector machines 
(SVM), and fingerprinting. In terms of identifying whole confidential documents, 
all the methods scored very close true positive and false-positive rates of ~95% 
and ~10%, respectively. When detecting confidential sections in a non-
confidential document scenario, the fingerprint algorithm achieved a higher true 
positive score than the proposed technique, followed by the SVM (90%, 70%, and 
15%, respectively), all with ~5% false positives. It is clear that this system does 
not perform better than fingerprinting in terms of the detection rate in both 
scenarios. However, the authors claimed that the system addressed a new 
scenario: rephrasing small parts of a confidential text. It can be argued that other 
techniques had already investigated this particular aspect and managed to 
achieve a promising result, such as Shapira et al. (2013). 
Another study that tried to overcome the disadvantages of a regular expression 
method was conducted by Du et al. (2015). The study introduced an approach 
that extracts a limited number of critical semantic features and necessitates a 
small training set. The ultimate objective of this study was to determine whether 
a given file belonged to the same class as the training set. The proposed method 
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uses latent semantic analysis (LSA), which maps documents to a vector space 
with reduced dimensionality. For feature extraction, LSA uses singular value 
decomposition (SVD), which abstracts the semantics of training documents and 
uses an algorithm to calculate those features. Given a training set of documents, 
its term- frequency matrix A cab be can be written as A = [ai,j ] ∈ R m×n, where m 
is the number of terms, n is the number of documents and ai,j is the number of 
times term i occurs in document j. Given A, we use SVD to decompose the term-
frequency matrix into three matrices: 
𝐴 = 𝑈𝑆𝑉𝑇 
Where S = diag(σ1, ..., σ min(m,n)), σ 1 ≥ ... ≥ σ min(m,n)  is a rectangular diagonal 
matrix. Each diagonal element in S corresponds to a concept or a semantic 
feature, as shown in Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5: Singular value decomposition. Du et al. (2015) 
In their experiment, Du et al. (2015) used documents on different topics, each 
category containing between 16 and 118 documents. They achieved true positive 
rates of between 76.1% and 98.6% and false-positive rates of between 0.8% and 
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15.1% for all document sets. A possible pitfall of their study is that the document 
dataset size could be considered small since other studies in the same field have 
used many more documents. For instance, Katz et al. (2014) used more than 
6,000 documents to evaluate the performance of their proposed system. 
3.3.2 Data Loss Detection in Emails 
One of the most common data loss exit points is email. A considerable amount of 
research has been undertaken in detecting sensitive information sent by email 
messages, including email content inspection and behaviour-based analyses. 
For instance, Kalyan and Chandrasekaran (2007) proposed 17 variables as 
generic attributes that would encapsulate a sender’s intent. The attributes include 
time slot, attachment type and size, mail body size, type of action on the email 
message (e.g., reply, forward, etc.), number of email addresses sent to, and the 
messages sent. The system analyses the value of the input variables by using a 
machine learning algorithm, and both SVM and neural networks were used in the 
experiments. To perform binary classification sing SVM, given training data (xi, yi) 
for i = 1 ...N, with xi ∈ Rd and yi ∈ {−1, 1}, learn a classifier f (x) such that 
𝑓(𝑥𝑖) = {
 ≥ 0, 𝑦𝑖  = + 1
< 0, 𝑦𝑖  = − 1
 
i.e. yi  f(xi) > 0 for a correct classification. 
They evaluated their approach using a dataset that contained 554 emails, with 70 
emails marked as leaked messages. The authors did not provide information 
about the dataset and whether it was real or artificially created for the experiment 
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purpose. The results show that the high performance of this method was 
demonstrated by achieving an overall accuracy of 92%. 
Interestingly, the above results were obtained without performing any content 
inspection or relying on predefined keywords. However, a possible weakness of 
this approach is the necessity for user involvement in some of the stages. For 
instance, the system user must perform manual inspections to distinguish 
whether email messages are official or personal. Furthermore, the metric used 
for examining system performance can be strongly criticised, as accuracy is a 
vague metric for measuring the quality of such systems. Metrics such as true 
positives and false positives would more clearly demonstrate the performance of 
a method. Furthermore, the result cannot be compared with other studies in the 
same domain, since the source of the dataset is not defined. 
Along the same lines, Liu et al. (2014) introduced features that can distinctly 
describe the characteristics of misdirected emails while preserving users’ privacy. 
Misdirected emails are detected based on 22 features, none of which are content-
based attributes. The researchers employed a random forest classifier to detect 
misdirected emails. The system evaluation used the version of the Enron dataset 
compiled by (Shetty and Adibi., 2004). Since the Enron dataset does not contain 
what the authors call misdirected emails, sample misdirected emails were 
generated by Liu et al. (2014) for each email in the training set for experimental 
purposes. Overall system performance reached an average recall rate of 82% 
with a precision rate of 89%.  
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Although both Kalyan and Chandrasekaran (2007) and Liu et al. (2014) used 
machine learning techniques, together with a set of generic variables as inputs to 
the classifiers used, it is not possible to compare the performance of the two 
studies. Different datasets and evaluation metrics were used in each piece of 
research. 
A study by Manmadhan et al. (2014) used a naïve Bayes classifier to investigate 
the possibility of categorising sensitive emails effectively. Naive Bayes algorithm 
that uses conditional probability approach to classification is adopted 
(Manmadhan et al., 2014b). The system architecture design consists of three 
engines that work in sequence: the pre-processing engine performs data cleaning 
by removing stop words and stemming as shown in Figure 3.6. 




Figure 3.6: Architectural diagram (Manmadhan et al., 2014b) 
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The output of the pre-processing engine is then fed into the classification engine 
using a naïve Bayes algorithm; finally, the security enforcement engine evaluates 
whether the email exchange satisfies the security property by applying a lattice 
model (Denning, 1976). For detection, the system uses predefined keywords to 
classify the documents into previously defined categories. As with Liu et al. (2014), 
the experiment used the Enron email dataset. The authors achieved an overall 
accuracy of 72.4%. Furthermore, what makes the Manmadhan et al. (2014) 
approach different from that of both Liu et al. (2014) and Kalyan and 
Chandrasekaran (2007) is that it performs content inspection, whereas the other 
studies used behaviour-based approaches. 
Balinsky et al. (2011) attempted to overcome the loss of data via email by 
intercepting the corresponding application system calls. The general architecture 
of the framework is demonstrated in Figure 3.7. The system first automatically 
intercepts system calls, then performs a content inspection based on certain 
predefined keywords (e.g., “customer”, “agreement”, “contract”, etc.). After that, 
the system implements an appropriate policy based on the sensitivity level 
determined in the previous step. In contrast with other approaches which are 
limited to UNIX-based operating systems, this method works on Microsoft 
Windows operating systems, despite the complexity of intercepting its system 
calls. The policy framework used also covers a variety of leak points, such as 
peripheral devices, shared locations, and accidental email leakage.  




Figure 3.7: General architecture of a proposed framework (Balinsky, Perez and 
Simske, 2011) 
The experimental results show that the overall process rate was 40-130 MB/ms. 
However, the evaluation of the system is ambiguous, since there is no information 
on how the system performs in terms of other metrics, for instance, true positives, 
false positives rates, f-score, precision or recall. Moreover, it seems that this 
system does not detect data leakage when a confidential message is embedded 
in a cover file, such as a text file embedded in OOXML files using the unknown 
parts and relationship data-hiding approach introduced by Park et al. (2009). 
3.3.3 Biometrics and Human Behaviour   
Some recent studies, such as Lee et al. (2013) and Lee et al. (2014), have 
researched an interesting approach to preventing data leakage by measuring the 
change in an individual’s bioelectrical signals. Both studies tried to predict the 
intention of a data leak by analysing the change in the subject’s biometric pattern, 
regardless of the identity of the subject in question. The method proposed by Lee 
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et al. (2013) also undertakes a proactive detection technique to measure the 
average value of an insider's biometric signal, such as pulse and skin conduction 
and compares it with one stored in a dataset. If this value exceeds the standard 
signal value, the system assumes that this is a sign of intentional data leakage. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the method is arguable, since it is neither 
demonstrated nor explained how the technique assumes that the insider’s 
abnormal behaviour is related to data leakage. The researchers also presented 
the basic design structure of their technique without conducting an evaluation or 
demonstrating any pilot experiments.  
Later, Lee et al. (2014) published another study, in which they measured a 
subject’s vital signs, such as heart rate variability, core body temperature, and 
skin temperature, while the subject watched a horror movie. The experiment 
showed that there was a noticeable change in the heart rate (HR) of the test 
subject when a dreadful scene suddenly took place during the movie. Despite this 
change in HR, the proposed technique is strongly questionable since the authors 
failed to indicate how the method could be transferred and implemented in the 
field of DLD.  
Using another technique, Wu et al. (2013) investigated profiling a subject’s 
keystroke behaviour along with discovering the input of sensitive data 
simultaneously. The system first hooks into the keyboard API records all the 
user’s inputs and then eliminates irrelevant keystrokes and function keys, such 
as Enter, Backspace and Shift. The system then performs intensive analysis on 
the captured data and stores the results in a file that is compatible with the data 
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loss prevention (DLP) software (called Privacy ID) the authors used for a 
detection-free DLP solution that supports the Chinese language (AmXecure, 
2013). Since the system detects sensitive information as it is being written, this 
eliminates the need for decoding or parsing different file formats. In terms of 
identifying the user, the system collects the time cost of characters typed by the 
user. It then uses an SVM to create the typing model of that user. The concept 
behind the proposed DLP model matching is presented in Figure 3.8. 
 
Figure 3.8: Concept behind a proposed DLP model matching (Wu et al., 2013) 
The method of keystroke behaviour was able to score an average accuracy of 
~80%. Overall, the experiments conducted demonstrate that this system 
positively employs keystroke profiling for detecting data leakage and dynamically 
identifying malicious intent. The system also resolves the issue of parsing 
different file formats that are encountered in current commercial DLP systems, 
since it does not require file inspection or content analysis. However, confidential 
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data could be leaked without being detected by the system as easily as sending 
a document via email, since the proposed system only intercepts data input via 
the keyboard. The proposed method is also unable to detect a simple copy and 
paste action, a shortcoming that could be used to manipulate data and avoid 
detection by the system. Furthermore, the system only detects keywords 
predefined as sensitive, whereas an insider could easily rephrase or misspell the 
input phrases to evade detection. 
3.3.4 Distributed and Host-Based Solutions 
Designing and evaluating a practical, working DLP solution is not an easy task. It 
involves several techniques that are required to work together, intelligently to 
detect and prevent leakage attempts. For instance, Lee et al. (2009) proposed an 
agent-based distributed system designed in a way that it separates the powers 
and responsibilities between the system’s agents. The system consists of seven 
agents (as shown in Figure 3.9), three of which are installed on target hosts to 
perform tasks such as content inspection and watermarking.  
 
Figure 3.9: Agent classifications and hierarchy (Lee et al., 2009). 
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The other parts of the system are centrally managed to control the ones that are 
distributed. Image watermarking (Dugad’s algorithm) is used to embed 
permissions into the object content in a way that is ideally irremovable without 
rendering the file content (Dugad, Ratakonda and Ahuja, 1998). Dugad’s 
algorithm adds the watermark to the significant coefficients in the DWT and it 
does not require the original image for watermark detection is presented. 
 
Figure 3.10: Dugad’s image watermarking algorithm, the top part shows 
watermark casting and the bottom part shows watermark detection (Dugad, 
Ratakonda and Ahuja, 1998). 
The following equations are using for the watermarking casting: 
𝑉′𝑖 = 𝑉𝑖 + 𝛼 | 𝑉𝑖 | 𝑥𝑖 
Where 𝑖 runs overall DWT coefficients > T1 (barring the low pass component). 
𝑉denotes the corresponding DWT coefficient of the original image and 𝑉′ denotes 
the DWT coefficient of the watermarked image. 𝑥𝑖  is the watermark value at the 
position of 𝑉′. 𝑥𝑖 is generated from a uniform distribution of zero mean and unit 
variance. 𝛼 is taken as 0.2. 
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Where 𝑖  runs overall coefficients > T2 > T1 and M is the number of such 
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Despite the system’s scalability and architectural complexity of the proposed 
system by Lee et al. (2009), the experiments focused only on image files, whereas 
most data loss incidents occur in the form of documents. Moreover, the paper 
does not include an evaluation that shows the system’s performance. 
Nevertheless, the authors claim that the proposed system correctly identified all 
invalid watermark images and quarantined the modified ones. 
From distributed systems to host-based deployment aiming to detect inadvertent 
information leaks, both Kemerlis et al. (2010) and Ko et al. (2014) have presented 
end-user solutions that are capable of overcoming the limitations of controlling 
suspicious events. These systems are designed for personal use only, in contrast 
with Lee et al. (2009), who delivered a solution for enterprises. Kemerlis et al. 
(2010) developed a lightweight system, called iLeaks, which dynamically traces 
information retrieval services. It consists of three main components, as shown in 
Figure 3.11: Uaudits, Inspectors, and Trail Gateway. iLeaks does not require 
kernel modification to intercept the system calls concerned because it utilises 
existing mechanisms in OS X, such as DTrace and data indexing services. These 
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services facilitate the tracing of computer program and process execution, along 
with its interaction with OS system calls. The authors describe the iLeaks working 
process as follows: once the Uaudit captures events that indicate a leak, it 
forwards them to the Trail Gateway, which, in turn, invokes the corresponding 
Inspector to verify that the candidate trail is indeed sensitive information that 
leaked into the network (Kemerlis et al., 2010).  
 
Figure 3.11: iLeak prototype implementation (Kemerlis et al., 2010) 
For the purpose of monitoring, however, the system relies on a predefined set of 
documents that are manually defined by the system user. In other words, the user 
must tag sensitive documents as being of interest in order to be monitored by the 
Trail Gateway. 
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In contrast, Ko et al. (2014) gave the computer user full control of the data flow 
during transmission, even when there is no predefined rule. Further, the designed 
software notifies the user what data are leaving the system and requests a 
decision to allow or block the transmission. By intercepting specific system calls, 
for instance, sys_sendto: for sending a file in the Linux OS, the system can detect 
suspicious activities that occur in the background. However, performing this kind 
of interception requires kernel hardcoding, as explained in previous studies 
reviewed in this chapter. Indeed, such low-level modification of the operating 
system code is not always applicable. For instance, Microsoft Windows and Apple 
OS X are both closed systems, which means access to the kernel code is not 
possible. Ko et al. (2014) do not provide sufficient information about the 
evaluation of this system, as it appears to be simply a theoretical model.  
By trying to incorporate open-source data loss prevention systems, Koutsourelis 
and Katsikas (2014) developed a DLP system that takes advantage of two sets 
of free DLP software: MyDLP, (2014) and OpenDLP, (2014). The authors 
amalgamated a number of techniques in order to automate several operational 
processes that minimise user interaction with the system. Even with the many 
features that the system facilitates, it does not introduce any novel techniques or 
mechanisms that would help in detecting malicious data leakage. Instead, it 
merely employs existing methods. The study did not include any information 
regarding the performance evaluation of the developed system. 
One of the most challenging data leak methods was investigated by Fujikawa, 
Mori and Terada, (2014). The authors studied the possibility of detecting the body 
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motion of an individual who is performing photo shooting or video recording 
(camera holding) to leak sensitive information. The system requires a motion 
detection sensor, which is attached to the computer screen. First, the sensor 
obtains three-dimensional information of the user’s motion. Then, the system 
analyses the captured information to detect any camera holding. Finally, based 
on the detection result, if the system suspected a potentially malicious activity, 
the computer is locked and an alarm is triggered. 
The above evaluation demonstrates that this technique is able to identify attempts 
at computer screen shooting. It can also distinguish between a camera being held 
by one or both hands. However, the system requires certain conditions to perform 
well, such as the subject being in a stable position (sitting at a desk) during 
photo/video shooting. This operation can be disrupted when an insider takes a 
screenshot from a different angle, such as standing outside the scope of the 
motion sensor, which significantly reduces the chance of detection. However, 
digital cameras, and even smartphones, commonly feature deep zooming 
technology that enables the shooter to take a high-resolution photo or video at 
various distances from the object. 
3.3.5 Guilt Identification 
Various studies have examined the detection of the leakage of sensitive data by 
a distributor’s agents. Some of these studies have further investigated the 
possibility of identifying the agent that probably leaked the data (Papadimitriou 
and Garcia-Molina, 2011; Kale and Kulkarni, 2012; Jadhav, 2012; Chavan and 
Desai, 2013). It is important to mention that all these studies assume that the data 
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owner has full control over the data creation and distribution prior to their being 
given to the agents. One of the most cited studies in this field was conducted by 
Papadimitriou and Garcia-Molina (2011), who proposed an allocation strategy to 
increase the possibility of detecting leaked data. Furthermore, they introduced a 
model for assessing the ‘guilt’ of agents. The authors claimed that the proposed 
method does not rely on alterations to the released data, such as watermarking. 
This method considered two types of agent request, as presented in Figure 3.12: 
explicit and sample requests. An explicit request holds particular settings and all 
the items in the dataset that adhere to those settings must be returned. A sample 
request determines the number of objects to be randomly chosen from the entire 
dataset.  
 
Figure 3.12: Leakage problem instances (Papadimitriou and Garcia-Molina, 
2011) 
Moreover, to increase the chance of identifying the agent responsible for a leak, 
Papadimitriou and Garcia-Molina considered the feasibility of inserting fake 
objects into requested data. The idea was to add a unique object to the data prior 
to handing them to the agent. However, adding fake objects is not always possible; 
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for instance, in the case of medical records, manipulating the data or injecting 
invalid information could lead to enormous risk. Therefore, the method is based 
on the nature of the data and how the fake elements generated modify the 
integrity of the original data. Examination of the feasibility of the system found that 
the proposed algorithms performed better in identifying the source of the data 
leakage compared with simple data allocation algorithms. Papadimitriou 
conducted several experiments, achieving scores with an average confidence 
level of 95%. 
Subsequent implementations of the guilt model by Kale and Kulkarni (2012), 
Jadhav (2012), Chavan and Desai (2013), and Kumar et al. (2014) resulted in the 
development of several prototype models. All those models use the concept of 
inserting unique fake objects or digital watermarks into data prior to distribution. 
In general, the data creator (in this case the distributor) is responsible for 
generating and embedding the fake object, whereas, in many cases, the data can 
be created by an insider who leaks the sensitive data themselves. However, 
Jadhav (2012) admitted that the process of creating fake but real-looking objects 
is a complicated task and beyond the scope of that author’s study. 
3.3.6 Proactive Digital Forensics 
The last part of this literature review discusses studies that provide some 
proactive functionality for digital forensics. The studies selected touch on the 
problem of data leakage from a forensic perspective, and the problem of 
identifying users who manipulate the use of sensitive files. For example, Cohen 
et al. (2011) developed a live, remotely accessed forensic solution that uses the 
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web interface for administering hosts and instantly accessing running computers. 
It is designed to be a centralised controlling framework and to support multiple 
operating systems, including Windows, OSX and Linux. Rafique and Khan (2013) 
argued that requiring a client-server environment makes the system less 
applicable for standalone machines and represents a limitation in Cohen et al.’s 
framework. Despite Rafique and Khan’s argument, the proposed system 
facilitates a rich set of forensic analysis features, such as attributes related to an 
object (e.g., file memory location, accessed timestamp, AFF4 stream). 
Cohen et al. (2011) also investigated a leakage of intellectual property scenario 
in which restricted information had been leaked. The aim of the investigation was 
to identify people who had access to that information. The task was performed by 
searching for specific keywords across hosts that run the system’s agent, as the 
technique could determine a list of machines that had those keywords. Further 
investigation could then, as stated by the authors, successfully isolate users of 
interest. However, the scenario only leads to document allocation, without 
providing intelligence information that would inextricably link the use of the 
information to the individual who used and accessed it. 
Similarly, Magklaras et al. (2011) developed an audit engine for actively logging 
user actions in a relational database management system (RDBMS). The 
proposed system could be used by post-case forensic examiners to aid an 
incident investigation. It stores actions, including files accessed (e.g., name, type, 
and location), timestamps, process execution, network endpoint and hardware 
device, in addition to other related information. Furthermore, the engine employs 
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a linguistic analysis of users’ correspondence as a monitoring technique, thus 
proactively detecting potential insider threat risks in the organisation. It also 
facilitates the use of Structured Query Language (SQL), which enables instance 
selection and completion. This function allows investigators to enumerate 
databases and execute different types of enquiry. The system was tested on a 
variety of simulated insider misuse scenarios. Although the evaluation results are 
promising in terms of logging different types of user actions along with useful 
information, it still does not correlate those actions to the identity of the individual 
who performed them. 
The final paper in this review is by Shields et al. (2011), who proposed a system, 
called PROOFS, that proactively and continuously collects evidence by creating 
and storing file signatures that are deleted, edited, or copied within the computers 
in the local network. The system uses a centralised database to store the 
signatures of the objects generated, which provides significant information, such 
as user ID, object timestamp, and the type of event. For instance, in events such 
as file creation or deletion, the signature contains the fingerprint (the bit-vector 
fingerprint of the document), user identifier, file name, file path, a timestamp for 
the event, and a machine identifier. This is especially helpful when conducting a 
forensic activity. The fingerprints generated are equal to around 1% of the storage 
space of the original file, which is a significant reduction in the size of the object. 
The system supports text files, such as Microsoft Word documents (.docx) and 
portable document formats (PDFs). 
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Overall, when the documents were shrunk by 60% of their original text size, the 
system was able to achieve an average recall rate of 95%, with a precision rate 
of 85%, of relevant documents based on the fingerprints generated, as illustrated 
in Figure 3.13. The experiment used the Enron email dataset, and a cosine 
similarity measure to measure the match between the queried fingerprints and 
the inspected documents. For its deployment, the system requires patching the 
system kernel in order to intercept system calls. Unfortunately, this low-level 
kernel hardcoding is limited to open-source operating systems, as explained 
earlier.  
 
Figure 3.13: Enron automatic summarisation, matcher 60 (Shields, Frieder and 
Maloof, 2011) 




Academics have contributed to the field of DLD/P by proposing numerous 
methods and techniques to combat and reduce existing issues. A number of 
studies have investigated document classification to detect the existence of 
confidential information by clustering documents based on their similarities. 
Among those studies, fingerprint-based methods that use a cycling hashing 
approach attained a high performance compared with other classification 
algorithms, such as SVM, as examined by Katz et al. (2014). This is not surprising 
since fingerprinting is applied widely in different applications, such as plagiarism 
detection. However, fingerprint accuracy can be affected by text manipulation 
techniques when the confidential part of a text is rephrased and changed, which 
results in different versions in the training set. Other attempts have been made 
by researchers to detect data leaks via email by employing text and document 
classification, as examined in Liu et al. (2014) and Manmadhan et al. (2014), 
whereas both Kalyan and Chandrasekaran (2007) and Liu et al. (2014) proposed 
generic variables to detect the probability of data leakage. These methods were 
expected to generate a high rate of false positives, although the authors did not 
discuss this issue. 
Research employing data encryption or encoding techniques to preserve 
confidential data has focused upon preventing outsiders from reaching them, as 
investigated by Sobh (2013) and Prakash and Singaravel (2015), although insider 
threats have been considered the utmost security issue by many recent research 
studies (Shabtai, Asaf, Yuval Elovici 2012; Collins et al., 2013; Huth et al., 2013). 
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Encryption and access control significantly help prevent data from being leaked 
by untrustworthy subjects. However, the focus of such research is on protecting 
the confidentiality aspect of the data, rather than focusing on tracing the source 
of the leakage. Mainly when the case involves insiders who supposedly have 
legitimate access to highly sensitive information by providing their credentials, 
encryption and encoding mechanisms fail to control the intent of the subject. 
Consequently, a user could gain full control over the data and a malicious user 
could even use encryption schemes to bypass intrusion detection systems. 
Interestingly, studies such as those by Lee et al. (2013) and Wu et al. (2013) have 
tried to use biometric information as a factor in detecting the malicious activities 
of an insider. It is clear, however, that the experimental setup is rather 
controversial, and there is neither an indistinct, strong correlation between their 
hypotheses nor the actual implementation of the data field of DLD. In addition, 
linking the subject with leak incidents is not a simple task to achieve, even with 
methods such as the guilt identification model, as this model is designed precisely 
for a case in which a data distributor has given sensitive information to a group of 
supposedly trusted agents (Papadimitriou and Garcia-Molina 2011). Therefore, 
the distributor should have full control over the distribution process, which is not 
always possible; for instance, insiders could have a legitimate right to access 
confidential data without the need to request it. Similarly, studies using proactive 
forensic solutions that take into account the issue of DLD can potentially offer 
some functionalities for linking leakage incidents with the suspected user. 
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Regardless of whether the object is in the form of an image, document or email 
message, it appears from the studies as mentioned above that numerous 
investigations have been conducted on the detection and prevention of data 
leakage. However, no attempt has been made to investigate the possibility of 
linking an incident to a suspicious subject in a biometric manner. Digital forensic 
investigators could benefit from linking the identity of a digital object to an 
individual, as opposed to simply using an electronic record or a log that indicates 
a user interacted with the object in question (evidence). Indeed, this is a 
challenging task, as it is currently difficult for digital forensic professionals and 
investigators to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law that a specific 
human being used the particular identity of a digital subject at a particular time 
(Shavers, 2013; Brown, 2015; Vincze, 2016). Biometric techniques could provide 
such a link to correlate the user interaction with the used object, thus giving rise 
to relevant information that would help investigators to answer the question: “Who 
did the crime?” 
The next chapter conducts an investigation into a biometric-based null cipher 
technique using images, in which the object that has been interacted with is linked 
to the individual who accessed it. 
3.5 Conclusion 
As presented in this chapter, several methods and systems from different 
perspectives have been proposed for solving the problem of data leakage. Overall, 
it is challenging to compare the studies reviewed with each other adequately in 
terms of evaluation performance due to the variation between the studies, as the 
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authors used different metrics and datasets to present the results of their 
experiments. The outcomes of this review also exposed an absence of significant 
literature on the specific aspects of the topic of investigation of this research.  
The existing literature has largely failed to overcome the key problem of being 
able to associate a specific person with electronic evidence and, as a result, 
stolen credentials and the Trojan defence are two commonly cited defences. 
There is, therefore, an urgent requirement to develop a technique that can 
inextricably link the use of information (e.g., documents and emails) to the 
individuals who access it, rather than intermediate controls. The next chapter 
introduces a proposed approach, which leverages biometrics technology along 
with steganographic techniques to provide this link.  
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4 System Design and Use Cases 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes how the system components work to correlate a leakage 
incident with the person who is responsible along with potential attack vectors. As 
shown in Figure 4.1, Actors such as user, outsider and digital forensics 
investigators are involved within a given scenario within which use cases is 
descript to explain how the incident and system reacts systematically. 
 
Figure 4.1: Use Case Scenarios Structure and Logic 
The elements of Figure 4.1 above work together to describe the system 
functionality both under normal operation and under attack conditions. These 
elements are linked to the use cases to describe how the system operates in such 
different cases. 
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4.2 Description of Taxonomy 
To derive accurate scenarios and use cases, a system engineering approach has 
been used whereby actors have been derived and will be used throughout the 
use cases. Table 4.1 illustrates the main actors in the system. 
Table 4.1: Common Person-Class Actors 
ID Description 
P1 An Insider/user who works at the entity/company who owns that 
classified/secret data 
P2 An outsider who might receive a leaked data (e.g. document/image)  
P3 An investigator who can use the system to extract correlated suspect 
information  
 
In Table 4.2 are the three categories of data collected as Cyber-Trust deals with 
different categories of data. 
Table 4.2: Common Data-Class Actors 
ID Name Description 
D1 File data Reflects data related to digital objects (e.g. 
documents/images) such as file content data, 
fingerprint and hash digest. 
D2 Biometrics data Reflects computer data that is created during a 
biometric process. This includes samples, 
models, fingerprints, similarity scores and all 
verification or identification data 
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D3 Forensic data Reflects the collection, processing and storage 
of information that may contain evidentiary 
material 
 
Because it is necessary to link the elements to corresponding use cases, Table 
4.3 places current envisioned components into actor roles: 
Table 4.3: Common Asset-Class Actors 
ID Name Description 
A1 Biometrics engine Captures and extracts the user’s biometric 
samples and stores it in a database on the 
user’s computer 
A2 Imprinting engine Retrieves the object metadata and a recent 
biometric sample(s) from the biometric 
engine and perform the imprinting process 
A3 Biometrics centralised 
database 
Stores users’ biometrics (e.g.  extracted 
facial feature vector) 
A4 Interactions/logs 
centralised database 
Stores the generated imprints and 
individuals’ along with user-object 
interaction logs  
A5 Generic electronic 
device 
This includes computers, smartphone, USB 




Chapter 4- System Design and Use Cases 
73 
 
Table 4.4: Common Attack-Class Actors 




Reflects attacks in which a file type/extension is 





Reflects attacks in which a format/style of a 
document’s text is changed (e.g. change in font 




Reflects attacks in which file content is 
changed/modified (e.g. remove part(s) of the file, 
cropping an image…etc.) 
 
4.3 Main Scenarios 
To effectively develop the use cases, this chapter defines the main scenario, 
which then is detailed with the possible attack vector(s). The specific system 
functionality will then develop and shape the associated use cases, according to 
the main scenario, and describes how their system element will respond to the 
attack vectors described below. 
4.3.1 Leaking Classified Documents/Images  
This real scenario reflects a case in which an insider employee [P1] leaked a 
classified document [D1] to a reporter [P2] in the United States. Hale [P1] served 
as an enlisted airman in the United States Air Force after receiving intelligence 
and language training, Hale has been assigned to work in the National Security 
Agency (NSA) and deployed to Afghanistan as an intelligence analyst. According 
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to Hal’s active duty service and function for the NSA, Hale’s period in NGA, Hale 
held a leading Secret/Sensitive compartmented information security clearance 
and has been entrusted with access to classified national personal information 
[D1] Hale published six classified documents [D1] to a reporter [P2]. Each one of 
those six records [D1] was afterwards published by the reporter publicly (Stuev, 
2019). These leaked documents [D1] could be imprinted [UC3] with Hale 
biometric information [D2] using use case UC1 if the proposed system was 
deployed and operated in place. Hale owned a thumb drive [A5], which was 
analysed by a digital forensic investigator [P3], and it has been found out that it 
comprised a classified document [D1] that Hale had published in February 2014 
and had tried to delete [D3] in the thumb drive [A5] (Stuev, 2019). Use case [UC6], 
could be used to retrieve the imprinted suspect biometric information [D2] in which 
correlated and more information can be established and extracted. 
4.3.2 Leaking and Modifying Classified Documents/Images  
The following scenario includes leaking and modified a classified document [D1]. 
As Reality Winner [P1], a 25-year-old Air Force veteran and federal contractor 
sent journalists a top-secret NSA intelligence report [D1], which showed that the 
NSA had collected intelligence suggesting that Russian military intelligence had 
tried to gain access to states' electronic voting systems in 2016. The Intercept 
published [P2] a partially-redacted version of the report [T1, T2, T3] on June 5, 
2017 (Pressfreedomtracker.us, 2019). 
These two scenarios can be correlated with the isdentifed use cases and actors 
as shown in Figure 4.2. 





Figure 4.2: General file leak scenario including Use Cases and relevant Actors 
4.4 Use Cases 
The use cases presented in this section composed of the functional components 
of the system. The use case covers incidents, and the respective scenarios of 
each explained in the previous section. These use cases will be the stepping 
stone to produce in the system the architecture. In total, five use cases are 
identified in the table below. These use cases are explained in detail in section 
4.4.2. 
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Table 4.5: Use cases description 
UC ID Name 
UC1 Biometric feature vector generation 
UC2 File fingerprint generation  
UC3 Imprinting process  
UC4 Storing biometrics in database 
UC5 Storing file fingerprint in the database 
UC6 Post-incident biometric extraction process 
 
4.4.1 Use Cases-Actors Inter-Relationships 
The main actors of the use cases are defined in section 4.2 of this chapter, and 
they are detailed as primary or secondary actors across the use cases in section 
4.4.2 below. In addition, each use case details the inter-relations between the use 
cases to provide a meta-picture within each use case of the dependencies 
resulting between the components of the system. 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 
UC1 X  X  X 
UC2  X  X  
UC3 X X  X  
UC4 X  X   
UC5  X  X  
UC6 X  X X  
 
Figure 4.3: Use cases-actors inter-relationships 
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4.4.2 Use Case Detailed Specifications 
ID: UC1 
Name: Biometric feature vector generation use case 
Description: User [P1] facial image(s) [D2] is captured by fitted camera [A5] and 
the biometric engine [A1] processes the captured image(s) to generate a 
biometric feature vector [D2]. 
Primary Actor: [A1] biometric engine 
Supporting/Secondary actors: [A5] camera device and [P1] user 
Stakeholders  Interest  
[A1] biometric engine Process and generates user’s biometric vector  
[A5] camera device Captures user’s frontal facial view 
 
Frequency of use 
Every time the user uses the device (e.g. computer) 
 
Related use cases 
[UC4] stores biometrics in database 
 
Example 
A user [P1] is set in front of a computer screen which is fitted with a camera 
device [A5] and started interacting with computer files [D1]. The camera [A5] 
capture the user facial image and is sent to the biometric engine [A1]. The 
biometric engine analyses the captured image and generates feature vector 
[D2], which then stores in the biometric database [A3]. 





Step Actor Action description 
1 [P1] 
User starts using and interacting with computer files (e.g. 
document/image) 
2 [A5] A fitted camera device captures user facial image 
3 [A1] 
The biometric engine process the user’s captured image and 
extracts the biometric features vector 
4 [A3] 





Name: File fingerprint generation use case 
Description: When a user [P1] interacts with a computer file [D1], one or more 
fingerprints are generated by the imprinting engine [A2] to be used for 
establishing a correlation log. 
Primary Actor: [A2] Imprinting engine 
Supporting/Secondary actors: [D1] file data 
Stakeholders  Interest  
[A2] imprinting engine Process and generates files’ fingerprint(s) 
 
Frequency of use 
Every time the user interacts with a computer file (e.g. document/image) 
 
Related use cases 
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[UC5] stores file’s fingerprint data 
 
Example 
A user [P1] is interacting with computer files [D1]. The imprinting engine [A2] 
analyses the files and generates fingerprint/local sensitivity hashing digest [D2] 
which then stores in the fingerprint/logs database [A4]. 
 
Main Scenario 
Step Actor Action description 
1 [P1] 
User starts using and interacting with computer files (e.g. 
document/image) 
3 [A2] 
The imprinting engine analysis and process files and generates 
a fingerprint 
4 [A4] 




Name: Imprinting process use case 
Description: A computer user [P1] interacts with a computer file [D1], the 
imprinting engine uses the generated (one or more) fingerprints and biometric 
feature vector [D2] establishing a correlation log (i.e. imprint file). 
Primary Actor: [A2] Imprinting engine  
Supporting/Secondary actors: [A1] biometric engine 
Stakeholders  Interest  
[A2] imprinting engine Process and generates imprint file 




Frequency of use 
Every time the user interacts with a computer file (e.g. document/image) 
 
Related use cases 
[UC1] Biometric feature vector generation use case 
[UC2] File fingerprint generation use case 
 
Example 
A user [P1] is interacting with computer files [D1]. The imprinting engine [A2] 
generate an imprint file in which it uses one or more of the generated file 
fingerprints [D1] and user’s biometric feature vector [D2]. 
 
Main Scenario 
Step Actor Action description 
1 [P1] 
User starts using and interacting with computer files (e.g. 
document/image) 
3 [A2] 
generate an imprint file in which it uses one or more of the 
generated file fingerprints and user’s biometric feature vector 
4 [A4] 




Name: Storing biometrics in the database use case 
Description: When the biometric engine [A1] generates a biometric feature vector 
[D2], the system stores it in the biometrics database [A3]. 
Primary Actor: [A3] biometrics database 
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Supporting/Secondary actors: [A1] biometric engine 
Stakeholders  Interest  
System Stores the generated biometric data in the database 
 
Frequency of use 
Every time the user interacts with a computer file (e.g. document/image) 
 
Related use cases 
[UC1] Biometric feature vector generation use case 
 
Example 
A Biometric feature vector [D2] is generated by the biometric engine [A1]. The 
system stores the generated data in the biometrics database [A3]. 
 
Main Scenario 
Step Actor Action description 
1 [A1] 
A user biometric feature vector is generated by the biometric 
engine. 
2 [A3] 




Name: Storing files fingerprints in the database use case 
Description: When the imprinting engine [A2] generates a files fingerprints [D1], 
the system stores it in the fingerprints/logs database [A4]. 
Primary Actor: [A4] fingerprints/logs database 
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Supporting/Secondary actors: [A1] biometric engine 
Stakeholders  Interest  
System 
Stores the generated file fingerprints in fingerprints/ 
logs database 
 
Frequency of use 
Every time the imprint engine generates file fingerprints 
 
Related use cases 
[UC2] File fingerprint generation use case 
 
Example 
File fingerprints [D1] are generated by the imprinting engine [A2]. The system 
stores the generated fingerprints in the fingerprints/logs database [A4]. 
 
Main Scenario 
Step Actor Action description 
1 [A2] 
The imprinting engine analysis and process files and generates 
a fingerprint 
2 [A4] 




Name: Post-incident biometric extraction process 
Description: After a document [D1] is leaked and obtained by a digital forensic 
investigator [P3] for analysis, the document is processed and the correlated 
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imprint file is located by the system by analysing the forensic data [D3] and the 
relevant biometric feature vector [D2] is extracted. 
Primary Actor: System 
Supporting/Secondary actors: [A3] biometrics database, [A4] logs database 
Stakeholders  Interest  
System Analysis on the leaked document  
 
Frequency of use 
Every time a leaked document is analysed  
 
Related use cases 
[UC4] stores biometrics in database 
[UC5] stores file’s fingerprint data 
 
Example 
A classified document and an image file [D1] are leaked by an insider employee 
[P1] to a repository website (e.g. WikiLeaks) [P2], the document has been 
modified and its content is manipulated [T1, T2, T3] to remove any potential 
tracking/embedded data (e.g. watermarks/user-related data) that could lead to 
the source of the leakage. A digital forensic investigator obtained a copy of the 
leaked file [D1] and performed a forensic analysis to reveal who is responsible 
for the leak. The investigator began the analysis by generating a fingerprint of 
the file to be compared with the correlated imprint file by retrieving the logs from 
the database [A4] in which a correlation can be established and a biometric 
data [D2] can be located once there is a positive match. 
 
 




Step Actor Action description 
1 [P3] An investigator gets a copy of a leaked file 
2 [A2] File fingerprint is generated  
3 [A4] 
The generated fingerprint is compared with those stored in the 
fingerprint/logs database. 
4 System 
Once there is a match, the biometric information is 
reconstructed using the imprint file that is intact with the 
matched fingerprint/log. 
 
4.4.3 Legal, Ethical and Privacy Dimensions 
The impact on an individual´s privacy should always be assessed on a case-by-
case basis. The system capabilities and functions should be only activated by 
specific incidents that are more likely to correlate to suspicious activity. For 
example, a user is accessing a classified document, and at the same time there 
is a USB memory stick plugged into the computer, in such case, the relevant 
engines (biometrics and imprinting) should be activated by the system. 
Data subject´s rights are fully communicated to the users. Users should be able 
to understand the implications of the system, detailed data protection and privacy 
statement should be easily accessible, including information about which types 
of data is collected, for which time-period, who can access it. The storage and 
transmission of data collected must be safeguarded. For example, by using 
suitable integrity, encryption algorithms and safe network transmission protocol. 
It must be ensured, that only persons with the right authorisation can access 
information generated by the system, which might include personal data, 
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individual’s biometrics and performed activities (e.g. user interactions with 
computer files). The participation of external entities/parties to the system (e.g. 
digital forensic investigator) and their access rights must be elaborated 
accordingly, to minimise the possibility of false positives or the likelihood of 
access to a user´s data without the right authorisation. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter identifies system actors, use cases and a relevant scenario to define, 
investigate, and evaluate the system would react in normal operation. It is worth 
noting that the design of the use cases aims to provide scenarios to conceptually 
stress-test the proposed system, rather than act as an exhaustive validation set. 
Both use cases and actors are applicable across all the scenarios and described 
as part of the methodology that also introduces the system design in the following 
chapter. Chapter 5, explains the proposed system and its components and 
capabilities in more details.  
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5 Proactive Biometric Imprinting of Digital Objects 
This chapter introduces a proactive digital forensics biometric-based approach to 
the attribution of misuse via information leakage, using biometrics and 
steganography. Two main methods are discussed: null cipher and grille cipher 
imprinting techniques. The chapter concludes with the main research questions 
investigated experimentally in subsequent chapters. 
5.1 Introduction 
From the exploration of the existing insider misuse tracing techniques conducted 
in the previous chapter, a limited number of studies have tried to leverage soft 
biometric signals in detecting malicious insiders’ activities (Almehmadi and El-
Khatib, 2014; Lee et al., 2014; Hashem et al., 2015). Those studies proposed 
systems that employ the use of human bio-signals, such as 
electroencephalography and electrocardiogram, to detect insiders' malicious 
activities. For detection, they measure the difference in bio-signal deviations 
between normal and malicious activity phases. Although both systems deployed 
their approaches in real-life scenarios and achieved high detection accuracy, the 
experimental setups relied on users wearing a headset that continuously monitors 
bio-signals and a finger sensor to capture them. It is both unrealistic and un-user-
friendly to wear these sensors continuously in real life. None of the current 
literature has specifically sought to embed individuals’ physiological and 
behavioural biometric signals transparently into digital objects, such as images, 
other than one study that mentioned a grille cipher (Alruban et al., 2016).   
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5.2 Steganography and Transparent Biometrics 
Several studies successfully leveraged transparent biometric techniques for the 
purpose of user authentication, verification and profiling (Clarke, Karatzouni and 
Furnell, 2008; Saevanee et al., 2015; Al Abdulwahid et al., 2016; Al-Bayati et al., 
2018; Abed et al., 2019). Such techniques can also be utilised to acquire 
biometric signals from individuals transparently as they interact naturally with a 
computer system and then embed the captured signals within digital objects, such 
as documents, PDFs, emails and photographs. In this manner, the last individual 
to access a digital object will have their biometric information bound to it. 
Subsequent misuse of the information, through disclosure, for example, would 
enable a legitimate organisation to process the digital object, recover the 
biometric identifiers and identify the last employee who accessed it. The 
transparent acquisition of biometric information is key to the solution, as an 
employee will not knowingly provide samples in an intrusive manner (i.e., the 
system will never ask the employee to provide a fingerprint sample or look at a 
camera) (Clarke, 2011). Rather, the approach seeks to employ a range of 
biometric modalities and continuously acquire biometric samples in a frictionless 
manner while the user is interacting with the system; for example, facial 
recognition using a web camera while the user is responding to an email or surfing 
the Internet. A multimodal and transparent/frictionless approach significantly 
reduces the opportunity for forgery and circumvention. The frictionless nature of 
the biometric capture also means that no action is required on the part of the 
user—thereby removing any additional workload or effort. 
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This research proposes an approach that is designed to operate in one of two 
modes: centralised or decentralised. Whilst it is envisaged an organisation is 
likely to select one of the two modes, the approach is capable of simultaneously 
operating in both—with the organisation being able to select which types of digital 
object use for which approach. For example, a document classification scheme 
could be used, with lower classification approaches utilising a decentralised mode 
and more highly classified documents using a centralised approach. The two 
modes offer a different level of repudiation but also introduce additional 
overheads in terms of storage and processing of data. 
Conceptually, the centralised approach seeks to provide a mapping between a 
digital object and biometric identifiers, storing the mapping information alongside 
document identifiers in a centralised storage repository. When objects are 
recovered or analysed, the information stored in the repository is used to recover 
the biometric information which is subsequently used to identify the user. The key 
advantage of this approach is that the underlying digital object is not modified in 
any form. Whilst the nature of typical watermarking or steganography processes 
is not to modify the digital object in a manner that is noticeable, it does still modify 
the document and there may be situations in which this modification is not 
desirable. It also disassociates any biometric information from the digital object 
itself, thereby minimising any attacks against the biometric data. This approach 
allows larger volumes of information to be embedded, making it more suitable for 
digital objects that are smaller or when greater levels of information need to be 
embedded (i.e., multimodal biometric samples). It does, however, introduce the 
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need for a centralised repository, which will grow as users interact with objects 
and will thus require configuration and management.  
The decentralised approach seeks to overcome the need for centralised storage 
by embedding all the necessary information within the digital object itself. This 
will result in the modification of the object but only in a manner that is not visually 
noticeable. The organisation need only process the recovered object to obtain the 
biometric identifier and identify the user. The amount of biometric information that 
can be embedded is directly linked to the digital object, introducing a trade-off 
between embedding a uni biometric or multimodal biometric identifier.  
The key to this proposed solution is its ability to recover biometric identifiers 
successfully, even under significant modification attack. Rather than requiring the 
complete digital object, it is possible to recover the necessary information with 
only snippets of the original document. 
The following sections provide a detailed breakdown of the decentralised and 
centralised approaches using null-ciphered and grille-ciphered steganographic 
techniques, respectively. 
5.3 Null-Ciphered Imprinting Using Images 
The decentralised approach is a secure and portable method that can link 
individuals with an object with which they have interacted (e.g., digital images) 
without the need for a centralised database. The correlation between the 
computer user and the digital object is established by leveraging biometric signals 
in a transparent fashion, along with a steganographic technique for embedding it 
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into the object. Figure 5.1 illustrates the decentralised approach elements and the 
main process flow. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Decentralised process 
The embedding procedure, as illustrated in Figure 5.1, follows the following steps: 
1. Capturing and extracting the individual’s biometric information. 
2. Transferring the biometric signal and image into a byte stream and adding the 
required padding, flag and timestamp.  
3. Encrypting the payload. 
4. Selection and embedding of the encrypted data into the file. 
A detailed description of the embedding and extraction process is provided in 
Chapter 6. 
Figure 5.2 schematically represents an image file that shows image data c and 
flag data contained in two portions, a, b, which together form the flag and data to 
be embedded. On creating or handling file c, biometric information corresponding 
to the creator or handler of file c is processed by the computer in which file c is 
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created or handled to generate a digital biometric feature vector file. Data portions 
corresponding to parts of the digital biometric feature vector file are then 
distributed amongst and embedded within other data within flag portion a 
according to a key, and key data corresponding to the key is stored or embedded 
within header portion b. The key corresponds to locations within flag portion a 
where the data portions are embedded. In order to associate file c with the creator 
or handler of the file, the flag portions a, b are processed to reconstruct the digital 
biometric feature vector file. The reconstructed digital biometric feature vector file 
can then be compared with each set of examples in digital biometric feature vector 
files held in a database in order to identify the creator or handler of file c. When 
the digital biometric feature vector file of the creator or handler of file c is 
processed into flag portion a, it may at the same time be added to the database 
so that the database is dynamically updated. 
 
Figure 5.2: Null-ciphered image 
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The watermarking/steganographic process was specifically designed to counter 
file modification attacks, resulting in robust and reliable retrieval of biometric 
information. 
 
Figure 5.3: Embedding and extraction procedures used by the steganographic 
system 
To maintain the privacy of the biometric data, all data are encrypted prior to the 
watermarking process. Only a legitimate organisation will have the ability to 
process, identify, extract and biometrically identify an employee from an 
electronic file. 
The solution mitigates against the need to collect, decrypt and store large 
volumes of network, server and application logs and provides a lightweight 
approach that embeds the necessary information within the file itself. Apart from 
an organisation needing to store a copy of an individual’s biometric data securely 
against which future data can be compared, no other information or continuous 
centralised storage is necessary.  
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5.4 Grille-Ciphered Imprinting Using Images and Text Files 
The centralised approach consists of two engines: a biometric and an imprinting 
cipher engine. The biometrics engine transparently captures and extracts the 
user’s biometric samples and stores them in a temporary database on the user’s 
computer. The imprinting engine retrieves the object metadata and a recent 
biometric sample(s) from the biometric engine to be used in the imprinting 
process. Finally, the imprints generated are stored in a centralised database for 
later analysis when required. Figure 5.4 illustrates the framework architecture of 
the centralised approach. 
 
Figure 5.4: Centralised process 
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The most important process in the centralised approach is mapping the 
biometrics signal(s) with the object. A detailed description of the mapping process 
is given in chapter 7 and 8. 
Upon the detection of data leakage, the object (whether it be posted on a public 
website or captured by the network) can be analysed for its biometric imprint. The 
sample is extracted and then processed by a biometric system in order to 
determine the last user to interact with the object, as presented in Figure 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.5: Process of identifying an individual 
5.4.1 Digital Object Imprinting 
The imprinting process technique takes a digital object file, such as an image or 
text file, and processes it with a biometric feature vector file that corresponds to 
an individual to produce a series of digital imprint files that are kept in centralised 
storage. A given digital imprint file represents locations within the original 
electronic file, each of which corresponds to a respective portion of the biometric 
feature vector file. A given electronic file, which may be the original file or a 
modified version of it, is processed with each of the digital imprint files to generate 
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the respective reconstructed biometric feature vector file. The reconstructed 
biometric feature vector files are compared with the biometric feature vector files 
in storage to associate the individual with the given electronic file. The method 
allows a particular digital object file to be linked to an individual with greater 
certainty than is possible with the use of fake objects, watermarks or digital 
signatures, even if the file was created following substantial modification of the 
original electronic file. 
5.4.2 Correlation Chaining  
The proposed approach can also serve an application other than mitigating 
malicious insiders, such as by embedding a person’s biometric trait signal (e.g., 
facial or iris biometric information) into an image being captured by, for instance, 
a smartphone or computer webcam. This can also be extended to handle a 
chaining scenario, in which more than one individual’s biometric information can 
be linked and stored once they have interacted with a traced image. 
Figure 5.6 shows a schematic of an example application of how a null-ciphered 
approach can be applied to a smartphone scenario. The first person (A), has a 
smartphone (not shown), which stores the biometric information of the first person 
and updates it over time, such as daily, weekly or monthly. The biometric 
information includes one or more of the fingerprint characteristics captured during 
logging-in, voice characteristics captured during phone calls and/or the operation 
of the speech recognition functionality of the smartphone and facial 
characteristics (possibly including iris characteristics) captured with a rear-facing 
built-in digital camera in the smartphone. A biometric feature vector file (FV) for 
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the person A is generated and updated over time using the biometric information 
of the first person captured by the first person’s smartphone and the biometric 
feature vector file is stored on the first person’s smartphone.  
 
Figure 5.6: Example of linking multiple persons’ biometric information with an 
image 
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Person A creates an image file using a built-in forward-facing digital camera in 
the smartphone. Immediately after the image file is created, a biometric feature 
vector file is processed, together with the image file, as described above, to 
generate a set of digital imprint files which is stored in a central database. The 
digital imprint files are transmitted over a wireless network to the central database, 
which is maintained at a remote location. Person A then transmits the image file 
by email or MMS to the smartphone of a second person (B). The second person’s 
smartphone (not shown) captures biometric information from the second person 
and maintains a regularly updated biometric feature vector file on the second 
person’s smartphone using that biometric data. Person B opens the file but does 
not modify the image data of the image file. On opening the image file, the second 
person’s smartphone operates to process that person’s biometric feature vector 
file with the image file to produce a second set of digital imprint files, which is 
added to the central database. The second person then uses her smartphone to 
send the image file to the smartphone of a third person (C). 
The third person’s smartphone (not shown) operates to maintain a biometric 
feature vector file using the biometric information of the third person, captured by 
the third person’s smartphone. The third person opens the file and modifies the 
image data of the image file to produce a modified image file. The modified image 
file may, for example, be produced by cropping the image data, pixelating one or 
more parts of it, combining it with other image data, or by a combination of two or 
more such operations. The third person’s smartphone operates to process the 
biometric feature vector file with the modified image file to generate a third set of 
digital imprint files, which is added to the central database. The modified image 
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file is then subsequently transmitted by the third person to further recipients in 
turn whom each handle the modified image file (e.g., opening, closing, saving or 
transmitting the file), either with or without further modifying the image data of the 
file. 
The above steps result in an image file comprising image data related to those of 
file. The identities of individuals, such as A, B and C, who have handled and/or 
modified earlier versions of image file are identified by processing the image file 
with each of the digital imprint files held in the central database to generate a set 
of reconstructed biometric feature vector files from which the individuals (A, B, 
and C) can be identified. 
Starting from a given electronic file, the identity of someone who has handled the 
file (either with or without modifying the file’s image data) can be recovered by 
processing the electronic file with digital imprint files held in the central database 
to generate a set of reconstructed biometric feature vector files. 
The reconstructed biometric feature vector files may be processed with each of a 
set of example or candidate biometric feature vector files held in a separate 
database in order to identify individuals. That database can be compiled by 
adding digital biometric feature vector files to the database by transmitting them 
over the wireless network after the users’ smartphones generate them. 
5.5 Discussion 
The proposed system aims to facilitate a proactive approach to tracing digital 
object leakages by linking individuals’ biometric signals to the objects with which 
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they interact. On the other hand, the current approach to detecting insider 
misuse—as explored in chapter 3—involves a layering of security countermeasures 
that include comprehensive logging of servers (including authentication requests), 
which suffer when encryption is in place, proxy-based network decryption and the 
storage of network traffic, which are required to identify misuse, possibly over 
prolonged periods of time (Pilli, Joshi and Niyogi, 2010; Birk and Wegener, 2011; 
Khan et al., 2016). However, there are a number of approaches that utilise 
steganography and watermarking techniques to embed specific data that could 
point to the action generator (Chaabane, Charfeddine and Ben Amar, 2013; Macq, 
Alface and Montanola, 2015; Bouslimi and Coatrieux, 2016; Alruban et al, 2017). 
While conventional watermarking or steganographic processes do not modify the 
digital object in a noticeable manner, they nonetheless alter the document. There 
may be situations in which this modification is not desirable, for instance, when 
preserving the integrity of the object is crucial.  
In contrast, the approach proposed in this study seeks to provide a mapping 
technique between the digital object and biometric identifiers, storing the mapped 
information alongside object identifiers in a standalone and centralised storage 
repository. When the mapped (imprinted) objects are recovered or analysed, the 
information stored in the repository is used to recover the biometric information 
that is subsequently used to identify the user. The two key advantages of this 
approach are that it leverages transparent biometrics to establish the desired 
correlation between user and object and the underlying digital object is not 
modified in any way, in contrast with the aforementioned watermarking and logs-
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based studies. In addition, no explicit biometric information is stored, as only the 
correlation that points to locations within the imprinted object is preserved. 
As stated above, the proposed approach provides two main methods for 
attributing insider misuse by creating a correlation between individuals and the 
digital objects with which they have interacted. The novelty of these approaches 
can be summarised in the following points: 
 The system serves the frictionless capture of biometric identifiers, resulting 
in a usable yet secure approach to associating users with the digital 
objects with which they interact. 
 The multimodal design enables broad participation and mitigates against 
forgery and circumvention. 
 The centralised and decentralised approaches provide flexibility and 
differing levels of repudiation capability.  
 The system offers the capability to recover biometric identifiers under 
significant levels of modification attack. 
While the introduction of such a system has the foundations for providing such a 
link, several concerns and issues need to be considered and addressed before 
the ubiquitous adoption and effective operation of this system. Thus far, the 
following aspects require further consideration throughout the development 
phase. 
Privacy: since the proposed framework incorporates biometric recognition 
technologies, this involves the use of an individual’s characteristics. Those data 
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are considered personal and sensitive and this raises issues related to biometric 
security and privacy. For that reason, storing and transferring a subject’s 
biometrics must be achieved in a manner that minimises the threat to the 
interception and misuse of that information. 
Scalability: developing a system that continuously generates data and stores and 
transfers them to a central data server introduces several challenges. This 
includes traffic management and synchronisation where optimisation is needed. 
Storage: capturing, generating, and storing data raises technical and conceptual 
challenges. In particular, as the proposed system generates and collects more 
substantial amounts of data, this will require more investigation to enhance the 
system and adapt the storage issue. 
Attack vectors: several threats are faced by the proposed framework, which 
include object manipulation (most of which are discussed in the experimental 
chapters 6, 7 and 8). It is, therefore, necessary to proceed to investigate and 
identifying attack vectors and security concerns and subsequently consider 
mitigation techniques in order to counter any potentially significant threats, as well 
as to evaluate the robustness and efficiency of the proposed system against such 
threats.  
5.5.1 Research Questions Identified 
Having introduced a system for the proactive biometric imprinting of digital objects, 
this research needs to investigate further how efficient and robust the proposed 
system is in inextricably linking the use of information (evidence) to the individual 
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users who access and use it. The following research questions are examined and 
investigated in the following chapters: 
1. What is the feasibility of developing a biometric-based null-ciphered 
technique using digital images to better understand the robustness of 
hiding and successfully recovering biometric information under different 
levels of modification attacks to digital images? 
2. What is the feasibility of developing a biometric-based grille-ciphered 
technique using digital images to better understand the robustness of 
mapping and successfully recovering biometric information under different 
levels of modification attacks to digital images? 
3. What is the feasibility of developing a biometric-based grille-ciphered 
technique using digital documents to better understand the robustness of 
mapping and successfully recovering biometric information under different 
levels of modification attacks to digital documents? 
4. What are the potential limitations and challenges in deploying a system for 
the proactive biometric imprinting of digital objects? 
In order to investigate scientifically and answer the above questions, a set of 
extensive experiments were conducted to identify the strengths and limitations of 
the proposed approach.  
5.6 Conclusion 
The proposed system for the proactive biometric imprinting of digital objects is a 
novel digital forensic approach that would enable investigators to link the use of 
information (e.g., images, documents, and emails) inextricably to the individual 
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users who use and access it, through the use of steganography and transparent 
biometrics. The system utilises the computer hardware available (i.e., camera, 
keyboard, and mouse) to monitor an individual’s interactions transparently and 
continuously by utilising different biometric techniques. However, as raised in this 
chapter, several considerations need to be taken into account of the privacy, 
efficiency, and security aspects introduced by the proposed framework.  
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6 Investigation of a Biometric-Based Null Cipher Using 
Images 
This chapter investigates the feasibility of embedding individuals’ biometric 
information inside digital objects (i.e., images) by utilising a null-ciphered 
technique, such as the LSB. The chapter includes an evaluation of the approach 
developed by measuring the success rate of retrieving the embedded signals 
under different types of attacks, such as cropping part of the image using different 
ratios. The chapter concludes with discussion and conclusion sections that 
examine the findings, along with a comparison with the previous research, and 
then highlights the limitations identified in the proposed approach.  
6.1 Introduction 
As explored in chapter 3, the detection of insiders’ malicious activities is an 
important task. However, tracking and tracing such activities back to the source 
of the leakage are also key elements in preventing future incidents and seeking 
compensation. Linking the leaked data after they have been made public to the 
insiders concerned is not a simple task. Even if useful information were 
successfully mined from server and network logs, the sharing of authentication 
credentials and the Trojan defence are all too frequently used to mitigate the 
evidence. 
Biometrics is a mean of identifying people by making use of someone’s individual 
physical and behavioural characteristics, enabling a stronger association 
between the users and the IT system they are using (Ashbourn, 2015). Extending 
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the use of biometrics into transparent capture further enhances usability and 
security. Usability is enhanced as samples are captured without explicit or 
intrusive interaction with the user, merely capturing samples as the user regularly 
interacts with the system. Security is enhanced because, rather than having a 
single sample, the system is able to capture samples continuously from a range 
of biometric modalities, providing a far stronger approach than usual (Clarke, 
2011). This could include capturing someone’s facial image while that individual 
usually interacts with a computer, using, for example, the embedded web camera. 
Furthermore, multimodal transparent biometrics could be employed that would 
make circumvention and forgery that much more challenging (Ceccarelli et al., 
2015). More closely aligning users’ biometric information to the data with which 
they are interacting could lead to more reliable and timely attribution of activities. 
Therefore, the next section provides an investigation into a biometric-based null 
cipher using images. 
6.2 Methodological Approach 
This investigation proposes a secure and portable approach that can link 
individuals with the object with which they interacted (e.g., digital images) without 
the need for a centralised database that stores interaction logs or the presence 
of the original object. The correlation between the user and the digital object is 
established by leveraging biometric signals, such as distinctive facial features, 
transparently (so the user is neither inconvenienced nor aware when samples are 
captured, which will mitigate forgery) with a steganographic technique for 
embedding them into the object. It is essential to state that the proposed algorithm 
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is not intended to develop a new data-hiding technique but rather to investigate 
whether the biometric signal(s) can still be recovered after significant modification 
of the original digital object. 
The main components of the proposed approach are built around the capturing, 
processing and classification of biometric signals derived from built-in sensors 
within the computing technology that can be captured without explicit interaction 
by the user. The transparent, continuous and multimodal capture of biometric 
signals is a key method in mitigating against forgery (Clarke et al., 2017). As 
illustrated in Figure 5.1, the system elements and the main process flow form 
critical parts of the imprint process. The design of the embedding algorithm also 
takes into consideration the following aspects: the effectiveness of the system, 
the security of the biometric information, and robustness against potential attacks, 
such as cropping and modification of the image. The embedding procedure, as 
illustrated in Figure 5.3, follows the steps outlined below. 
6.2.1 Capturing an Individual’s Biometric Information 
An individual’s biometric signals are transparently and continuously captured 
while the user interacts with the object. For instance, when the user edits/writes 
a particular document, different biometric modalities could be used to profile the 
subject, including facial recognition and keystroke dynamics. A camera fitted in a 
computer can capture facial samples while the user is looking at the computer 
screen. In addition, keystroke dynamics can be used to identify individuals by the 
way they type, which can also be analysed and processed to provide a 
discriminative biometric signal. 
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6.2.2 Extracting a Biometric Signal 
The biometric signal is then extracted and forms the biometric feature vector(s). 
The size and number of dimensions of the vector vary—depending upon the 
algorithm that is used for detecting and extracting the signals for the given 
biometric modality. For instance, a typical facial feature vector used in this study 
is 60 digits long. 
6.2.3 Transferring the Biometric Signal and Image into Byte Streams 
For most spatial domain image steganography systems, the first step in the 
process is to transfer the representation of the data (that is to be embedded) along 
with the carrier into byte streams. Only those pixel bits selected are converted 
into a bit matrix and substituted with the payload data with respect to the 
steganographic algorithm used. 
6.2.4 Padding the Flag and the Timestamp 
In order to maximise the anonymity of the embedded data, a flag of 10 alphabet 
characters in length is randomly generated for each print and padded to the 
beginning of the signal to be used later as a lead for the extraction algorithm to 
identify the locations of the embedded data. The length of this generated token 
ensures high entropy, as no two prints could hold the same token. A timestamp 
in the Epoch time format (also known as POSIX time) is inserted after the padded 
characters (flag) to provide more intelligence information to the investigator, as it 
indicates when exactly the user interacted with the object that is being examined. 
In the recovery process, the flag bytes are then decrypted one by one, looking for 
ten consecutive alphabet characters (the flag). This helps to ensure the number 
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of spurious keys is zero and thus the information that follows is a viable timestamp 
and biometric feature vector.  
6.2.5 Choosing the Embedding Locations 
The number of times (prints) that the payload is injected into the image can be 
specified as a variable within the embedding algorithm. Hiding the tracing 
information in multiple locations increases the likelihood of finding the hidden data 
after the image is modified, for instance by cropping part of the image. Therefore, 
the coordinates of the pixels (xi, yi) are randomly selected by the embedding 
algorithm to specify where the payload is injected. 
6.2.6 Encrypting the Payload 
Prior to the embedding process, the data are encrypted using AES. AES is 
symmetric encryption and the encryption keys (Ki) are generated based upon a 
predefined master key. The keys are used to encrypt each print of the payload so 
that the inserted data are not alike, in contrast with a single key being used to 
encrypt all the prints. This ensures that the imprints (payloads) have a different 
pattern and detecting those data can be harder. If the same key is used to encrypt 
the data, the resulting ciphers will be identical; thus, finding those payloads is 
simply a matter of searching for identical values across the carrier object. 
6.2.7 Embedding the Encrypted Data into the Image 
The embedding function inserts the encrypted byte streams into the image. The 
maximum embedding capacity varies depending on the given image size, colour 
depth and steganography method. For instance, within true colour images, the 
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number of elements in the cover, n, is three times larger than those in greyscale 
images. 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the concept of how the bits in the original carrier are replaced 
when using the LSB method to hide data. Each bit in the payload is substituted 
for the LSB in the original data. 
 
Figure 6.1: Applying LSB using one least significant bit 
The resulting image conceals the biometric signal(s), flag and timestamp. A 
substantial advantage of this system is that the embedding process is entirely 
random, which makes predicting where the data are hidden highly challenging. 
To recover the embedded information, the extraction algorithm works in reverse 
when compared with the embedding algorithm. It takes the image in question and 
the decryption keys as inputs; the keys are the same as those used by the 
embedding algorithm to encrypt the payload. Since the location of the pixels in 
which the embedded data are located are selected randomly, the extraction 
process starts at the first pixel (0, 0) and continues until the last (xn, yn) (i.e., all 
possible locations). All the interesting bits are mapped out into a matrix of byte 
streams.  
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The following steps explain the process of extracting the embedded data from the 
examined object: 
1. Read the examined image. 
2. Find the hidden flag that indicates the location of the secret data. 
3. Continue the process until the message is fully extracted from the image. 
4. Split the extracted message into parts (flag and biometric signal). 
5. Use the encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext to find the original 
information. 
6. Reconstruct the biometric and supplemental information. 
The bytes are then decrypted one by one, looking for 10 consecutive alphabet 
characters (the flag). Once the flag has been found, the 70 bytes (131 bytes when 
two biometric signals were embedded) next to the flag are written out in plaintext 
format, which illustrates the embedded payload that contains the timestamp as 
well as the biometric signal(s).  
6.3 Experimental Analysis 
This research aims to investigate and better understand the nature of hiding and 
successfully recovering biometric information under different levels of 
modification attack to the digital object in a way that could lead to the individual 
who interacted with the digital files (images in this experiment). In order to achieve 
this, a real facial biometric vector was captured for one individual using a 
developed script while the individual was interacting naturally with the computer. 
Two variations of the payloads were examined. The first variation consists of only 
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a single biometric feature vector (facial biometric) along with the flag and 
timestamp. The Fisherface algorithm was used to generate the feature vectors 
for the facial images captured from the user (Belhumeur, Hespanha and 
Kriegman, 1997). Fisherface projects the image set to a lower-dimensional space 
so that the resulting within-class scatter matrix SW is non-singular. This is 
achieved by using PCA to reduce the dimension of the feature space to N - c, and 
then applying the standard Fisher’s Linear Discriminant (FLD) to reduce the 




















Where 𝑆𝐵the between-class scatter matrix is be defined as: 
𝑆𝐵 =  ∑ 𝑁𝑖
𝑐
𝑖=1
 (µ𝑖 −  µ)(µ𝑖 −  µ)
𝑇 
Where 𝑆𝑤the within-class scatter matrix is be defined as: 
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Where mi is the mean image of class 𝑋𝑖 , and 𝑁𝑖 is the number of samples in 
class 𝑋𝑖. 
The optimization for 𝑊 𝑝𝑐𝑎  is performed over n × (N - c) matrices with 
orthonormal columns, while the optimization for 𝑊 𝑓𝑙𝑑 is performed over (N - c) 
× m matrices with orthonormal columns. In 𝑊 𝑝𝑐𝑎 , the smallest c - 1 principal 
component is ignored.  
The resulting vector is four-dimensional and 60 digits long (zeros are padded to 
the beginning of a vector whenever it has fewer than 60 digits). The cipher stream 
of the payload is 80 bytes long. The second variation combines two biometric 
signals (e.g., facial and keystrokes) and, along with the flag and timestamp, is 
141 bytes. The Lena picture (a standard test image widely used in the field of 
image processing) was used as the test image in this study. 
The minimum pixel size needed to carry out at least one imprint of a single 
biometric modality is 214 pixels for RGB images and 1,128 pixels for greyscale 
images when the LSB approach is used for embedding. To determine the 
maximum number of prints that a test image can accommodate, when only the 
LSB per colour is substituted, the total number of LSBs of the given image is 
divided by the size of the payload (in bits). 
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Table 6.1 shows the maximum number of prints (times) that the payload can be 
embedded in the test image for the various image sizes. 




Max. number of prints using all available LSBs 
Single bio-signal Two bio-signals 
256x256 307 174 
512x512 1,220 696 
1,024x1,024 4,880 2,784 
2,048x2,048 19,520 11,136 
By using this steganographic approach, in which the biometric signals are directly 
inserted into the image, the quality of the original object changes depending upon 
the size of the embedded data. Therefore, to measure the error rate and noise 
introduced by the embedding algorithm, both the mean squared error (MSE) and 
peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) are calculated. MSE is a metric that estimates 
the quality of the modified image compared with its reference (original) based on 
the squared difference between the two. The MSE value for the original image (x) 
and the modified version (y) is computed using Equation 3: 




∑ (𝑥𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖)
2𝑛
𝑖=1
   Equation 3 
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The MSE is used to compute the PSNR using a logarithm (dB, as shown in 
Equation 4: 
Equation 4: Peak signal-to-noise ratio 
𝑃𝑆𝑁𝑅 = 10 𝑙𝑜𝑔10
𝐿2
𝑀𝑆𝐸
   Equation 4 
Where L represents the dynamic range of possible image pixel intensities. For 
instance, for images that have allocations of 8 bits per pixel of greyscale, L is 
computed by 256 − 1 = 255. Figure 6.2 illustrates the effect of embedding 
payloads into an image (512x512 pixels) measured by MSE and PSNR. It is 
generally known and expected that, as the size of the embedding data increases 
(the number of prints in this case), the error rate and noise introduced to the image 
will also rise.  
 
Figure 6.2: MSE1 and PSNR1: single biometric signal per print; MSE2 and 
PSNR2: two biometric signals per print 
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The watermarked images are then randomly cropped—to ensure that the result is 
more generalised—by 25%, 50% and 75% of their original size (as Figure 6.3 
illustrates). The cropping attack simulates a case in which only part of an 
imprinted image is available for examination. Such an attack could be performed 






Figure 6.3: Cropped versions of the test image 
Figure 6.4 illustrates the number of recovered prints under the three cropping 
ratios (25%, 50% and 75%), along with the different number of embedded prints 
per image. It is clear that, as the size of the examined watermarked image 
increases, the number of prints being extracted also rises. The result for the single 
biometric signal per print experiment shows that even with only 25% of the 
watermarked image, it is still possible to retrieve and recover the embedded data 
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successfully by searching for the encrypted flag. Therefore, the number of 
recovered prints is significantly correlated with the number of embedded prints, 
as well as the type of modification being performed on the image.  
Figure 6.4: Number of prints extracted for a single biometric signal per print 
Furthermore, two biometric signals per print were experimentally examined to 
investigate whether the length of the embedded data could affect the number of 
recovered prints. Figure 6.5 demonstrates the number of recovered prints when 
the watermarked image is cropped by 75%. 




Figure 6.5: Number of extracted prints for two biometric signals per print 
By comparing the results obtained with the experiment above, it is notable that 
the number of recovered prints has dropped significantly due to the increase in 
payload size. The size of the payload that contains two signals is 141 bytes (1,128 
bits), which requires 376 pixels to accommodate (when 1 bit per colour is 
substituted). Whereas, the payload that contains a single biometric signal is 80 
bytes long, which uses 214 pixels of the watermarked image. The difference 
between the two variations is ~76% in terms of size. Therefore, due to this 
difference, cropping a watermarked image that carries two signals per print by 
less than 75% (i.e., 50% or 25%) is highly likely to render extracting the 
embedded prints unfeasible. However, it is still possible to retrieve at least one 
signal, which is sufficient for the ultimate aim (i.e., having a biometric signal that 
could indicate a particular individual). 




Figure 6.6: Correlation between the number of signals per print, size of the 
image and the likelihood of recovery 
To further demonstrate the correlation between the number of signals per print/ 
payload, size of the image and the likelihood of the successful recovery of the 
embedded data, Figure 6.6 shows that the correlation between those variables is 
a direct relation. The colour indicates the recovery likelihood: dark red expresses 
a low chance and dark green implies a high chance of recovery. The circles 
represent the number of signals per print/payload. From this data, it can be seen 
that, as the size of the image increases, the number of signals per print also rises, 
as does the likelihood of recovering the embedded prints.  
6.4 Discussion 
From the results obtained, it is clear that the use of the LSB approach, especially 
under a modification attack (i.e., cropping the image), enables the embedding and 
recovery of biometric information. Although embedding the payload directly into 
the image when using the null cipher approach introduces noise to the object, it 
does not require the original image to be present or the existence of a database 
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to store metadata or signatures. Whereas, a grille cipher stores the generated 
digital imprint file in a centralised database. This file represents the locations 
within the object, each of which corresponds to a respective portion of the 
extracted biometric features. 
That said, some several limitations and challenges exist and require further 
research, these include:  
 The placement of the bits to be embedded could be randomised using a random 
function (e.g., scattering) so that it would be almost impossible to retrieve the 
embedded data without knowing the seed for the random function. Although 
this is a useful approach, it only works if the image has not been modified or 
cropped after the data were embedded. 
 Using the LSB for inserting the payload is vulnerable to file type transformation. 
For instance, transforming the resulting image (e.g., PNG) into other formats 
(e.g., JPEG) is highly likely to destroy the embedded data by using the 
compression algorithm.  
 The proposed algorithm uses a conventional spatial technique (LSB substitution) 
that embeds the data directly in the intensity of the pixels. In other 
steganographic approaches, such as frequency techniques, the images are first 
transformed into an intermediate image and then the data are embedded in the 
image. A common method in the frequency domain is to modify the relative size 
of two or more DCT coefficients in an image block, embedding one bit of 
information in each block. The algorithm should be robust against JPEG 
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compression, so DCT coefficients with equal quantisation values should be 
chosen, in accordance with the JPEG quantisation table (Soria-Lorente and 
Berres, 2017). 
Further investigation and experimentation are needed into attacks targeting LSB 
techniques, such as the Chi-square and the extended Chi-square attacks, and 
the Zhang and Ping Method, which targets the Jsteg-like algorithm (Fridrich, 
2004). This study has focused only upon the image file type and differing file types 
have varying degrees of stability due to their structure. For example, Word 
documents and their underlying data structure can change considerably, given 
small alterations to a file. Therefore, alternative approaches need to be developed 
to overcome this issue. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the feasibility of embedding an individual’s biometric 
signals into image files by utilising a null-ciphered technique, the LSB 
steganography approach. The proposed algorithm takes the biometric signals as 
a feature vector along with the supplementary information (flag and timestamp) 
and embeds them into the interacted image after the payload is encrypted. The 
experimental results have shown that it is possible to retrieve the biometric 
signals successfully even when the image is cropped to 25% of its original.  
The results obtained are robust against many of the scenarios examined, and the 
nature of conventional watermarking and null cipher-based processes is not to 
modify the digital object in a manner that is noticeable. It does, nonetheless, 
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modify the digital object. There may be situations in which this modification is not 
desirable; for instance, when preserving the integrity of the object is crucial, as is 
the case in a digital forensic investigation. Directly performing modifications to the 
object, beyond the computer user’s awareness, would change the integrity of the 
file. Hence, this type of evidence of a crime would not be accepted in a court of 
law. The next chapter proposes a novel approach that does not directly modify or 
change the examined object and preserves its integrity. Instead, it generates a 
correlation file and stores it in a local database to be used later when needed. 
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7 Investigation into a Biometric-Based Grille Cipher Using 
Images 
This chapter presents an investigation into a biometric-based grille cipher using 
images by linking a subject (i.e., computer user) with an object of interest (e.g., 
image) and using the individual’s biometric sample, such as a facial biometric, 
without modifying the object being imprinted. The chapter begins by introducing 
the proposed approach, including the core process, followed by an explanation of 
the experimental methodology of using different types of attack vectors to 
evaluate the robustness of the proposed method. The experimental results are 
then presented, followed by a discussion of the findings and the limitations 
identified from the experimental analysis. 
7.1 Introduction 
Unlike most existing methods, such as digital watermarking or null ciphers, in 
which the integrity of the object is modified (Charbonneau and Simon, 2014; 
Nelson and Xie, 2014), a generic grille cipher approach employs a template that 
is used to cover the carrier message; the words that appear in the openings of 
the template are the hidden message. Unfortunately, designing a cipher scheme 
that satisfies all the constraints remains a difficult problem. The approach 
proposed in this chapter ‘imprints’ the object with any given data (i.e., the user’s 
biometric feature vector). Therefore, the imprinting process employed can be 
described as a correlation of the feature vector with the object.  
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7.2 Methodological Approach 
The proposed framework consists of two engines: a biometric engine and a grille 
cipher engine. The biometric engine transparently captures and extracts the 
user’s biometric samples (e.g., facial features, keystroke analysis, behavioural 
profiling) and stores them in a database on the user’s computer. The grille cipher 
engine retrieves the object metadata and its hexadecimal (hex) representations 
and requests the latest user’s biometric feature vector from the biometric engine 
for use in the imprinting process. Finally, the imprints generated are stored in a 
centralised database for later analysis when required. Figure. 7.1 illustrates the 
framework architecture for the proactive biometric-enabled forensic imprinting 
system. Upon detection of data leakage, the object (whether it is posted on a 
public website or captured by the network) can be analysed for the biometric 
imprint.  




Figure. 7.1: The proposed framework architecture 
The sample is extracted and then processed by a biometric system in order to 
determine the last user to interact with the object. The generation process of the 
imprints is inspired by the benefits of employing the grille cipher technique. Grille 
ciphers were used in the past (prior to the modern null cipher) as a means of 
transferring/exchanging secret messages between two parties. They were initially 
used to extract hidden messages from a plain text by mapping the text through a 
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extracted from a letter puzzle by applying a piece of cardboard with appropriate 
apertures that map the desired locations of the letters, as Figure 7.2 illustrates.  
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Figure 7.2: Grille cipher mapping example 
The embedded secret message can be retrieved by mapping specific locations. 
Hence, applying the same technique to imprint a biometric feature vector to an 
object file is possible, as the object can be an image file, document, video, or any 
other digital file type. Adapting the grille cipher technique to the proposed 
approach involves several consecutive steps, which are described below. 
7.2.1 Preparation of the Feature Vector and Object 
The preparation step converts both the feature vector and object into their hex 
representations for mapping purposes. The index of each character is preserved 
during this conversion, which begins with zero for the first character and continues 
in ascending order until the last. The process of conversion is not necessarily 
achieved by transforming each character, since reading the whole object in binary 
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mode allows for low-level representations of both hex and binary. Character-by-
character (or byte-by-byte) indexing is still required in order to generate the object 
index list. 
7.2.2 Mapping the Feature Vector to the Object 
After obtaining the hex representations of the feature vector and the object, each 
hex value in the feature vector is mapped to its equivalent position in the object’s 
hexes to retrieve possible positions where they both match. Accordingly, the 
mapping process returns lists of indexes of the matched hexes. 
7.2.3 Generating the Feature Vector Imprints 
By retrieving the positions of each character of the feature vector with the object, 
it is now possible to generate imprints based on the list of indexes, which means 
that multiple imprints of the whole feature vector can be generated by combining 
those positions. 
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The pseudocode of the imprinting process, starting from the preparation is 
illustrated below in Algorithm 1. 
Algorithm 1: Imprinting algorithm 
Input: Feature Vector (FV), Object (O) 
Output: Imprints 
1: function PREP (FV, O) 
2:            for each value in FV & O: 
3:                      Convert FV, O into its HEX representations 
4:                      Retrieve the index of each value 
5:            Return FVHEX, index, OHEX, index 
6: function MAPPING (FVHEX, index, OHEX, index) 
7:           for each value in FVHEX, OHEX: 
8:                                 index (Oindex) ← FVHEX  ⋂ OHEX 
9:                 Return index (Oindex) 
10: function IMPRINTING (indexes ) 
11:            imprint ← Combine unique indexes from the 
12:            retrieved index list 
13:            Return imprints 
 
The following example explains how the imprinting algorithm works in practice. 
For demonstration purposes, assume that the following feature vector needs to 
be mapped to an object, as presented in Figure 7.3.  




Figure 7.3: Feature vector and an object 
  FV 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 𝐇𝐞𝐱(𝐅𝐕) 30 31 32 33 34 35 
 𝐇𝐞𝐱(𝐅𝐕)𝐢𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐱 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
O 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 
𝐇𝐞𝐱(𝐎) 30 31 32 33 34 35 30 31 32 33 34 35 30 31 32 33 34 35 
𝐇𝐞𝐱(𝐎)𝐢𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐱 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Figure 7.4: Hex representation of the feature vector and the object 
The process occurs regardless of the file type of the object since any file type can 
be transformed and treated as a hex representation. The first step in the proposed 
algorithm is to convert both the feature vector and the object into their hex 
representations. In accordance with the ASCII table, Figure 7.4 shows the 
converted characters as the hex alongside the position of each value (index). In 
this example, each value of the feature vector exists in more than one location 
within the object. For example, “30” (the hex representation of zero) is located in 
positions 0, 6, and 12 (as show in Table 7.1). In the same manner, the mapping 
process continues for all subsequent feature vector values until all possible 
positions are retrieved. In addition, the column titled “positions in the object” 
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Table 7.1: Feature vector value positions in the object 
Original value Hex representation Positions in the object 
0 30 0, 6, 12 
1 31 1, 7, 13 
2 32 2, 8, 14 
3 33 3, 9, 15 
4 34 4, 10, 16 
5 35 5, 11, 17 
 
The last step in this example is to generate all possible imprints from the positions 
retrieved. Since each feature vector value is located in three different locations, 
the total number of unique imprints that can be generated from these positions is 
three, as illustrated in Table 7.2. Therefore, using any value for these imprints, it 
is possible to reconstruct the original feature vector from the object by reversing 
the mapping process. After explaining how the imprinting technique works 
through the example given, the next section investigates the feasibility of 
imprinting biometric feature vectors with images and later recovering them (even 
after object modification).  
Table 7.2: Possible imprints 
Imprint number Imprint 
1 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
2 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
3 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 
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7.3 Experimental Methodology 
The primary goal of the experiment is to assess the feasibility of the proposed 
hypothesis of the subject’s feature vector being forensically linked to and retrieved 
from an object of interest. Therefore, it is critical to evaluate its performance in a 
sophisticated, subject-related manner. A total of four experiments were 
conducted: 
 The first experiment retrieved the feature vector from the original imprinted 
image. 
 The second experiment examined a situation in which the image is modified 
in one area with an increasing proportion of modification. 
 The third experiment verified the case in which an image is modified in 
several areas.  
 The final experiment investigated what happens when only parts of the 
original image are available and the rest is missing. 
The feature vector used in the experiments represented a real facial feature 
vector sample with a length of 57 numeric characters, as illustrated in Figure 7.5. 
The length of the vector relies upon the feature extraction algorithm used to 
compute the feature vector. In this study, the Fisherface algorithm was used to 
compute the feature vector for the captured user’s facial images (Belhumeur, 
Hespanha and Kriegman, 1997). The algorithm also performs PCA and LDA for 
dimensionality reduction (Yu and Yang, 2001).  




Figure 7.5: Facial feature vector 
With regard to the objects used in the experiments, UCID image dataset version 
2 was used (Schaefer and Stich, 2003). The database contains a total of 1,300 
images of two sizes: 1,234 x 1,858 or 1,858 x 1,234 width, height in pixels. For 
this study, only the first 100 images were used from the dataset, since it was 
assumed that this number would be enough for the purpose of evaluation. The 
implementation of the proposed algorithm was developed in Python due to its 
flexibility in terms of list comprehension and image processing. Moreover, 
Python’s built-in library has several useful functions, such as map and zip, which 
facilitate a number of relevant operations.  
7.3.1 Retrieving the Feature Vector from the Original Imprinted Image 
The aim of this experiment was to imprint the feature vector as many times as 
possible with each image in the dataset. The first experiment examined the 
possibility of generating imprints between the feature vector and the object used. 
Since there is a high probability that the subject or another party (intentionally or 
unintentionally) could somehow modify the object in question after it is imprinted, 
the subsequent experiments investigated the accuracy of retrieving the feature 
vector from the object in several situations.  
[1679.2235398, -1555.40390834, -1140.07728186, -1999.85500108] 
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7.3.2 Modification in One Area 
The second experiment evaluated the imprinting mechanism after the image was 
modified by a different percentage. The simulation of this was performed by 
randomly choosing a section of the image as a rectangular box of a growing size 
to reflect an increasing proportion of modification. Equation 5 was used to 
determine the size and random position of the modified section. The equation 
takes the following three variables: 
 w: image width; 
 l: image height; 
 s: the desired modification percentage. 
The equation gives four values: x and y are random values between zero (image 
width) and zero (image height), respectively. These set the top-left pixel position 
of the modified rectangle (as highlighted in red in Figure 7.6); the third and fourth 
values are for the bottom-right corner of the rectangle (shown in blue). 
Equation 5: Modification size 












                     
 




Figure 7.6: Sample of a modified area of an image 
In this experiment, the imprinted images were modified by 5% increments, which 
means that the first alteration rate was 5%, then 10%, 15% and so forth until 
reaching 100%. Figure 7.7 demonstrates samples of an image modified by 
different rates. The (a) image is modified by 5% of its original size and the other 
three samples (b, c and d) are modified at rates of 35%, 65%, and 95%, 
respectively. 
  





(a) 5% (b) 35% 
  
(c) 65% (d) 95% 
Figure 7.7: Sample of a modified part of an image 
7.3.3 Modification in Multiple Areas 
The third experiment was similar to the previous one, except that the 
modifications occurred in several parts of the image instead of an increasing 
proportion of one area. This type of attack is more influential since various and 
random parts of an image are affected by these alterations. In order to simulate 
this type of modification, the dataset images were altered using multiple 
rectangular boxes, each of which was equal to 1% of the total image size. 
Therefore, simulating a 5% alteration of random locations would need five of 
these boxes in an image. This experiment also assessed the proposed technique 
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with object alteration in 5% increments of the original size. Figure 7.8 illustrates 






Figure 7.8: Sample of a modified area of an image 
7.3.4 Partial Image 
Further investigation was needed to better understand the effects of different 
attack vectors on retrieving the imprinted feature vector. Therefore, the last 
experiment presented in this chapter is interesting in terms of the results obtained. 
The fourth experiment simulated a scenario in which only part of the imprinted 
image was available and the rest was missing; for instance, the imprinted image 
might have been resized or cropped. To simulate this type of alteration, a random 
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section of the images in the dataset was cropped to different sizes, starting from 
5% of the original size; then, in each subsequent test, random sections were 









Figure 7.9: Samples of an image cropped to certain percentages 
7.4 Experimental Analysis 
The results of experiment one show that the average number of generated 
imprints was 854 per image. The minimum number of imprints in a single image 
was 244 and the maximum 1,815. This suggests that the mapped feature vector 
could be retrieved and reconstructed from any of the imprints. The number of 
imprints achieved is not surprising since the feature vector always contains 
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numerical values (0-9). Therefore, there are many matches between the feature 
vector and the hex values of the images. A reconstruction of the feature vector 
from the unmodified images was also possible using those generated imprints 
with an accuracy of 100%. This was achieved by reversing the imprinting 
processes. 
In the second experiment, it was found that the imprinting technique was effective 
since the imprinted feature vector was successfully retrieved from an average of 
97 out of 100 images, even when the modification percentage was 80%, as Figure 
7.10 illustrates. On average, it takes around 3 milliseconds to generate an imprint 
(with an average size of imprints of 472 bytes). However, after a modification of 
80% to the images, the number of valid retrieved feature vectors significantly 
drops due to the loss of most of the imprint values across those images. It can be 
seen that there is a fluctuation in the percentage of retrieved feature vectors while 
the modification rate increases. It worths to mention that if at least one imprint per 
image is successfully retrieved (with a minimum number of imprints in a single 
image was 244 and the maximum 1,815), the result is counted valid. Now, the 
fluctuation in the result has occurred as the nature of these imprints are scattered 
among the image, and due to the randomness of the attack (modifying part of the 
image in random locations), this could change the values of the mapped 
offsets/indices while in another rate of modification, although it is still restoring 
those mapped imprints, some of which are not affected. While after a massive 
amount of change, a decline occurs because the critical set of mapped index 
values changes after such a high modification rate. However, it was clearly 
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illustrated that it is feasible to reconstruct the feature vector from the imprinted 
objects even after significant destruction of its original values.  
 
Figure 7.10: One area modification attack 
In the third experiment, in which the modification took place in multiple areas, the 
results show that the imprinted feature vector was successfully retrieved, even 
when the images were altered in a more sophisticated way than in the one area 
modification attack (experiment two). Figure 7.11 shows the percentage of 
































Figure 7.11: Multiple parts modification attack 
Changing the values of specific pixels by printing the black boxes after the 
imprinting process with the feature vector affects the values of the mapped 
indexes. Therefore, many of the imprints were rendered useless after this type of 
attack. Despite significant destruction to the image visualisation with an increased 
rate of modification, it was possible to recapture the feature vector from some of 
the images, even following enormous alteration, such as when the object was 
changed by 95%. At the same time, this attack caused significant loss of the 
mapped index values compared with the experiment that investigated 
modification in one area, where the latter was vandalised less than the former in 



































To explain why there is a fluctuation in the resulting graph in both Figure 7.10 and 
Figure 7.11, the following simulation gives a possible justification of the obtained 
results of these to attacks extermination. Assume that a vector of [0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 9] needs to be imprinted with this given random matrix of numbers from 0-9 (i.e. 
pixels or similar type of object) which has dimensions of 7 x 7 (49 values) as 
shown in Figure 7.12.  
 
4 5 2 1 9 4 9 
7 0 1 6 4 3 2 
1 9 2 9 2 8 3 
7 3 5 8 3 8 8 
6 0 2 7 5 0 1 
9 8 3 6 1 1 2 
9 7 5 0 8 4 0 
 
Figure 7.12. Matrix of numbers to be used as an example of an object to be 
imprinted with a given vector. 
 
By mapping the given vector value with this matrix, this should result in 4 possible, 
complete, and non-overlapped imprints scattered among the matrix as shown in 
Figure 7.13.  
 
4 5 2 1 9 4 8 
7 0 1 6 4 3 2 
1 9 2 9 0 8 3 
7 5 3 8 3 0 1 
6 0 2 7 5 0 1 
9 6 8 6 1 1 2 
4 7 5 0 8 4 0 
 
Figure 7.13. Matches values of the given vector highlighted in colour per imprint 
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Now, by simulating some attacks (shown in a black background in Figure 7.14, 
Figure 7.15, Figure 7.16, and Figure 7.17) to reflect why the fluctuation in the 
results occurred. As shown in Figure 7.14, the yellow, blue and green imprints are 
affected by the attack in which only the red imprint is still valid to be retrieved. 
This results in 1 out of 4 possible imprints can be retrieved from this given 
simulation. 
4 5 2 1 9 4 8 
7 0 1 6 4 3 2 
1 9 2 9 0 8 3 
7 5 3 8 3 0 1 
6 0 2 7 5 0 1 
9 6 8 6 1 1 2 
4 7 5 0 8 4 0 
 
Figure 7.14. Biometric information—document correlation generation pipeline 
In Figure 7.15, although that the affected area is larger than the previous example 
(shown in Figure 7.14),  only the green imprint is affected by the attack in which 
the yellow, blue and red imprints are still valid to be retrieved. This resulted in 3 
out of 4 possible imprints can be retrieved from this given simulation. 
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4 5 2 1 9 4 8 
7 0 1 6 4 3 2 
1 9 2 9 0 8 3 
7 5 3 8 3 0 1 
6 0 2 7 5 0 1 
9 6 8 6 1 1 2 
4 7 5 0 8 4 0 
Figure 7.15. Biometric information—document correlation generation pipeline 
With this attack in Figure 7.16, all imprints are affected by the attack in which no 
valid imprint to be retrieved. This results in 0 out of 4 possible imprints can be 
retrieved from this given simulation. 
4 5 2 1 9 4 8 
7 0 1 6 4 3 2 
1 9 2 9 0 8 3 
7 5 3 8 3 0 1 
6 0 2 7 5 0 1 
9 6 8 6 1 1 2 
4 7 5 0 8 4 0 
Figure 7.16. Biometric information—document correlation generation pipeline 
Although the attack shown in Figure 7.17 affected more values of the matrix in 
comparison with the previous attacks, the yellow imprint is not affected by the 
attack in which this results in 1 out of 4 possible imprints can be retrieved from 
this given simulation. 
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4 5 2 1 9 4 8 
7 0 1 6 4 3 2 
1 9 2 9 0 8 3 
7 5 3 8 3 0 1 
6 0 2 7 5 0 1 
9 6 8 6 1 1 2 
4 7 5 0 8 4 0 
 
Figure 7.17. Biometric information—document correlation generation pipeline 
 
By plotting the number of retrieved imprints in the function of modification rate, it 
can be seen in Figure 7.18 that the resulted graph is fluctuating in which even 
with more areas/values modified, the affected imprints can vary. This fluctuating 
will depends on the object values and the vector values to be imprinted.  
 
Figure 7.18. Biometric information—document correlation generation pipeline 
 
These simulated attacks in this small matrix/imprints explain why the rate of 
retrieved imprints have fluctuated at some modification rations and not a steady, 
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dimensions of 1,234 x 1,858 and 1,858 x 1,234 width, height in pixels, this is equal 
to 2,292,772 pixels per image which enabled (a minimum of 244 and of maximum 
1,815) of imprints to be generated. If only one imprint per image is successfully 
retrieved, the result is counted valid as we only need one imprint to find a match 
in the biometric signal.  
Finally, in the last experiment, the most striking finding to emerge from the results 
is that of all the tests in this experiment, the feature vector was retrieved and 
reassembled 100% for all the images tested. This suggests that by giving only 
part of the original imprinted image, it is possible to restore the feature vector to 
its original values. Figure 7.19 shows the percentage of successfully retrieved 
feature vectors under a partial image attack. The results relating to this attack 
also show that, as long as the corresponding locations of the imprints are not 
changed, it is still possible to retrieve the imprinted information, as the mapped 
indexes are still valid. 































% of Images with successful retrieved feature vectors




Figure 7.20: Multiple parts modification attack 
Figure 7.20 shows that the average, maximum, and minimum numbers of a 
retrieved feature vector cross for all the images examined. However, these results 
were obtained by assuming that the preserved indexes of the hexes of interest 
had not been changed after the cropping process. This suggests that all the 
imprints in the database correlated with the samples in question as part of the 
original images. In practice, this is not always possible, since the original object 
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Therefore, more research is needed to find a link between the parts of an object 
and the original.  
7.5 Discussion 
The results have shown that, by mapping the hex representations of a feature 
vector to the hex representations of an image of interest, it is feasible that one or 
more imprints of the feature vector can be generated. The results of the first 
experiment conducted revealed an ‘expected’ outcome by imprinting the feature 
vector from the original imprinted image. Since 100% of the imprinted feature 
vector was retrieved using only the generated imprints that contained the indexes 
of the corresponding positions, this was expected because the mapped objects 
(images in this case) had not been exposed to any kind of alteration and, therefore, 
were tested based on their original status.  
Being able to achieve such high scores is attributable to the nature of the 
examined object. Since images are a set of pixels that range from 0 to 255, 
changing the value of one pixel does not affect the value or the position of other 
pixels. Thus, altering part of an image is not necessary, as it affects the values of 
all the imprinted indexes. Therefore, generating as many imprints as possible in 
various positions of the image will, in turn, increase the likelihood of successfully 
retrieving the imprinted values. 
It is worth mentioning that the approach introduced in this chapter could be 
applied to other types of object, such as Microsoft Office Word documents and 
PDF files. Nevertheless, the results do not necessarily reflect a robust success 
rate, since changing a small part these file types could affect the offset of binary 
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representation of these files. An initial experiment was also carried out in which a 
small set of Office Word and PDF files were examined using the same imprinting 
technique that was conducted on the images. The results showed that, unlike 
images, changing a small value in the document/file content leads to an 
adjustment of the entire offset/index sequence. For that reason, many attacks 
would have a considerable impact on the accuracy of retrieving the imprinted 
feature vector from such objects. 
In comparison with the experiment in Chapter 6—Investigation of a Biometric-
Based Null Cipher Using Images, the use of a grille cipher increases the likelihood 
of retrieving the mapped information (biometric signals). Moreover, the grille 
cipher approach does not change the integrity of the data by directly modifying 
the examined image, as it only generates those imprints, which is simply a 
mapping between individual biometric signals and the corresponding matching 
location within the object. Another advantage of this approach is that it works 
across different file types, not only images (i.e., the text-based files that are 
investigated in the next chapter). 
Nevertheless, these findings provide interesting insights for future research, 
whereby other techniques could be investigated for robust object alteration. A 
possible solution for tackling this type of issue could be that, instead of mapping 
the feature vector to the object at the hex level, a higher level of representation 
could be used. For instance, in the case of documents, mapping the feature vector 
with static representations of the text of the document (such as a locality sensitive 
hashing digest) might possibly become less vulnerable to an alteration attack, 
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especially when the imprints generated preserve more static values related to the 
object. Therefore, the next chapter provides an investigation into leveraging 
locality sensitive hashing algorithms to generate a feature vector less sensitive to 
a modification that could be used for establishing the desired document to a user 
correlation file.  
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter proposed a proactive framework that uses transparent biometrics to 
inextricably link the use of information (images) to the individual users who use 
and access them, rather than intermediate controls. Such an approach would aid 
digital forensic investigators in their analysis of electronic evidence and could 
increase the likelihood of evidence being admissible in a court of law. The results 
of all the experiments conducted show that even when an object is altered in a 
sophisticated way, there is still a chance that the imprinted feature vector can be 
retrieved and reconstructed.  
Despite these promising results, the use of transparent biometrics to monitor and 
acquire a subject’s traits introduces several challenges that need to be 
considered when developing this type of system. For instance, in the case of 
facial detection, environmental and external factors, such as light, the subject’s 
distance from the camera and facial orientation, significantly affect the accuracy 
of the samples obtained. Even with extensive research being undertaken in this 
field, such issues cannot be overcome very easily, primarily because the 
operation of transparent biometric monitoring is meant to be unobtrusive and 
unsupervised. Further work is required to investigate the ability to utilise a broader 
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range of file types, such as text documents (i.e., PDF and DOCX) since different 
file types operate differently from an embedding perspective. 
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8 Investigation into a Biometric-Based Grille Cipher Using 
Documents 
The preceding chapter presented promising experimental results in validating the 
feasibility of the grille cipher approach in generating a forensically rich correlation 
between the user and the image file is used. This chapter investigates the 
feasibility of mapping an individual’s biometric information to documents by 
leveraging locality sensitive hashing (LSH) algorithms, such as Trend Micro 
Locality Sensitive Hashing (TLSH) (Oliver, Cheng and Chen, 2013). The chapter 
includes an evaluation of the developed approach by measuring the success rate 
for retrieving the mapped signals to assess how robust the method is given 
subsequent modification of the document. The chapter concludes with discussion 
and conclusion sections that examine the findings and highlight the limitations 
identified. 
8.1 Introduction 
This investigation sought to provide a technique for mapping between a digital 
object and biometric identifiers and storing the mapped information alongside 
document identifiers in a centralised storage repository. When the mapped 
(imprinted) objects are recovered or analysed, the information stored in the 
repository is used to recover the biometric information, which is subsequently 
used to identify the user. The key advantage of this approach is that the 
underlying digital object is not modified in any way, in contrast with the 
watermarking techniques referred to previously. No explicit biometric information 
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is stored, as only the correlation that points to locations within the imprinted object 
is preserved. 
8.2 Methodological Approach 
The proposed approach takes advantage of LSH schemes to generate a 
representation that is less sensitive to modification of a document (text). In 
general, LSH algorithms are mainly used for dimensionality reduction by mapping 
high-dimensional input space into a lower-dimensional space. A key difference 
between LSH-based algorithms and cryptographic schemes is that the former are 
less sensitive to small changes in the mapped input space. In contrast, hash-
based cryptographic schemes are designed for ensuring data integrity by 
maximising its sensitivity to the input space. Both methods map the input stream 
into a fixed output called a digest (hash values). 
This study leverages the LSH property of maximising the probability of a collision 
of similar inputs. This is achieved by directly mapping the biometric feature vector 
representation of an individual with the computed LSH digest of a given document, 
which generates a digital record—known as an ‘imprint’ file. The resulting imprint 
file represents locations within the computed LSH hash value, each of which 
corresponds to a respective portion of the digital biometric feature vector. The 
user’s biometric samples from which the feature vector is computed (e.g., facial 
features, iris, keystroke analysis or behavioural profiling) are transparently and 
continuously captured—using suitable sensors—while the person is interacting 
with the computer. 
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Finally, the imprints generated are stored in a centralised, secure database for 
later analysis when required. 
The locality sensitive hashing scheme TLSH is utilised in this research to 
construct documents digest. The construction of the TLSH digest is computed as 
the following steps: 
1. Process the byte string of the given document using a sliding window of 
size 5 to populate an array of bucket counts 
2. Calculate the quartile points, q1, q2 and q3 
3. Construct the digest header values 
Construct the digest body by processing the bucket array 
Steps 1, 2 and 4 combine to use a modified bit sampling method; instead of bit 
sampling, these steps are sampling pairs of bits. The sampling process is done 
to a finite precision so as to have a fixed-length digest. Step 3 constructs 
innovative features based on the approach used to get a fixed-length digest. The 
final TLSH digest constructed from the Byte string is the concatenation of the 
hexadecimal representation of the digest header values from step 3, and the 
hexadecimal representation of the binary string from step 4 (Oliver, Cheng and 
Chen, 2013). 
Figure 8.1 illustrates the process of generating imprint files, which establishes the 
correlation between the biometric information acquired from the corresponding 
person and the triggered document. Data leakage in the form of a document 
(whether posted on a public website or captured by the network) can then be 
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analysed by processing the imprint file with the given ‘leaked’ document, which 
was already imprinted at some point before it was leaked, to reconstruct the 
mapped biometric feature vector. Once the sample is extracted, it can be 
processed by a biometric system in order to determine the last user to interact 
with the object. 
 
Figure 8.1. Biometric information—document correlation generation pipeline 
To illustrate how mapping the biometric feature vector with the LSH digest works, 
assume that the following feature vector needs to be mapped to the given LSH 





[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] 
LSH 
digest 
sample      [F1751BD78C133A4A9303D6365E78E4933D843436A7921120789B58138AFB927BF7DE] 
Index 
         
      0…………...….10……….…….20……….………30..………...…40….………....50.……………60……………….… 
 
Figure 8.2: Examples of a feature vector and the TLSH digest sample 
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In this example, each value (digit) of the feature vector exists in more than one 
location within the hash digest. The sample digest in this figure was computed 
using the TLSH scheme, the output of which is 70 hex characters long (35 bytes). 
TLSH is an LSH scheme developed by TrendMicro (Oliver, Cheng and Chen, 
2013). In mapping, zero is located in two locations: 18 and 47. 
In the same manner, the mapping process finds all matching locations for the 
remaining values of the given feature vector, as shown in  
Figure 8.3. 
F.V. Matched index location within the TLSH digest 
0 18 47  
1 1 4 10 44 45 54  
2 43 46 61  
3 11 12 17 19 22 31 32 36 38 55 
4 14 29 35 37  
5 3 24 52 
 
6 21 23 39 
7 2 7 26 41 48 62 65  
8 8 27 34 49 56 
 
9 16 30 42 50 60 




Figure 8.3: Feature vector—LSH digest mapping matrix 
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Combining the mapped locations (one location from each row) forms a single 
imprint. Hence, the total number of unique imprints that can be generated from 
the mapped indexes is two, as highlighted in light green in  
Figure 8.3. Therefore, using any of these imprints, it is possible to reconstruct the 
original (mapped) feature vector from the document by reversing the mapping 
process. The next subsection describes the correlation-generation pipeline, 
including the mapping process step. 
8.2.1 Correlation-Generation Pipeline 
The generation process of the imprint file that associates an individual’s biometric 
signal with a document of interest involves six main steps, starting with acquiring 
the text from the document and ending with generating the target imprint file. 
8.2.2 Extracting document text 
The document text is extracted from the file; the text itself is processed, not the 
document file type. This approach makes it possible to imprint any document type 
so that its text can be extracted. For example, PDF, DOCX, TXT, HTML or even 
email messages can all be analysed and their content parsed. Furthermore, the 
extraction process eliminates any text formatting and, therefore, the subsequent 
steps of the imprinting process rely purely on the text. 
8.2.3 Pre-Processing the Extracted Text 
In this phase, all extra spaces between words, lines, paragraphs and pages that 
exist in the text are removed and replaced with a single space. This ensures that 
the computed LSH digest is based only on plain text, which means that if the 
Chapter 8- Investigation into a Biometric-Based Grille Cipher Using Documents 
157 
 
document is maliciously manipulated later, for instance by adding extra spaces 
or page breaks, it will have low or even no effect on the computed hash value. 
8.2.4 Computing the LSH Value of the Text 
The LSH value can be computed by using one of the widely known open-source 
algorithms, including Ssdeep, Sdhash, Nilsimsa and TLSH (Damiani et al., 2004; 
Kornblum, 2006; Roussev, 2010; Oliver, Cheng and Chen, 2013). It is well 
established that TLSH is more robust than the other schemes with regard to 
digest entropy, collision likelihood, and manipulation attacks (e.g., removing, 
swapping, and inserting words) (Oliver, Forman and Cheng, 2014). Therefore, 
the TLSH algorithm was chosen for use in this study to compute the hash digest 
of the extracted text. Two approaches can be used to compute the hash digest of 
the document: 
a) Only a single hash digest is computed for the whole document, which 
makes the imprinting process much faster and stores fewer data in the 
database, as only one digest is used to generate the correlation with the 
biometric signal. 
Hashing the text using a different resolution to produce multiple digests per 
document, for example, per page, half page, and paragraph, or using the k-
overlapped-folds of the examined document, as illustrated in  
b) Figure 8.4. The figure presents how the document text is sliced into 10-
overlapped-folds, each of which is processed separately and its LSH value 
computed. 




Figure 8.4: Slicing document text into 10-overlapped-folds 
In this study, methods (a) and (b) are both examined and evaluated against 
different possible attack vectors, as detailed in section 8.3. 
Another LSH hash digest is computed (using, for instance, Nilsimsa) and stored 
in a centralised database to be used later to locate the associated imprint file 
when a document is queried. The biometric signal is also hashed using the 
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) digest and stored. The SHA is used for checking 
the integrity of the extracted biometric signal. The reason for using another LSH 
algorithm is to avoid storing the same LSH digest that was used for generating 
the imprint. This ensures that having only the imprint in the database without the 
correlated document makes it impossible to reconstruct the related biometric 
information. 
8.2.5 Mapping the Feature Vector to the Hash Digest Value 
The feature vector and the LSH hash value of the text are mapped to its equivalent 
location in the text LSH hash value to retrieve the locations where they might 
match, as described previously in this section. 
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8.2.6 Generating Imprints 
By retrieving the locations of each character in the feature vector with the object, 
it becomes possible to generate imprints based on the list of indexes obtained. 
This means that multiple imprints of the whole feature vector can be generated 
by combining those positions. 
8.2.7 Recovery Algorithm 
The recovery algorithm used to extract and reconstruct the imprinted biometric 
information from a questioned document in the case of information leakage 
shares the same steps 1-3 of the imprinting process listed above. This is followed 
by the steps given below: 
1. The questioned document hash digest is computed (e.g., Nilsimsa) as 
input to the next step. 
2. The related stored imprint file is retrieved by querying the centralised 
database–-using the computed hash digest–-where previously generated 
fingerprints and imprints for all documents are stored. 
3. The retrieved imprint file is mapped to the computed LSH value of the 
document in question, and the correlated biometric signal is reconstructed 
from the mapped locations. 
4. To validate the integrity of the reconstructed biometric signal, its SHA 
digest is compared against the stored digest generated when the imprint 
was created. 
After explaining how the imprinting and retrieval techniques of the proposed 
approach work, the next section investigates the feasibility of imprinting biometric 
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information with documents and later recovering them (even after the text has 
been modified). 
8.3 Experimental Analysis 
The fundamental research question concerning the imprinting of a biometric 
signature is how robust the approach is given subsequent modification of the 
document—arguably, the key attack vector against this approach. An insider who 
intends to leak a confidential document could maliciously manipulate its content 
in order to destroy any tracks to avoid being traced. Therefore, to examine the 
feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed approach, genuine leaked 
documents from WikiLeaks were chosen for experimental purposes. WikiLeaks 
is an international non-profit organisation that publishes secret information, news 
leaks and classified media provided by anonymous sources (WikiLeaks, no date). 
In 2009, it released more than 6,000 reports commissioned by the United States 
Congress. These reports are classified as confidential documents but are now 
publicly available and accessible online in the form of text files (WikiLeaks.org, 
2009).. 
 
Table 8.1 provides statistical information about the dataset used. Leaking 
repositories, such as WikiLeaks and The Intercept, typically perform some kind of 
modification to the leaked documents. For instance, they watermark uploaded 
documents and files with extra information, such as a document ID, date, website 
address or logo (The Intercept, no date). 




Table 8.1. Corpus statistics 
File size distribution 
(KB) 
# of docs 
Document 
content 
Min. Max. Average 
1-99 4,920 Chars. 1,288 874,548 47,345 
100-199 853 Words 233 155,614 8,873 
200+ 227 Lines 38 16,160 981 
Total 6,000 Pages 1 622 34 
 
A number of experiments were designed and conducted to evaluate the proposed 
approach in scenarios that consider malicious intent with regard to any possible 
modification that might be performed on a document. The first experiment maps 
the biometric feature vector to the computed text TLSH digest and retrieves it. 
The goal was to compute the possible number of imprints that could be generated 
from the mapping process. A total of 21 attacks were developed and included file, 
formatting and text-based manipulation methods. The attacks were employed to 
examine critically the effectiveness of possible modification attacks on the 
imprinted documents and how such attacks could affect the retrieval performance 
of the mapped biometric information. The developed attacks can be classified into 
three main categories: file-type conversion, formatting change and content 
manipulations, as shown in Table 8.2. 




Table 8.2. Possible document manipulation methods 
File-type conversion Formatting change Content manipulation 
1. PDF to .docx 
2. PDF to .txt 
3. PDF to Image 
4. Docx to PDF 
5. Docx to txt 
6. Txt to PDF 
7. Txt to .docx 
8. Txt to Image 
9. Font resizing 
10. Font type changing 
11. Colour changing 
12. Text highlighting 
13. Line and para spaces 
14. Deleting words 
15. Deleting sentences 
16. Deleting lines 
17. Swapping words 
18. Swapping sentences 
19. Swapping lines 
20. Substituting synonyms 
21. Inserting new words  
In the imprinting process, the biometric feature vectors used to represent real 
facial features. The Fisherfaces feature extraction algorithm was used to compute 
these vectors for the captured users’ facial images (Belhumeur, Hespanha and 
Kriegman, 1997). The dimensions of the generated feature vector when using the 
Fisherface algorithm are small compared with deep learning approaches, as the 
length of the vector is a prime factor when performing the imprinting process. The 
resulting vector is four-dimensional, with a length of 60 digits. The chosen vector 
includes the frequency of all digits (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9), as well as a ‘-’ sign, 
to ensure that this study covers all possible numbers within the mapping process. 
For all the manipulation methods referred to above, the original document TLSH 
value was computed before it was modified and the resulting digest was then 
imprinted with the biometric information. After that, the manipulation methods 
were applied to the imprinted documents. Finally, the TLSH value of the modified 
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version was computed again and compared with the original. As long as the 
original text has not changed, the fully mapped biometric feature vector should 
be successfully retrieved by reversing the imprinting process. However, this is not 
always the case, since a leaked document is highly likely to have been 
manipulated or modified. Consequently, the computed hash value is directly 
affected, to what degree depends upon the scale of the modification. Fortunately, 
the TLSH is less sensitive to small changes than cryptographic hashing 
algorithms, such as the SHA, since a small modification in the input drastically 
changes the output computed digest. This is the so-called avalanche effect. 
In contrast, all similar digest schemes have the property that a small change to 
the file being hashed results in a small change to the hash (Oliver, Cheng and 
Chen, 2013). Figure 8.5 shows two samples of computed document hash digests 
using SHA256 and TLSH. Each present two values: one for the original document 
and one for the modified version of the same document. 
It is clear in the above that the digest of the modified document computed by 
SHA256 is entirely different from the originals. The TLSH digest is only slightly 
affected; the characters shown in red are those that have changed, while the 
others remain the same with exact locations. Therefore, the TLSH can be used in 
this approach to give a less sensitive representation of the whole document. 
  




Figure 8.5: Samples of computed document hash digests using SHA256 and 
TLSH 
Figure 8.6 shows the average distribution of the number of imprints generated per 
document for the 6,000 documents examined in the dataset. The histogram 
indicates that most of the imprinted documents generated more than three 
imprints. The number of obtainable imprints mainly depends on the TLSH digest 
entropy generated and the digit frequency. The rate of entropy and the frequency 
differ from one document to another, as this is a natural property of hash schemes. 
Although multiple imprints per document were generated, as the figure illustrates, 
only one imprint was needed to reconstruct the biometric information successfully. 
Indeed, having multiple imprints for a given document significantly increases the 
likelihood of recovering the mapped information, even after the document is 
exposed to manipulation. 
6efa3f05f084127249ebe7e0b37ffdda41db9ceacfbb65c04cd7de6a 
SHA256 digest of the original document 
49ca48a970f02c40cf85667d1708416ccca84de06d65467856aa3ef1 
SHA256 the digest of the modified document 
77F1866D9E10AF925F4228F3475961F8C0DAB4751388000565A1B8571D67C7E1F5A6FE1BE78C1
33A4A9303D6365E7CE8933D843437A7D21120789B58238AFB927BF7DE 
TLSH digest of the original document 
4DF1856D4E106F925F4224F7476961F8C0DBB0751388001565A178571D67C7E0F1AAFF1BE78C1
33A0A9303D6365E68E5A33D843437A7911520789B58238AFB927BF7EE 
TLSH digest of the modified document 




Figure 8.6: Distribution of the imprints generated per document 
The experimental results of the method developed indicate that the proposed 
approach is resistant and robust against both file-type conversion and formatting 
change attacks, with an accuracy of 100%. Since the nature of these modification 
methods does not change the actual text or content that is fed into the LSH 
algorithm, the mapped biometric signal is fully retrievable, even when the text 
format or file type is changed, including converting the document into an image. 
However, in such a case, optical character recognition (OCR) technologies could 
be used to analyse and convert the image content (printed text) into machine-
encoded text. In this study, test documents were converted into images (JPEG) 
to simulate such an attack, and a Tesseract-OCR engine was used to read all the 
images and recognise and extract the embedded text (Smith, 2007). As long as 
the OCR was able to recognise the correct text, which it did, the integrity of the 
text can be preserved when compared with its original version. For the content 
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manipulation attacks, random settings were configured for the rate of modification, 
as Figure 8.7 illustrates, ranging from 1 to 100 for word-type attacks and from 1 
to 20 for line and paragraph attacks. As this rate increases, the number of 
changes also rises. For instance, in the case of a word-deleting attack, a number 
of random words (between 1 and 100) are deleted from each document in the 
dataset. This also applies to all other attacks that fit the same category. 
 
Figure 8.7: Modification types and rates among the dataset documents 
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Table 8.3 presents the results of retrieving the mapped feature vector under 
content manipulation attack methods. 
Table 8.3. Content manipulation attack methods experimental results 
No. Attack type 
Rate 
(number) 





Min. Max. Avg. 
1  Del words 1-100 5,359 89.31 0 217 8 
2  Swap words 1-100 5,464 91.06 0 82 7 
3  Insert words 1-100 5,304 88.40 1 471 33 
4  Words syn. 1-100 5,751 95.85 1 465 30 
5  Del lines 1-10 2,708 45.13 7 466 43 
6  Swap lines 1-10 2,637 43.95 7 874 71 
7  Swap sentences 1-10 5,929 98.81 0 30 3 
8  Swap paras 1-10 2,853 47.55 5 125 26 
9  Del paras 1-10 2,767 46.11 5 149 26 
10  Del sentences 1-10 4,915 82.00 1 788 15 
11  Multi attacks 2 1-10 3,828 64.00 1 456 31 
1 TLSH diff. is the distance score between two digests (texts). 
2 A number of attack methods were randomly chosen. 
 
In addition, the TLSH uses a distance score of zero, which indicates that the files 
are identical (or nearly identical), while scores above that represent a greater 
distance between the examined documents. A higher score should indicate that 
there are more differences between the documents (Oliver, Cheng and Chen, 
2013). From the data in Table 8.3, it can be seen that given the ability to recover 
biometric identifiers under significant levels of modification—such as deleting 100 
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words—it is still possible to regenerate the correlation established between the 
biometric information and the imprinted document with a success rate of 89.31%. 
In addition, Figure 8.8 illustrates how accuracy changes along with a defined 
number of deleted words. 
 
Figure 8.8: Averaged accuracy and F1-Score for a deleted words attack 
Two levels of hashing resolution were applied on the examined documents: one 
hash digest per document and a multi-hash digest using 10-overlapped-folds per 
document. The overall accuracy improved when multi-hash digests were 
generated. In general, a document was counted as correctly identified (feature 
vector retrieved) if at least one imprint was perfectly extracted from the imprinted 
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feature vector, even when the computed hash digest was not identical to the one 
from which the original correlation was established. 
Furthermore, paragraph attacks (swap and delete methods) scored low rates, of 
47.55% and 46.11%, respectively. These rates are considered low as biometric 
information of more than half of the documents could not be reconstructed due to 
the effect of the attack. Indeed, removing a number of paragraphs from the 
document significantly affected the computed hash digest to a greater degree 
than other types of modification, such as deleting words or sentences. This can 
be improved by changing the hashing resolution (i.e., using k-folds). For instance, 
instead of hashing the whole document and generating a single hash digest, 
multiple digests were computed for the document, for example per page, half 
page or paragraph, and correlated the biometric information with the resulted 
hashes. 
 
Figure 8.9: Averaged accuracy and F1-Score for a deleted paragraphs attack 
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Figure 8.9 shows the averaged accuracy and F1-Score for a deleted paragraphs 
attack using 10-overlapped-folds. The overall accuracy is higher than for the 
single hash digest per document approach, as it scored 93%. In contrast, the F-
Score achieved is not high, as it was computed for all the generated imprints, 
while only one valid retrieved imprint of a given document was needed to 
reconstruct the mapped biometric information. Moreover, the chances of 
recovering correlated biometric signals vary based on the type and scale of the 
attack vector. However, in many leakage cases, the leaked document might not 
be exposed to severe modification. Hence, reconstructing the biometric sample 
is highly likely to be possible and, as a result, the source of the leak can be 
identified. 
8.4 Discussion 
The most apparent finding to emerge from this study is that the underlying digital 
objects, documents, in this case, are not modified in any way. The proposed 
approach also disassociates any biometric information from the digital object itself, 
thereby minimising any attacks on the biometric data. This suggests that the 
biometric signal is not stored by any means in a database; it is only its correlation 
to the imprinted object (document/text in this case) that is preserved in the imprint 
file. Thus, the signal becomes useless without the presence of the imprinted 
document in the recovery process, since the imprint file that correlates the object 
with the related biometric signal only contains those locations within the 
document from which the signal can be extracted. It also allows larger volumes 
of information to be imprinted, making it more suitable for digital objects when 
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more significant levels of information need to be correlated (i.e., multimodal 
biometric samples). It does, however, introduce the need for a centralised 
repository which will grow as users interact with objects and thus require 
configuration and management. 
Although the above investigation has critically examined the proposed approach 
against possible malicious attacks and shown robustness and strength, some 
challenges exist and require further research. These include the ability to 
automate the process of capturing biometric signals and detecting user 
interaction with the object instantly, along with establishing the correlation with 
the interacted object. This requires the development of a smart and active agent 
that continually captures an individual’s biometric information (using a camera in 
the case of facial information) and performs the imprinting process.  
Furthermore, the proposed approach raises substantial privacy concerns for 
those individuals who are monitored by the system, as processing, transmitting 
and storing biometric samples into a centralised database requires a high level of 
confidentiality and sufficient resources. This obviously needs to be investigated 
in-depth in future work. More broadly, research is also needed to determine the 
ability to utilise a broader range of digital objects. Different objects have varying 
degrees of stability due to their structure. For example, executable files and their 
underlying data structure can change considerably given small alterations to a 
file, in contrast with the text. Therefore, the proposed approach needs to be 
examined for such file types to measure its usefulness and robustness fully. 
Further study also needs to be carried out regarding the ability to utilise soft 
Chapter 8- Investigation into a Biometric-Based Grille Cipher Using Documents 
172 
 
biometric features, such as the gender, age and even race of individuals, to 
increase the discriminative ability and provide more reliable information to the 
investigator. 
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced a proactive approach to aiding an incident investigator to 
establish and examine a case of insider misuse, particularly with respect to 
information leakage, which could increase the likelihood of the evidence being 
admissible in a court of law. This study has shown that it is possible to recover 
biometric information from text files successfully, even under significant 
modification attacks. Rather than requiring the complete digital object, it is 
possible to recover the necessary information with even a modified version of the 
questioned document. This was achieved by utilising the TLSH algorithm to 
enable the creation of a compact representation of the examined text files, in 
which mapping these with biometric feature vectors becomes less sensitive to 
malicious modification. Based on the experimental results obtained, when the 
imprinted documents are significantly modified (i.e., deleting more than two 
paragraphs of a document that has 20 paragraphs), the imprinted values can be 
lost. At which point, retrieving and reconstructing mapped biometric information 
becomes less likely to be successful. Therefore, further investigation and 
experimentation into leveraging different locality sensitive hashing or 
dimensionality reduction schemes and algorithms are strongly recommended. 
Some possible future studies using the same experimental setup are apparent. It 
would be interesting to assess the effects of employing deep learning algorithms, 
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such as autoencoders, to combine the original object with the biometric 
information. As such, this could generate a robust correlation that is resistant to 
more sophisticated modifications. 
  
Chapter 9- Conclusions and Future Work 
174 
 
9 Conclusions and Future Work 
This chapter concludes the thesis by outlining the key contributions and 
achievements of the research. This is followed by a summary of the limitations 
and obstacles encountered during the development of the research project. 
Finally, potential areas of further research work are also presented. 
9.1 Contributions and Achievements of the Research 
The research has accomplished all the objectives stated initially in chapter 1, with 
a series of experimental studies leading to the development of a proactive 
biometric-enabled forensic imprinting system. The key contributions and 
achievements of this research are as follows: 
 Proposing a novel proactive digital forensic approach that correlates 
individuals with the digital objects with which they interact. The proposed 
approach operates in two modes—centralised or decentralised—each of 
which overcomes the limitations of the other. For instance, the centralised 
mode can map biometric signals with multiple file types, while the 
decentralised mode requires a specific embedding technique for each file 
type. However, the latter does not require a centralised database in order 
to operate. 
 Conducting an investigation into biometric-based image steganography by 
embedding individuals’ biometric signals directly into image files, with a 
particular focus upon the ability to recover the biometric information under 
varying degrees of modification attack. The experimental results show that 
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even when a watermarked object is significantly modified (e.g., only 25% 
of the image is available), it is still possible to recover the embedded 
biometric information.  
 Conducting an investigation into biometric-based image imprinting by 
linking a subject (i.e., a computer user) with an object of interest (e.g., 
images) using the individual’s biometric sample, such as a facial biometric, 
without modifying the object being imprinted. This investigation has also 
developed a set of experiments that employ a grille cipher technique to 
generate a correlation that could identify the individual. The experimental 
results of the proposed approach have shown that it is possible to correlate 
an individual’s biometric feature vector with images and still successfully 
recover the biometric information, even with significant file modification. 
 Conducting an investigation into biometric-based document mapping to 
attribute document misuse via information leakage using biometrics and a 
locality sensitive hashing scheme. Comprehensive experiments using the 
proposed approach have shown that it is highly possible to establish this 
correlation even when the original version has undergone significant file 
modification. In many scenarios, such as changing the file format or 
removing parts of the document, including words and sentences, it was 
possible to extract and reconstruct the correlated biometric information 
from a modified document (e.g., 100 words were deleted) with an average 
success rate of 89.31%. 
A number of papers related to the research programme have been presented and 
published in refereed journals and conferences. As a result, the research is 
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deemed to have made positive contributions to the field of proactive digital 
forensics, and specifically in the biometric identity tracing domain. 
9.2 Limitations of the Research 
The proposed proactive biometric-based forensic imprint system provides a 
proactive digital forensic approach to inextricably link the use of information (e.g., 
documents and images) to the individual users who use and access them, 
through the use of steganography and transparent biometrics. Whilst the set of 
experimental tests conducted with the system has the foundation for providing 
such a link, several limitations and concerns need to be considered and 
addressed before ubiquitous adoption and fully effective operation of the system. 
The key limitations of this study are briefly listed below. 
 In the investigation into an experiment on a biometric-based null cipher 
using images, the placement of the bits to be embedded (payload) could 
be randomised using a random function, so that the payload is scattered 
among the image’s pixel space. It is then almost impossible to retrieve the 
embedded data without knowing the seed of the random function. Although 
this is an instrumental approach, the recovery of the embedded payload 
(biometric information) is only possible if the image has not been modified 
or cropped after the data were embedded. 
 Using the LSB for inserting the payload is vulnerable to file-type 
transformation attacks. For instance, transforming the resulting image (e.g., 
PNG) to other formats (e.g., JPEG) is highly likely to lead to the destruction 
of the embedded data by the compression algorithm. Therefore, a more 
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robust null-ciphered approach could be used, in which, instead of using a 
conventional spatial technique (LSB substitution) that embeds the data 
directly in the intensity of the pixels, other approaches, such as frequency 
techniques, can be used, in which images are first transformed into an 
intermediate image and then the data are embedded in the image. 
 An approach that involves documents with a grille cipher raises significant 
privacy concerns for those individuals who are monitored by the system. 
Processing, transmitting and storing biometric samples into a centralised 
database require a high level of confidentiality and sufficient resources. It 
is clear that this needs to be investigated in depth in future work. 
 The proposed proactive digital forensic approach relies mainly on an 
individual’s biometric information being captured transparently. Hence, the 
robustness and quality of the captured samples vary dramatically, 
depending on the stability and the conditions in which the samples were 
captured. Therefore, further investigation is needed to examine the 
robustness and reliability of transparent biometric samples in relation to 
the identification of the individual to whom the captured sample belongs. 
 The proposed approach was examined in generating a correlation of the 
last person who modifies or accesses a digital object, while in more 
realistic scenarios, the object (such as a document) could be modified or 
leaked by more than one person. Tracing the leak back to the source is 
more challenging, as the timing factor needs to be further investigated and 
the research focused only on generating a correlation and the ability to 
retrieve it.  
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 The experiments conducted were all performed offline, while a more 
realistic study could evaluate the proposed approach in real-life settings 
while the computer user is performing normal daily tasks. Hence, not only 
would the retrieval of the biometric samples be measured as a 
performance metric, the other operations could also be considered, such 
as the operational overhead of the proposed system with regard to CPU 
and memory consumption. 
 Whilst the system is designed to be able to identify information leakage 
and the misuse of classified/secret data, yet there is one type of category 
which is whistleblowers that means it will be possible to identify 
whistleblowers. A whistleblower is a person who exposes secretive 
information or activity that is deemed illegal, unethical, or not correct within 
a private or public organisation. Thus, future work should consider 
addressing the issue of identifying whistleblowers by the system. In which 
the system should be compliance with the organisation’s whistleblowing 
policies. For example, what is the procedure to be undertaken when the 
system identifies a whistleblowing incident? Will be there any protection 
for the Whistleblower such as using the United Kingdome criminal law to 
protect whistleblowers? 
9.3 Ethics and the Moral Context and Implications of the Research 
As the proposed proactive biometric-based forensic imprint system inextricably 
link the use of information (evidence) to the individual users who access and use 
it by utilising individual biometrics, yet the system has some possible ethical 
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implications. The relevance of ethical implications of the developed system 
includes those issues raised by processing, storing and managing individuals’ 
biometrics. Thus, individual rights such as the protection of personal data, 
confidentiality, and personal liberty, the relationship between individual and 
collective rights. Biometrics is one of the most significant examples of how 
complex it is to match individual and collective needs. It indeed leads to questions 
associated with an individual, social and collective identity which according to 
some (Mordini and Petrini, 2007). As the presented system in this research is 
designed to capture, process, store information, containing user-specific data 
such as digital objects usage data and other personal biometric features to a 
centrally managed system. This introduces some privacy issues, which typically 
would not be tolerable for a real-world implementation. Therefore, despite specific 
measures have been suggested in the system design (e.g. encrypting the 
biometric feature vector), further practical consideration should be addressed in 
any future enhancement. Moreover, more work is needed on securing the storage 
of biometrics-based information to reduce the privacy concern about centralising 
such information.  
 In addition, leveraging facial recognition in this research to generate biometric 
feature vectors which is used as the main lead to match individuals, actions, along 
with the digital object that they could interact with, have some ethics areas include 
necessity, complicity, impartiality, bias, and accountability. Concerns surround 
the issue of privacy, data control, the right that users to remove their own data 
from the centralised system(s). Also, the implication of having a biased facial 
recognition algorithm could lead to a false match/result in which the system could 
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accuse an innocent person. Therefore, thoroughly examining the used algorithms 
against any potential biases is essential to ensure that the system does not 
compromise any ethical constraints. 
Finally, as the proposed system acts as an active monitoring engine, in the case 
of using an endpoint camera (e.g. a fitted web camera) this could lead to capture 
unnecessary user-related activities, such calling on the phone or talking to a 
friend without interaction with the computer. Therefore, monitoring and tracking 
processes should be limited to those activities directly related to digital objects.  
9.4 Suggestions and Scope for Future Work 
This research project has advanced the field of proactive digital forensics in 
general and insider misuse identification in particular. However, a number of 
areas for future work exist that are specifically related to this research. These 
suggestions are detailed below. 
 More research is needed to determine the ability to utilise a broader range 
of digital objects. Differing objects have varying degrees of stability due to 
their structure. For example, executable files and their underlying data 
structure can change considerably given small alterations to a file, in 
contrast with the text. Therefore, the proposed approach needs to be 
examined for different file types to measure fully its usefulness and 
robustness. 
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 Further study also needs to be carried out regarding the ability to utilise 
soft biometric features, such as the gender, age and even race of 
individuals, to offer discriminative ability and information to the investigator.  
 Further research could also consider the ability to automate the process of 
capturing biometric signals and detecting user interaction with the object 
instantly, along with establishing the correlation with the interacted object. 
This requires the development of a smart and active agent that would 
continually capture an individual’s biometric information (using a camera 
in the case of facial information) and perform the imprinting process as the 
capture is taking place. 
 With the recent advances in deep learning algorithms, more advanced 
facial feature extraction techniques can be explored, including utilising 
deep learning algorithms to generate more robust and less noisy feature 
representations of a person’s facial image.   
 Further investigation and experimentation into the liveness of biometric 
samples are strongly recommended. It would be interesting to assess the 
effects of using fake biometric samples, such as printed pictures, and to 
develop a counter machine learning algorithm that could detect such a 
forgery. This would reduce the chance of cheating in front of the camera 
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9.5 Null Cipher Embedding and Extracting Script 1 
Mapped to Chapter 6 experimental investigation 
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- 2 
""" 3 
Created on Wed Jun 03 19:11:39 2015 4 
 5 
@author: aalruban 6 




How to install the dependencies on a mac 11 
---------------------------------------- 12 
 13 
1) Reinstall brew. 14 
```bash 15 
rm -rf /usr/local/Cellar /usr/local/.git && brew cleanup 16 
ruby -e "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/master/install)" 17 
``` 18 
2) Install opencv 19 
```bash 20 
brew tap homebrew/science 21 
brew install opencv 22 
``` 23 
3) Add the packages to python 24 
```bash 25 
mkdir -p $HOME/Library/Python/2.7/lib/python/site-packages 26 





import cv2.cv as cv 32 
import sys 33 
 34 
class SteganographyException(Exception): 35 
    pass 36 
 37 
class LSBSteg(): 38 
    def __init__(self, im): 39 
        self.image = im 40 
        self.width = im.width 41 
        self.height = im.height 42 
        self.size = self.width * self.height 43 
        self.nbchannels = im.channels 44 
 45 
        self.maskONEValues = [1,2,4,8,16,32,64,128] 46 
        #Mask used to put one ex:1->00000001, 2->00000010 .. associated with OR bitwise 47 
        self.maskONE = self.maskONEValues.pop(0) #Will be used to do bitwise operations 48 
 49 
        self.maskZEROValues = [254,253,251,247,239,223,191,127] 50 
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        #Mak used to put zero ex:254->11111110, 253->11111101 .. associated with AND bitwise 51 
        self.maskZERO = self.maskZEROValues.pop(0) 52 
 53 
        self.curwidth = 0 #Current width position 54 
        self.curheight = 0 #Current height position 55 
        self.curchan = 0 #Current channel position 56 
 57 
    def saveImage(self,filename): 58 
    # Save the image using the given filename 59 
        cv.SaveImage(filename, self.image) 60 
 61 
 62 
    def putBinaryValue(self, bits): #Put the bits in the image 63 
        for c in bits: 64 
            val = list(self.image[self.curheight,self.curwidth]) #Get the pixel value as a list 65 
            if int(c) == 1: 66 
                val[self.curchan] = int(val[self.curchan]) | self.maskONE #OR with maskONE 67 
            else: 68 
                val[self.curchan] = int(val[self.curchan]) & self.maskZERO #AND with maskZERO 69 
 70 
            self.image[self.curheight,self.curwidth] = tuple(val) 71 
            self.nextSpace() #Move "cursor" to the next space 72 
 73 
    def nextSpace(self):#Move to the next slot were information can be taken or put 74 
        if self.curchan == self.nbchannels-1: #Next Space is the following channel 75 
            self.curchan = 0 76 
            if self.curwidth == self.width-1: #Or the first channel of the next pixel of the same line 77 
                self.curwidth = 0 78 
                if self.curheight == self.height-1:#Or the first channel of the first pixel of the next line 79 
                    self.curheight = 0 80 
                    if self.maskONE == 128: #Mask 1000000, so the last mask 81 
                        raise SteganographyException, "Image filled" 82 
                    else: #Or instead of using the first bit start using the second and so on.. 83 
                        self.maskONE = self.maskONEValues.pop(0) 84 
                        self.maskZERO = self.maskZEROValues.pop(0) 85 
                else: 86 
                    self.curheight +=1 87 
            else: 88 
                self.curwidth +=1 89 
        else: 90 
            self.curchan +=1 91 
 92 
    def readBit(self): #Read a single bit int the image 93 
        val = self.image[self.curheight,self.curwidth][self.curchan] 94 
        val = int(val) & self.maskONE 95 
        self.nextSpace() 96 
        if val > 0: 97 
            return "1" 98 
        else: 99 
            return "0" 100 
 101 
    def readByte(self): 102 
        return self.readBits(8) 103 
 104 
    def readBits(self, nb): #Read the given number of bits 105 
        bits = "" 106 
        for i in range(nb): 107 
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            bits += self.readBit() 108 
        return bits 109 
 110 
    def byteValue(self, val): 111 
        return self.binValue(val, 8) 112 
 113 
    def binValue(self, val, bitsize): #Return the binary value of an int as a byte 114 
        binval = bin(val)[2:] 115 
        if len(binval) > bitsize: 116 
            raise SteganographyException, "binary value larger than the expected size" 117 
        while len(binval) < bitsize: 118 
            binval = "0"+binval 119 
        return binval 120 
 121 
    def hideText(self, txt): 122 
        l = len(txt) 123 
        binl = self.binValue(l, 16) #Length coded on 2 bytes so the text size can be up to 65536 bytes long 124 
        self.putBinaryValue(binl) #Put text length coded on 4 bytes 125 
        for char in txt: #And put all the chars 126 
            c = ord(char) 127 
            self.putBinaryValue(self.byteValue(c)) 128 
 129 
    def unhideText(self): 130 
        ls = self.readBits(16) #Read the text size in bytes 131 
        l = int(ls,2) 132 
        i = 0 133 
        unhideTxt = "" 134 
        while i < l: #Read all bytes of the text 135 
            tmp = self.readByte() #So one byte 136 
            i += 1 137 
            unhideTxt += chr(int(tmp,2)) #Every chars concatenated to str 138 
        return unhideTxt 139 
 140 
    def hideImage(self, imtohide): 141 
        w = imtohide.width 142 
        h = imtohide.height 143 
        if self.width*self.height*self.nbchannels < w*h*imtohide.channels: 144 
            raise SteganographyException, "Carrier image not big enough to hold all the datas to 145 
steganography" 146 
        binw = self.binValue(w, 16) #Width coded on to byte so width up to 65536 147 
        binh = self.binValue(h, 16) 148 
        self.putBinaryValue(binw) #Put width 149 
        self.putBinaryValue(binh) #Put height 150 
        for h in range(imtohide.height): #Iterate the hole image to put every pixel values 151 
            for w in range(imtohide.width): 152 
                for chan in range(imtohide.channels): 153 
                    val = imtohide[h,w][chan] 154 
                    self.putBinaryValue(self.byteValue(int(val))) 155 
 156 
 157 
    def unhideImage(self): 158 
        width = int(self.readBits(16),2) #Read 16bits and convert it in int 159 
        height = int(self.readBits(16),2) 160 
        unhideimg = cv.CreateImage((width,height), 8, 3) #Create an image in which we will put all the 161 
pixels read 162 
        for h in range(height): 163 
            for w in range(width): 164 
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                for chan in range(unhideimg.channels): 165 
                    val = list(unhideimg[h,w]) 166 
                    val[chan] = int(self.readByte(),2) #Read the value 167 
                    unhideimg[h,w] = tuple(val) 168 
        return unhideimg 169 
 170 
    def hideBin(self, filename): 171 
        f = open(filename,'rb') 172 
        bin = f.read() 173 
        l = len(bin) 174 
        if self.width*self.height*self.nbchannels < l+64: 175 
            raise SteganographyException, "Carrier image not big enough to hold all the datas to 176 
steganography" 177 
        self.putBinaryValue(self.binValue(l, 64)) 178 
        for byte in bin: 179 
            self.putBinaryValue(self.byteValue(ord(byte))) 180 
 181 
    def unhideBin(self): 182 
        l = int(self.readBits(64),2) 183 
        output = "" 184 
        for i in range(l): 185 
            output += chr(int(self.readByte(),2)) 186 





Methods to expose this functionality to the command-line 192 
''' 193 
def binary_steg_hide(image, binary, result): 194 
    carrier = cv.LoadImage(image) 195 
    steg = LSBSteg(carrier) 196 
    steg.hideBin(binary) 197 
    steg.saveImage(result) 198 
 199 
def binary_steg_reveal(steg_image, out): 200 
    inp = cv.LoadImage(steg_image) 201 
    steg = LSBSteg(inp) 202 
    bin = steg.unhideBin() 203 
    f = open(out, "wb") 204 
    f.write(bin) 205 
    f.close() 206 
 207 
import argparse 208 
 209 
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='This python program applies LSB Steganography to an 210 
image and some type of input') 211 
 212 
def main(av): 213 
    bgroup = parser. add_argument_group("Hide binary with steg") 214 
    bgroup.add_argument('-image', help='Provide the original image') 215 
    bgroup.add_argument('-binary', help='The binary file to be obfuscated in the image') 216 
    bgroup.add_argument('-steg-out', help='The resulting steganographic image') 217 
 218 
    bgroup = parser.add_argument_group("Reveal binary") 219 
    bgroup.add_argument('-steg-image', help='The steganographic image') 220 
    bgroup.add_argument('-out', help='The original binary') 221 




    args = parser.parse_args(av[1:]) 223 
 224 
    if len(av) == 7: 225 
 binary_steg_hide(args.image, args.binary, args.steg_out) 226 
    elif len(av) == 5: 227 
        binary_steg_reveal(args.steg_image, args.out) 228 
    else: 229 
        print "Usage: '", av[0], "-h' for help", "\n", args 230 
 231 
if __name__=="__main__": 232 
    from sys import argv as av 233 
    main(av)  234 
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9.6 TLSH Generation and Attacks Against Text Files Script 235 
Mapped to Chapter 8 experimental investigation 
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- 236 
""" 237 
Created on Wed Jun 03 19:11:39 2015 238 
 239 
@author: aalruban 240 
from __future__ import print_function 241 
import pytesseract 242 
from PIL import Image 243 
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt 244 
import numpy as np 245 
import sys 246 
import tlsh 247 
import os 248 
import csv 249 
import re, string 250 
import random 251 
from unidecode import unidecode 252 
import shutil 253 
import subprocess 254 
import pickle 255 
import reportlab.pdfbase.ttfonts 256 
from reportlab.lib.units import inch 257 
from reportlab.pdfgen import canvas 258 
from docx import Document 259 
import pandas as pd 260 
import re 261 
import os 262 
import io 263 
 264 
from pdfminer.pdfinterp import PDFResourceManager, PDFPageInterpreter 265 
from pdfminer.converter import TextConverter 266 
from pdfminer.layout import LAParams 267 
from pdfminer.pdfpage import PDFPage 268 
from random import randint 269 
 270 
from nltk.corpus import wordnet 271 
from nltk.tokenize import word_tokenize 272 
from random import randint 273 
import nltk.data 274 
 275 
PUNCTUATION = re.compile('[%s]' % re.escape(string.punctuation)) 276 
 277 
class Fingerprinter(object): 278 
    ''' 279 
    Python implementation of Google Refine fingerprinting algorithm described here: 280 
    https://github.com/OpenRefine/OpenRefine/wiki/Clustering-In-Depth 281 
 282 
    Requires the unidecode module: https://github.com/iki/unidecode 283 
    ''' 284 
 285 
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    def __init__(self, string): 286 
        self.string = self._preprocess(string) 287 
 288 
    def _preprocess(self, string): 289 
        ''' 290 
        Strip leading and trailing whitespace, lowercase the string, remove all punctuation, 291 
        in that order. 292 
        ''' 293 
        return PUNCTUATION.sub('', string.strip().lower()) 294 
 295 
    def _latinize(self, string): 296 
 297 
        return unidecode(string.decode('utf-8')) 298 
 299 
    def _unique_preserving_order(self, seq): 300 
        ''' 301 
        Returns unique tokens in a list, preserving order. Fastest version found in this 302 
        exercise: http://www.peterbe.com/plog/uniqifiers-benchmark 303 
        ''' 304 
        seen = set() 305 
        seen_add = seen.add 306 
        return [x for x in seq if not (x in seen or seen_add(x))] 307 
 308 
    def get_fingerprint(self): 309 
        ''' 310 
        Gets conventional fingerpint. 311 
        ''' 312 
        return self._latinize(' '.join( 313 
            self._unique_preserving_order( 314 
                sorted(self.string.split()) 315 
            ) 316 
        )) 317 
 318 
    def get_ngram_fingerprint(self, n=1): 319 
        ''' 320 
        Gets ngram fingerpint based on n-length shingles of the string. 321 
        Default is 1. 322 
        ''' 323 
        return self._latinize(''.join( 324 
            self._unique_preserving_order( 325 
                sorted([self.string[i:i + n] for i in range(len(self.string) - n + 1)]) 326 
            ) 327 
        )) 328 
 329 
 330 
def getFingerprint(text): 331 
        f = Fingerprinter(text) 332 
        f.get_fingerprint() 333 
        return f.get_ngram_fingerprint(n=1) 334 
 335 
 336 
def compute_1(path): 337 
    with open(path, 'rb') as f: 338 
        data = f.read() 339 
        hs = tlsh.hash(data) 340 
    return hs 341 
 342 
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def compute_2(path): 343 
    h = tlsh.Tlsh() 344 
    with open(path, 'rb') as f: 345 
        for buf in iter(lambda: f.read(512), b''): 346 
            h.update(buf) 347 
    h.final() 348 
    return h 349 
 350 
 351 
def readDoc(path): 352 
    name = 1 353 
     354 
    docList = [] 355 
 356 
    for filename in os.listdir(path): 357 
  358 
         if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 359 
               continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 360 
 361 
         doc = path+'/'+filename 362 
  #shutil.move(doc, 'txt/'+str(name).zfill(4)+'.txt') 363 
  docList.append(path+'/'+filename) 364 
  name += 1 365 
    return docList 366 
def docStats(): 367 
 path = 'tmp/txt/' 368 
 numOfChar = [] 369 
 numOfWords = [] 370 
 numOfLines = [] 371 
 numOfPars = [] 372 
 numOfPages = [] 373 
 374 
 for filename in os.listdir(path): 375 
  376 
  if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 377 
                 continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 378 
  with open('txt/'+filename) as file: 379 
   lines = file.read().splitlines() 380 
   paras = [value for value in lines[:] if value != '\t'] 381 
   text = ' '.join(lines) 382 
   wordsList = text.split() 383 
   chars = ''.join(wordsList) 384 
    385 
    386 
   numOfChar.append(len(chars)) 387 
   numOfWords.append(len(wordsList)) 388 
   numOfLines.append(len(lines)) 389 
   numOfPars.append(len(paras)) 390 
   numOfPages.append(len(wordsList)/250)  391 
 392 
 return [[min(numOfChar), max(numOfChar), sum(numOfChar)/6000], [min(numOfWords), 393 
max(numOfWords), sum(numOfWords)/6000],[min(numOfLines), max(numOfLines), 394 
sum(numOfLines)/6000], [min(numOfPars), max(numOfPars), 395 
sum(numOfPars)/6000],[min(numOfPages), max(numOfPages), sum(numOfPages)/6000]] 396 
 397 
 398 
def delWordsInc(): 399 
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 import os.path 400 
 path = 'tmp/txt/' 401 
 402 
 403 
 for numWords in range(1,101): 404 
  n = 1 405 
  for filename in range(1,6001): 406 
   print(str(numWords)+':'+str(n)) 407 
    408 
   filename = str(filename).zfill(4)+'.txt' 409 
 410 
   if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 411 
           continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 412 
 413 
   with open('tmp/txt/'+filename) as file: 414 
    wordsList = file.read().split() 415 
 416 
 417 
    for i in range(0, numWords): 418 
     del wordsList[randint(0, len(wordsList)-1)] 419 
    420 
    421 
    text = ' '.join(wordsList) 422 
   if not os.path.exists('modifiedText/delWordsInc/'+str(numWords).zfill(3)): 423 
    os.makedirs('modifiedText/delWordsInc/'+str(numWords).zfill(3)) 424 
 425 
   with open('modifiedText/delWordsInc/'+str(numWords).zfill(3)+'/'+filename, 426 
'wb') as f: 427 
    f.write(text) 428 
 429 
   if os.path.exists('hash/delWordsInc/'+str(numWords).zfill(3)+'.txt'): 430 
    with open('hash/delWordsInc/'+str(numWords).zfill(3)+'.txt', 'a') as 431 
hashFile: 432 
     hash = 433 
compute_1('modifiedText/delWordsInc/'+str(numWords).zfill(3)+'/'+filename) 434 
     hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 435 
 436 
   else: 437 
    with open('hash/delWordsInc/'+str(numWords).zfill(3)+'.txt', 'wb') as 438 
hashFile: 439 
     hash = 440 
compute_1('modifiedText/delWordsInc/'+str(numWords).zfill(3)+'/'+filename) 441 
     hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 442 
  443 
 444 
 445 
   os.remove('modifiedText/delWordsInc/'+str(numWords).zfill(3)+'/'+filename) 446 
 447 
   n += 1 448 
    449 
 450 
def delWordsInc_test(): 451 
 import os.path 452 
 path = 'tmp/txt/' 453 
 454 
 455 
 for numWords in range(1,2): 456 
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  n = 1 457 
  for filename in range(1,6001): 458 
   print(str(numWords)+':'+str(n)) 459 
    460 
   filename = str(filename).zfill(4)+'.txt' 461 
 462 
   if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 463 
           continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 464 
 465 
   with open('tmp/txt/'+filename) as file: 466 
    wordsList = file.read().split() 467 
 468 
 469 
    for i in range(0, numWords): 470 
     #del wordsList[randint(0, len(wordsList)-1)] 471 
     #del wordsList[10]    472 
     pass 473 
    text = ' '.join(wordsList) 474 
   if not os.path.exists('modifiedText/delWordsInc2/'+str(numWords).zfill(3)): 475 
    os.makedirs('modifiedText/delWordsInc2/'+str(numWords).zfill(3)) 476 
 477 
   with open('modifiedText/delWordsInc2/'+str(numWords).zfill(3)+'/'+filename, 478 
'wb') as f: 479 
    f.write(text) 480 
 481 
   if os.path.exists('hash/delWordsInc2/'+str(numWords).zfill(3)+'.txt'): 482 
    with open('hash/delWordsInc2/'+str(numWords).zfill(3)+'.txt', 'a') as 483 
hashFile: 484 
     hash = 485 
compute_1('modifiedText/delWordsInc2/'+str(numWords).zfill(3)+'/'+filename) 486 
     hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 487 
 488 
   else: 489 
    with open('hash/delWordsInc2/'+str(numWords).zfill(3)+'.txt', 'wb') 490 
as hashFile: 491 
     hash = 492 
compute_1('modifiedText/delWordsInc2/'+str(numWords).zfill(3)+'/'+filename) 493 
     hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 494 
  495 
 496 
 497 
  498 
 os.remove('modifiedText/delWordsInc2/'+str(numWords).zfill(3)+'/'+filename) 499 
 500 
   n += 1 501 
    502 
   503 
def delWordsIncRand(): 504 
 path = 'tmp/txt/' 505 
 kList = [] 506 
 n = 1 507 
 508 
 for filename in os.listdir(path): 509 
  print(n) 510 
 511 
  k= randint(1, 101) 512 
  kList.append(k)  513 
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  if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 514 
                 continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 515 
  with open('tmp/txt/'+filename) as f: 516 
   wordsList = f.read().split() 517 
 518 
 519 
   for i in range(0, k): 520 
    del wordsList[randint(0, len(wordsList)-1)] 521 
    522 
    523 
   text = ' '.join(wordsList) 524 
 525 
  with open('modifiedText/delWordsIncRand/'+filename, 'wb') as f2: 526 
   f2.write(text) 527 
    528 
  if os.path.exists('hash/delWordsIncRand.txt'): 529 
   with open('hash/delWordsIncRand.txt', 'a') as hashFile: 530 
    hash = compute_1('modifiedText/delWordsIncRand/'+filename) 531 
    hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 532 
 533 
  else: 534 
   with open('hash/delWordsIncRand.txt', 'wb') as hashFile: 535 
    hash = compute_1('modifiedText/delWordsIncRand/'+filename) 536 




  os.remove('modifiedText/delWordsIncRand/'+filename) 541 
 542 
  n += 1 543 
  544 
 pickle.dump(kList, open('plots/delWordsIncRand.p', "wb")) 545 
 return kList 546 
 547 
def delWords(): 548 
 path = 'tmp/txt/' 549 
 kList = [] 550 
 n = 1 551 
 for filename in os.listdir(path): 552 
  print(n) 553 
  k= randint(1, 101) 554 
  kList.append(k)  555 
  if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 556 
                 continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 557 
   558 
 559 
 560 
  with open('tmp/txt/'+filename) as file: 561 
   wordsList = file.read().split() 562 
   for i in range(0, k): 563 
    del wordsList[randint(0, len(wordsList)-1)] 564 
    565 
    566 
   text = ' '.join(wordsList) 567 
  with open('modifiedText/delWords/'+filename, 'wb') as f: 568 
   f.write(text) 569 
  n += 1 570 
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  571 
 pickle.dump(kList, open('plots/delWords.p', "wb")) 572 
 return kList 573 
 574 
def swapWords(): 575 
 kList = [] 576 
 n = 1 577 
 for filename in os.listdir('tmp/txt/'): 578 
  print(n) 579 
  k= randint(1, 51) 580 
  kList.append(k)  581 
  if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 582 
                 continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 583 
   584 
  with open('tmp/txt/'+filename) as file: 585 
   wordsList = file.read().split() 586 
   587 
   for itera in range(0, k): 588 
    i = randint(0, len(wordsList)-1) 589 
    j = randint(0, len(wordsList)-1) 590 
    wordsList[i], wordsList[j] = wordsList[j], wordsList[i] 591 
    592 
   #print(len(wordsList)) 593 
   text = ' '.join(wordsList) 594 
 595 
  if not os.path.exists('modifiedText/swapWords'): 596 
   os.makedirs('modifiedText/swapWords') 597 
 598 
  with open('modifiedText/swapWords/'+filename, 'wb') as f2: 599 
   f2.write(text) 600 
    601 
  if os.path.exists('hash/swapWords.txt'): 602 
   with open('hash/swapWords.txt', 'a') as hashFile: 603 
    hash = compute_1('modifiedText/swapWords/'+filename) 604 
    hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 605 
 606 
  else: 607 
   with open('hash/swapWords.txt', 'wb') as hashFile: 608 
    hash = compute_1('modifiedText/swapWords/'+filename) 609 
    hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 610 
 611 
 612 
  os.remove('modifiedText/swapWords/'+filename) 613 
 614 
   615 
  n += 1 616 
  617 
 pickle.dump(kList, open('plots/swapWords.p', "wb")) 618 
 return kList 619 
 620 
 621 
def wordsSyn(): 622 
 623 
 # Load a text file if required 624 
 # Load the pretrained neural net 625 
 #nltk.download('punkt') 626 
 #nltk.download('averaged_perceptron_tagger') 627 
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 #nltk.download('wordnet') 628 
 629 
 kList = [] 630 
 n = 1 631 
 tokenizer = nltk.data.load('tokenizers/punkt/english.pickle') 632 
 for filename in os.listdir('tmp/txt/'): 633 
  output = "" 634 
  print(n) 635 
  k= randint(1, 101) 636 
  kList.append(k)  637 
  if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 638 
                 continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 639 
   640 
  with open('tmp/txt/'+filename) as file: 641 
 642 
   words = file.read().split() 643 
   644 
 645 
   # Identify the parts of speech 646 
 647 
   tagged = nltk.pos_tag(words) 648 
   removedWords = [] 649 
   for item in range(0, k): 650 
    ind = randint(0, len(words)-1) 651 
    removedWords.append(ind) 652 
 653 
   for i in range(0,len(words)): 654 
       replacements = [] 655 
  656 
       # Only replace nouns with nouns, vowels with vowels etc. 657 
       for syn in wordnet.synsets(words[i]): 658 
   659 
    # Do not attempt to replace proper nouns or determiners 660 
    if tagged[i][1] == 'NNP' or tagged[i][1] == 'DT': 661 
        break 662 
 663 
    if i not in removedWords: 664 
        break 665 
    # The tokenizer returns strings like NNP, VBP etc 666 
    # but the wordnet synonyms has tags like .n. 667 
    # So we extract the first character from NNP ie n 668 
    # then we check if the dictionary word has a .n. or not 669 
 670 
  671 
    word_type = tagged[i][1][0].lower() 672 
 673 
    if syn.name().find("."+word_type+"."): 674 
        # extract the word only 675 
        r = syn.name()[0:syn.name().find(".")] 676 
        replacements.append(r) 677 
        678 
       if len(replacements) > 0: 679 
    # Choose a random replacement 680 
    replacement = replacements[randint(0,len(replacements)-1)] 681 
    output = output + " " + replacement 682 
    683 
       else: 684 
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    # If no replacement could be found, then just use the 685 
    # original word 686 
    output = output + " " + words[i] 687 
 688 
  if not os.path.exists('modifiedText/wordsSyn'): 689 
   os.makedirs('modifiedText/wordsSyn') 690 
 691 
  with open('modifiedText/wordsSyn/'+filename, 'wb') as f2: 692 
   f2.write(output) 693 
    694 
  if os.path.exists('hash/wordsSyn.txt'): 695 
   with open('hash/wordsSyn.txt', 'a') as hashFile: 696 
    hash = compute_1('modifiedText/wordsSyn/'+filename) 697 
    hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 698 
 699 
  else: 700 
   with open('hash/wordsSyn.txt', 'wb') as hashFile: 701 
    hash = compute_1('modifiedText/wordsSyn/'+filename) 702 
    hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 703 
 704 
 705 
  os.remove('modifiedText/wordsSyn/'+filename) 706 
 707 
  n += 1 708 
  709 
 pickle.dump(kList, open('plots/wordsSyn.p', "wb")) 710 
 return kList 711 
 712 
def delLines(): 713 
  714 
 kList = [] 715 
 n = 1 716 
 717 
 for filename in os.listdir('txt/'): 718 
  print(n) 719 
  k= randint(1, 11) 720 
  kList.append(k)  721 
 722 
  if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 723 
                 continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 724 
   725 
  with open('txt/'+filename) as file: 726 
   lines = file.read().splitlines() 727 
 728 
   random_lines = random.sample(lines, k) 729 
    730 
   with open('tmp/cm/'+filename, 'wb') as output_file: 731 
     output_file.writelines(line + "\n" 732 
             for line in lines if line not in random_lines) 733 
 734 
   #elif lines: # file is too small 735 
       #print("\n".join(lines)) # print all lines 736 
       #with open('modifiedText/delLines/'+filename, 'wb', 0): # empty the file 737 
     #pass 738 
    739 
 740 
  with open('tmp/cm/'+filename) as final_file: 741 
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   wordsList = final_file.read().split() 742 
   text = ' '.join(wordsList) 743 
    744 
  with open('modifiedText/delLines/'+filename, 'wb') as modFile: # empty the file 745 
   modFile.write(text) 746 
 747 
  n += 1 748 
 749 
 pickle.dump(kList, open('plots/delLines.p', "wb")) 750 
 return kList 751 
 752 
def linesAllignemt(): 753 
  754 
 kList = [] 755 
 n = 1 756 
 757 
 for filename in os.listdir('txt/'): 758 
  print(n) 759 
  k= randint(1, 11) 760 
  if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 761 
                 continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 762 
   763 
  with open('txt/'+filename) as file: 764 
   lines = file.read().splitlines() 765 
 766 
   random_lines = random.sample(lines, k) 767 
    768 
   with open('tmp/cm/'+filename, 'wb') as output_file: 769 
     output_file.writelines(line + "\n" for line in lines if line not 770 
in random_lines) 771 
 772 
   #elif lines: # file is too small 773 
       #print("\n".join(lines)) # print all lines 774 
       #with open('modifiedText/delLines/'+filename, 'wb', 0): # empty the file 775 
     #pass 776 
    777 
  with open('tmp/cm/'+filename) as f1: 778 
   wordsList = f1.read().split() 779 
   text = ' '.join(wordsList) 780 
  781 
  if not os.path.exists('modifiedText/delLines'): 782 
   os.makedirs('modifiedText/delLines') 783 
 784 
  with open('modifiedText/delLines/'+filename, 'wb') as f2: 785 
   f2.write(text) 786 
    787 
  if os.path.exists('hash/delLines.txt'): 788 
   with open('hash/delLines.txt', 'a') as hashFile: 789 
    hash = compute_1('modifiedText/delLines/'+filename) 790 
    hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 791 
 792 
  else: 793 
   with open('hash/delLines.txt', 'wb') as hashFile: 794 
    hash = compute_1('modifiedText/delLines/'+filename) 795 
    hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 796 
 797 
 798 
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  os.remove('modifiedText/delLines/'+filename) 799 
  n += 1 800 
 801 
 pickle.dump(kList, open('plots/delLines.p', "wb")) 802 
 return kList 803 
 804 
 805 
def swapLines(): 806 
 kList = [] 807 
 n = 1 808 
 809 
 for filename in os.listdir('txt/'): 810 
  print(n) 811 
  k= randint(1, 11) 812 
  kList.append(k)  813 
 814 
  if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 815 
                 continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 816 
   817 
  with open('txt/'+filename) as file: 818 
   lines = file.read().splitlines() 819 
   for itera in range(1, k): 820 
    i = randint(0, len(lines)-1) 821 
    j = randint(0, len(lines)-1) 822 
    lines[i], lines[j] = lines[j], lines[i] 823 
    text = ' '.join(lines) 824 
 825 
 826 
    827 
  with open('tmp/cm/'+filename, 'wb') as modFile: # empty the file 828 
   modFile.write(text) 829 
 830 
  with open('tmp/cm/'+filename) as final_file: 831 
   wordsList = final_file.read().split() 832 
   text = ' '.join(wordsList) 833 
 834 
  if not os.path.exists('modifiedText/swapLines'): 835 
   os.makedirs('modifiedText/swapLines') 836 
 837 
  with open('modifiedText/swapLines/'+filename, 'wb') as f2: 838 
   f2.write(text) 839 
    840 
  if os.path.exists('hash/swapLines.txt'): 841 
   with open('hash/swapLines.txt', 'a') as hashFile: 842 
    hash = compute_1('modifiedText/swapLines/'+filename) 843 
    hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 844 
 845 
  else: 846 
   with open('hash/swapLines.txt', 'wb') as hashFile: 847 
    hash = compute_1('modifiedText/swapLines/'+filename) 848 
    hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 849 
 850 
 851 
  n += 1 852 
 853 
 pickle.dump(kList, open('plots/swapLines.p', "wb")) 854 
 return kList 855 






def swapSentences(): 859 
 kList = [] 860 
 n = 1 861 
 tokenizer = nltk.data.load('tokenizers/punkt/english.pickle') 862 
 for filename in os.listdir('tmp/txt/'): 863 
  print(n) 864 
  k= randint(1, 6) 865 
  kList.append(k)   866 
  if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 867 
                 continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 868 
   869 
  with open('tmp/txt/'+filename) as file: 870 
   text = file.read() 871 
   sentences = tokenizer.tokenize(text) 872 
     873 
  for itera in range(1, k): 874 
     i = randint(0, len(sentences)-1) 875 
     j = randint(0, len(sentences)-1) 876 
     sentences[i], sentences[j] = sentences[j], sentences[i] 877 
    878 
  text = ' '.join(sentences) 879 
 880 
   881 
  if not os.path.exists('modifiedText/swapSentences'): 882 
   os.makedirs('modifiedText/swapSentences') 883 
 884 
  with open('modifiedText/swapSentences/'+filename, 'wb') as f2: 885 
   f2.write(text) 886 
    887 
  if os.path.exists('hash/swapSentences.txt'): 888 
   with open('hash/swapSentences.txt', 'a') as hashFile: 889 
    hash = compute_1('modifiedText/swapSentences/'+filename) 890 
    hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 891 
 892 
  else: 893 
   with open('hash/swapSentences.txt', 'wb') as hashFile: 894 
    hash = compute_1('modifiedText/swapSentences/'+filename) 895 
    hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 896 
 897 
 898 
  os.remove('modifiedText/swapSentences/'+filename) 899 
   900 
  n += 1 901 
 902 
 pickle.dump(kList, open('plots/swapSentences.p', "wb")) 903 
 return kList 904 
def delSentences(): 905 
 kList = [] 906 
 n = 1 907 
 tokenizer = nltk.data.load('tokenizers/punkt/english.pickle') 908 
 for filename in os.listdir('tmp/txt/'): 909 
  print(n) 910 
  k= randint(1, 11) 911 
  kList.append(k)   912 
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  if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 913 
                 continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 914 
   915 
  with open('tmp/txt/'+filename) as file: 916 
   text = file.read() 917 
   sentences = tokenizer.tokenize(text) 918 
    919 
  for itera in range(1, k): 920 
   try: 921 
    del sentences[randint(0, len(sentences)-1)] 922 
   except: 923 
    pass 924 
  text = ' '.join(sentences) 925 
  926 
  if not os.path.exists('modifiedText/delSentences'): 927 
   os.makedirs('modifiedText/delSentences') 928 
 929 
  with open('modifiedText/delSentences/'+filename, 'wb') as f2: 930 
   f2.write(text) 931 
    932 
  if os.path.exists('hash/delSentences.txt'): 933 
   with open('hash/delSentences.txt', 'a') as hashFile: 934 
    hash = compute_1('modifiedText/delSentences/'+filename) 935 
    hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 936 
 937 
  else: 938 
   with open('hash/delSentences.txt', 'wb') as hashFile: 939 
    hash = compute_1('modifiedText/delSentences/'+filename) 940 
    hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 941 
 942 
 943 
  os.remove('modifiedText/delSentences/'+filename) 944 
  n += 1 945 
 pickle.dump(kList, open('plots/delSentences.p', "wb")) 946 
 return kList 947 
 948 
def insertWords(): 949 
  950 
 kList = [] 951 
 n = 1 952 
 with open('wordsList.txt') as file: 953 
   wordsList = file.read().split() 954 
 955 
 tokenizer = nltk.data.load('tokenizers/punkt/english.pickle') 956 
 for filename in os.listdir('tmp/txt/'): 957 
  print(n) 958 
  k= randint(1, 101) 959 
  kList.append(k)  960 
  if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 961 
                 continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 962 
   963 
  with open('tmp/txt/'+filename) as file: 964 
   words = file.read().split() 965 
    966 
   967 
  for itera in range(0, k): 968 
   words.insert(randint(0, len(words)-1), wordsList[randint(0, len(wordsList)-1)]) 969 
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   970 
    971 
  text = ' '.join(words) 972 
  973 
  if not os.path.exists('modifiedText/insertWords'): 974 
   os.makedirs('modifiedText/insertWords') 975 
 976 
  with open('modifiedText/insertWords/'+filename, 'wb') as f2: 977 
   f2.write(text) 978 
    979 
  if os.path.exists('hash/insertWords.txt'): 980 
   with open('hash/insertWords.txt', 'a') as hashFile: 981 
    hash = compute_1('modifiedText/insertWords/'+filename) 982 
    hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 983 
 984 
  else: 985 
   with open('hash/insertWords.txt', 'wb') as hashFile: 986 
    hash = compute_1('modifiedText/insertWords/'+filename) 987 
    hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 988 
 989 
 990 
  os.remove('modifiedText/insertWords/'+filename) 991 
  992 
  n += 1 993 
 994 
 pickle.dump(kList, open('plots/insertWords.p', "wb")) 995 
 return kList 996 
 997 
def delLine_range(): 998 
  999 
 k= 0.20 1000 
 for filename in os.listdir('wikileaks-crs-reports'): 1001 
 #for filename in os.listdir('test'): 1002 
  #print(filename) 1003 
  if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 1004 
                 continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 1005 
   1006 
  with open('wikileaks-crs-reports/'+filename) as file: 1007 
  #with open('test/'+filename) as file: 1008 
   lines = file.read().splitlines() 1009 
    1010 
  removePercentage = int(round(len(lines)*k)) 1011 
  idx = random.randint(0, len(lines)-removePercentage) 1012 
     1013 
  random_lines = random.sample(lines, int(removePercentage)) 1014 
   1015 
  with open('modifiedText/randomRangeLines/20/'+filename, 'w') as output_file: 1016 
   output_file.writelines(line + "\n" 1017 
                  for line in lines if line not in lines[idx:idx+removePercentage]) 1018 
def swapParas(): 1019 
 kList = [] 1020 
 n = 1 1021 
 1022 
 for filename in os.listdir('txt/'): 1023 
  print(n) 1024 
  k= randint(1, 11) 1025 
  kList.append(k)  1026 




  if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 1028 
                 continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 1029 
   1030 
  with open('txt/'+filename) as file: 1031 
   paragraphs = file.read().splitlines() 1032 
   paragraphs = [value for value in paragraphs[:] if value != '\t'] 1033 
   for itera in range(1, k): 1034 
     i = randint(0, len(paragraphs)-1) 1035 
     j = randint(0, len(paragraphs)-1) 1036 
     paragraphs[i], paragraphs[j] = paragraphs[j], paragraphs[i] 1037 
    1038 
   text = ' '.join(paragraphs) 1039 
 1040 
  with open('tmp/cm/'+filename, 'wb') as modFile: 1041 
   modFile.write(text) 1042 
 1043 
  with open('tmp/cm/'+filename) as final_file: 1044 
   wordsList = final_file.read().split() 1045 
   text = ' '.join(wordsList) 1046 
 1047 
  if not os.path.exists('modifiedText/swapParas'): 1048 
   os.makedirs('modifiedText/swapParas') 1049 
 1050 
  with open('modifiedText/swapParas/'+filename, 'wb') as f2: 1051 
   f2.write(text) 1052 
    1053 
  if os.path.exists('hash/swapParas.txt'): 1054 
   with open('hash/swapParas.txt', 'a') as hashFile: 1055 
    hash = compute_1('modifiedText/swapParas/'+filename) 1056 
    hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 1057 
 1058 
  else: 1059 
   with open('hash/swapParas.txt', 'wb') as hashFile: 1060 
    hash = compute_1('modifiedText/swapParas/'+filename) 1061 
    hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 1062 
 1063 
 1064 
  os.remove('modifiedText/swapParas/'+filename) 1065 
  1066 
  n += 1 1067 
 1068 
 pickle.dump(kList, open('plots/swapParas.p', "wb")) 1069 
 return kList 1070 
 1071 
def delParas(): 1072 
 kList = [] 1073 
 n = 1 1074 
 1075 
 for filename in os.listdir('txt/'): 1076 
  print(n) 1077 
  k= randint(1, 11) 1078 
  kList.append(k)  1079 
 1080 
  if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 1081 
                 continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 1082 
   1083 
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  with open('txt/'+filename) as file: 1084 
   paragraphs = file.read().splitlines() 1085 
   paragraphs = [value for value in paragraphs[:] if value != '\t'] 1086 
   for itera in range(1, k): 1087 
    del paragraphs[randint(0, len(paragraphs)-1)] 1088 
    1089 
   text = ' '.join(paragraphs) 1090 
 1091 
   #print(paragraphs) 1092 
  with open('tmp/cm/'+filename, 'wb') as modFile: 1093 
   modFile.write(text) 1094 
 1095 
  with open('tmp/cm/'+filename) as final_file: 1096 
   wordsList = final_file.read().split() 1097 
   text = ' '.join(wordsList) 1098 
 1099 
  if not os.path.exists('modifiedText/delParas'): 1100 
   os.makedirs('modifiedText/delParas') 1101 
 1102 
  with open('modifiedText/delParas/'+filename, 'wb') as f2: 1103 
   f2.write(text) 1104 
    1105 
  if os.path.exists('hash/delParas.txt'): 1106 
   with open('hash/delParas.txt', 'a') as hashFile: 1107 
    hash = compute_1('modifiedText/delParas/'+filename) 1108 
    hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 1109 
 1110 
  else: 1111 
   with open('hash/delParas.txt', 'wb') as hashFile: 1112 
    hash = compute_1('modifiedText/delParas/'+filename) 1113 
    hashFile.write(filename[0:4]+str(hash)+'\n') 1114 
 1115 
 1116 
  os.remove('modifiedText/delParas/'+filename) 1117 
  1118 
  n += 1 1119 
 1120 
 pickle.dump(kList, open('plots/delParas.p', "wb")) 1121 
 return kList 1122 
   1123 
  1124 
def delPara(folder): 1125 
 path = 'modifiedText/randomPara/'+folder 1126 
  1127 
 n = 1 1128 
 if os.path.exists('tmp'): 1129 
  shutil.rmtree('tmp') 1130 
 os.mkdir('tmp') 1131 
 for filename in os.listdir(path): 1132 
  print(n) 1133 
  os.mkdir('tmp/'+filename[:-4]) 1134 
 #for filename in os.listdir('test'): 1135 
  #print(filename) 1136 
  if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 1137 
                 continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 1138 
   1139 
  optimizedPara = [] 1140 
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  with open(path+'/'+filename, 'r') as file: 1141 
  #with open('test/'+filename) as file: 1142 
   paragraphs = file.read().splitlines() 1143 
   paragraphs = (value for value in paragraphs[:] if value != '\t') 1144 
 1145 
   ITEM ='' 1146 
   1147 
   for para in paragraphs: 1148 
    #print(para) 1149 
    if len(ITEM) < 260 : 1150 
     ITEM = ITEM+para+' ' 1151 
        1152 
    else: 1153 
     optimizedPara.append(ITEM) 1154 
     ITEM = '' 1155 
   1156 
  for index, newPara in enumerate(optimizedPara): 1157 
   with open('tmp/'+filename[:-4]+'/'+str(index).zfill(4)+'.txt', 'w') as f: 1158 
    f.write(newPara)  1159 
   1160 
  hashTocsv(generateHash(readDoc('tmp/'+filename[:-4]+'/')), filename, folder) 1161 
  n += 1 1162 
 1163 
 1164 
def ParaHash2Ways(folder): 1165 
 path = 'modifiedText/randomLines/'+folder 1166 
 #path = 'wikileaks-crs-reports' 1167 
  1168 
 n = 1 1169 
 if os.path.exists('tmp'): 1170 
  shutil.rmtree('tmp') 1171 
 os.mkdir('tmp') 1172 
 for filename in os.listdir(path): 1173 
  print(n) 1174 
  os.mkdir('tmp/'+filename[:-4]) 1175 
 1176 
  if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 1177 
                 continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 1178 
   1179 
  optimizedPara = [] 1180 
  with open(path+'/'+filename, 'r') as file: 1181 
   paragraphs = file.read().splitlines() 1182 
   paragraphs = [value for value in paragraphs[:] if value != '\t'] 1183 
 1184 
   ITEM ='' 1185 
   1186 
   for para in reversed(paragraphs): 1187 
     1188 
    if len(ITEM) < 260 : 1189 
     ITEM = ITEM+para+' ' 1190 
        1191 
    else: 1192 
     optimizedPara.append(ITEM) 1193 
     ITEM = '' 1194 
   1195 
  for index, newPara in enumerate(optimizedPara): 1196 
   with open('tmp/'+filename[:-4]+'/'+str(index).zfill(4)+'.txt', 'w') as f: 1197 
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    f.write(newPara)  1198 
   1199 
  hashTocsv(generateHash(readDoc('tmp/'+filename[:-4]+'/')), folder, filename) 1200 




def delParaFormText(): 1205 
 path = 'wikileaks-crs-reports' 1206 
 k= 0.40 1207 
  1208 
 n = 1 1209 
 for filename in os.listdir(path): 1210 
  print(n) 1211 
  if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 1212 
                 continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 1213 
   1214 
   1215 
  with open(path+'/'+filename, 'r') as file: 1216 
   1217 
   paragraphs = file.read().splitlines() 1218 
   paragraphs[:] = (value for value in paragraphs[:] if value != '\t') 1219 
 1220 
  removePercentage = int(round(len(paragraphs[:])*k)) 1221 
  idx = random.randint(0, len(paragraphs[:])-removePercentage) 1222 
     1223 
  random_lines = random.sample(paragraphs[:], int(removePercentage)) 1224 
 1225 
  with open('modifiedText/randomPara/40/'+filename, 'w') as output_file: 1226 
   output_file.writelines(line + "\n" 1227 
                  for line in paragraphs[:] if line not in random_lines) 1228 
  n += 1 1229 
 1230 
def ParaList(): 1231 
 #path = 'modifiedText/randomPara/'+folder 1232 
 path = 'test' 1233 
  1234 
 n = 1 1235 
 if os.path.exists('tmp'): 1236 
  shutil.rmtree('tmp') 1237 
 os.mkdir('tmp') 1238 
 for filename in os.listdir(path): 1239 
  print(n) 1240 
  os.mkdir('tmp/'+filename[:-4]) 1241 
 1242 
  if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 1243 
                 continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 1244 
   1245 
  optimizedPara = [] 1246 
  with open(path+'/'+filename, 'r') as file: 1247 
      1248 
       lines=0 1249 
       words=0 1250 
       characters=0 1251 
 1252 
       for line in file: 1253 
        wordslist = line.split() 1254 
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        lines=lines+1 1255 
        words=words+len(wordslist) 1256 
        characters += sum(len(word) for word in wordslist) 1257 
       print(lines) 1258 
       print(words) 1259 
       print(characters) 1260 
       paragraphs = file.read().splitlines() 1261 
       paragraphs = (value for value in paragraphs[:] if value != '\t') 1262 
        1263 
       ITEM ='' 1264 
       for para in paragraphs: 1265 
        if len(ITEM) < 260 : 1266 
         ITEM = ITEM+para+' ' 1267 
        else: 1268 
         optimizedPara.append(ITEM) 1269 
         ITEM = '' 1270 




def generateHash(docList): 1275 
 n = 1 1276 
 hashList= [] 1277 
 for index, doc in enumerate(docList): 1278 
     #letters = ['A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F'] 1279 
     1280 
     #delLine(doc) 1281 
     1282 
 1283 
     hash = compute_1(doc) 1284 
     hashList.append(hash) 1285 
      1286 
     #print(len(hash[3:])) 1287 
       1288 
    1289 
      1290 
     #for num in numbers: 1291 
   1292 
   1293 
  #if str(num) not in hash[6:]: 1294 
      #n +=1 1295 
      #print('doc#',n,num) 1296 
      #print(getFingerprint(str(hash[6:]))) 1297 
      #for index, letter in enumerate(letters): 1298 
   #if letter in hash[3:]: 1299 
      # print(num,':',letter) 1300 
      # del letters[index] 1301 
      # break 1302 
   #else: 1303 
   # print(hash[6:]) 1304 
   # print('Not found') 1305 
   # continue 1306 
    1307 
   1308 
      1309 
      1310 
 return hashList 1311 




def hashTocsv(hashList): 1313 
 1314 
  1315 
 with open('hash/original/original.txt', 'wb') as f: 1316 
   1317 
  for index, line in enumerate(hashList): 1318 
    1319 
   f.write(line+'\n') 1320 
  1321 
 1322 
 1323 
def wirteTextPDF(docs): 1324 
   1325 
  for filename in os.listdir(docs): 1326 
  #for filename in os.listdir('test'): 1327 
   #print(filename) 1328 
   if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 1329 
           continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself 1330 
   1331 
   with open(docs+'/'+filename, 'r') as file: 1332 
   1333 
    c = canvas.Canvas('pdf /'+filename[:-4]+'.pdf') 1334 
    c.drawString(100,750, file) 1335 




def text2pdf(): 1340 
 path = 'txt/' 1341 
 k = 1 1342 
 for filename in os.listdir(path):  1343 
   print(k) 1344 
   if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 1345 
         continue # skip non-image files and the logo file itself  1346 
    1347 
   outputfn='pdf/'+filename[:-4]+'.pdf' 1348 
   command = str('python txt2pdf.py -o '+outputfn+' '+path+filename) 1349 
   print(command) 1350 




def tex2docx(): 1355 
 n = 1 1356 
 path = 'cleanedText/' 1357 
 for filename in os.listdir(path): 1358 
     print(n) 1359 
     document = Document() 1360 
     #document.add_heading(filename, 0) 1361 
     myfile = open(path+filename).read() 1362 
     myfile = re.sub(r'[^\x00-\x7F]+|\x0c',' ', myfile) # remove all non-XML-compatible characters 1363 
     p = document.add_paragraph(myfile) 1364 
     document.save('docx/'+filename[:-4]+'.docx') 1365 
     n += 1 1366 
  1367 
def pdf2txt(path): 1368 
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    rsrcmgr = PDFResourceManager() 1369 
    retstr = io.BytesIO() 1370 
    codec = 'utf-8' 1371 
    laparams = LAParams() 1372 
    device = TextConverter(rsrcmgr, retstr, codec=codec, laparams=laparams) 1373 
    fp = open(path, 'rb') 1374 
    interpreter = PDFPageInterpreter(rsrcmgr, device) 1375 
    password = "" 1376 
    maxpages = 0 1377 
    caching = True 1378 
    pagenos = set() 1379 
 1380 
    for page in PDFPage.get_pages(fp, pagenos, maxpages=maxpages, 1381 
                                  password=password, 1382 
                                  caching=caching, 1383 
                                  check_extractable=True): 1384 
        interpreter.process_page(page) 1385 
 1386 
    text = retstr.getvalue() 1387 
 1388 
    fp.close() 1389 
    device.close() 1390 
    retstr.close() 1391 
    myfile = re.sub(r'[^\x00-\x7F]+|\x0c',' ', text) # remove all non-XML-compatible characters 1392 
    text2 = "".join([s for s in myfile.splitlines(True) if s.strip("\r\n")]) 1393 
 1394 
    text3 = "".join([s.lstrip() for s in text2.splitlines(True) if s.lstrip()]) 1395 
 1396 
    return text3 1397 
 1398 
def docx2txt(path): 1399 
 document = Document(path) 1400 
        newparatextlist = [] 1401 
        for paratext in document.paragraphs: 1402 
            newparatextlist.append(paratext.text.encode("utf-8")) 1403 
 text2 = '\n\n'.join(newparatextlist) 1404 
 text3 = "".join([s.lstrip() for s in text2.splitlines(True) if s.lstrip()]) 1405 
        return text3 1406 
 1407 
 1408 
def text2file(filename): 1409 
  1410 
 if filename[-3:] == 'pdf': 1411 
  #print(pdf2txt(filename)) 1412 
  with open('tmp/'+filename[:-4]+'.txt', 'wb') as f: 1413 
   for line in pdf2txt(filename): 1414 
    f.write(line.rstrip('\n')) 1415 
  1416 
 elif filename[-4:] == 'docx': 1417 
  with open('tmp/txt/'+filename[:-5]+'.txt', 'wb') as f: 1418 
   for line in docx2txt(filename): 1419 
    f.write(line.rstrip('\n')) 1420 
 elif filename[-3:] == 'txt': 1421 
  with open('tmp/txt/'+filename[:-4]+'.txt', 'wb') as f: 1422 
   with open('txt/'+filename, 'rb') as text: 1423 
    line = "".join([s.lstrip() for s in text.readlines() if s.lstrip()]) 1424 
    line2 = "".join([s.rstrip('\n') for s in line if s.rstrip('\n')]) 1425 
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def tlshHash(): 1430 
 for doc in range(1,2): 1431 
         print(str(doc).zfill(4)) 1432 
  txt = 'txt/'+str(doc).zfill(4)+'.txt'  1433 
  docx = 'docx/'+str(doc).zfill(4)+'.docx' 1434 
  pdf = 'pdf/'+str(doc).zfill(4)+'.pdf' 1435 
   1436 
  text2file(txt) 1437 
  text2file(pdf) 1438 
  #text2file(docx) 1439 
   1440 
  if compute_1('tmp/'+txt[:-3]+'txt') == compute_1('tmp/'+docx[:-4]+'txt') and 1441 
compute_1('tmp/'+docx[:-4]+'txt') == compute_1('tmp/'+pdf[:-3]+'txt'): 1442 
   print(1)  1443 
  1444 
  else: 1445 
   print(0) 1446 
  print(compute_1('tmp/'+txt[:-3]+'txt')) 1447 
  print(compute_1('tmp/'+docx[:-4]+'txt')) 1448 
 1449 
  print(tlsh.diff(compute_1('tmp/'+txt[:-3]+'txt'), compute_1('tmp/'+docx[:-4]+'txt'))) 1450 
 1451 
def ocr(): 1452 
  1453 
 print(pytesseract.image_to_string(Image.open('test/temp.png'))) 1454 







#wordsSwap()    1462 
#delWordsInc() 1463 
 1464 
def loop(): 1465 
 n = 1 1466 
 for file in os.listdir('txt/'): 1467 
  print(n) 1468 
  text2file(file) 1469 
  n += 1 1470 
 1471 
 1472 
def plotHist(): 1473 
 x = swapParas() 1474 
 plt.hist(x, bins=20, edgecolor='black',linewidth=1) 1475 
 plt.title("Histogram of swapParas") 1476 
 plt.xlabel("Number of swapParas") 1477 
 plt.ylabel("Frequency") 1478 
 plt.savefig('plots/swapParas.png', bbox_inches='tight') 1479 
 #plt.show() 1480 
 1481 
def computeTLSH(): 1482 
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 #with open('hash/swapParas.txt', 'wb') as f: 1483 
 with open('hash/original.txt', 'wb') as f:  1484 
  for file in range(1,6001): 1485 
   #print(str(k)+':'+str(file)) 1486 
   filename = str(file).zfill(4)+'.txt' 1487 
   #text2file('txt/'+filename) 1488 
   hash = compute_1('tmp/txt/'+filename) 1489 












def joinWords(): 1502 
 size = [] 1503 
 for file in range(1,6001): 1504 
  filename = str(file).zfill(4)+'.txt' 1505 
  #text2file('txt/'+filename) 1506 
  size.append(os.stat('txt/'+filename).st_size/1000) 1507 
 #print(sorted(size)) 1508 
 #count, division = np.histogram(size, bins=3, range=[1, 300]) 1509 
 #for index, c in enumerate(count): 1510 
  #print(c, division[index]) 1511 
 1512 
 plt.hist(size, bins=3, edgecolor='w', range=[1,300]) 1513 
 plt.show() 1514 
 1515 
def computeAvgDiff(output): 1516 
 1517 
 diffList = [] 1518 
 filename = str(file).zfill(2)+'.txt' 1519 
 originalTLSH = pd.read_csv('hash/original.txt', header=None) 1520 
 ModifiedTLSH = pd.read_csv('hash/delWordsIncRand.txt', header=None) 1521 
 1522 
 for index, row in originalTLSH.iterrows(): 1523 
  #print(index+1) 1524 
  hex1 = row[0][4:] 1525 
  hex2 = [0][4:] 1526 
 1527 
  diffList.append(tlsh.diff(hex1, hex2)) 1528 
  1529 
 data = str(file)+','+str(min(diffList))+','+str(max(diffList))+','+str(sum(diffList)/6000)+'\n' 1530 
 output.write(data) 1531 
 1532 
 1533 
#for k in range(42,90): 1534 
 #delWordsInc(k) 1535 
 #computeTLSH(str(k).zfill(2)) 1536 
#stat = docStats() 1537 
#for list in stat: 1538 
# print(list) 1539 






with open('result/retrivel/HAShes_diff.csv', 'w') as output: 1543 
 computeAvgDiff(output) 1544 
 1545 
#print(len(compute_1('wordsList.txt'))) 1546 
#print('The total number of documents is:', len(docList)) 1547 




#hex1 = compute_1(sys.argv[1]) 1552 
#print(len(hex1)) 1553 
#print('tlsh.hash hex1', hex1) 1554 
#hex2 = compute_1(sys.argv[2]) 1555 
#print('tlshcd .hash hex2', hex2) 1556 
#print('tlsh.diff(hex1, hex2)', tlsh.diff(hex1, hex2)) 1557 
#print('tlsh.diff(hex2, hex1)', tlsh.diff(hex2, hex1)) 1558 
#h1 = compute_2(sys.argv[1]) 1559 
#hex1 = h1.hexdigest() 1560 
#print('tlsh.Tlsh hex1', hex1) 1561 
#h2 = compute_2(sys.argv[2]) 1562 
#hex2 = h2.hexdigest() 1563 
#print('tlsh.Tlsh hex2', hex2) 1564 
#print('h1.diff(h2)', h1.diff(h2)) 1565 
#print('h2.diff(h1)', h2.diff(h1)) 1566 
#print('h1.diff(hex2)', h1.diff(hex2)) 1567 
#print('h2.diff(hex1)', h2.diff(hex1)) 1568 
#h3 = tlsh.Tlsh() 1569 
#h3.fromTlshStr(hex2) 1570 
#print('tlsh.Tlsh.fromTlshStr', hex2) 1571 
#print('h3.diff(h2)', h3.diff(h2)) 1572 
     1573 
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9.7 Grille Cipher Mapping and Retrieving Script 1574 
Mapped to chapter 7 and 8 experimental investigations 
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- 1575 
""" 1576 
Created on Wed Jun 03 19:11:39 2015 1577 
 1578 
@author: aalruban 1579 
""" 1580 
import hashlib 1581 
from timeit import default_timer as timer 1582 
import collections, binascii # 1583 
import numpy as np 1584 
import time 1585 
from tqdm import tqdm #for counter the timer and status bar 1586 
from os.path import basename 1587 
import itertools 1588 
import datetime 1589 
import sqlite3 1590 
import sys, os 1591 
import cPickle as pickle 1592 
import openxmllib 1593 
from PyPDF2 import PdfFileReader 1594 
import pandas as pd 1595 
import shutil 1596 
 1597 
def db(insertDB): 1598 
    conn = sqlite3.connect('Bio.db') 1599 
 1600 
    c = conn.cursor() 1601 
    #check weather the table is exist or not 1602 
    tb_exists = "SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name='mappedBio'" 1603 
    if not conn.execute(tb_exists).fetchone(): 1604 
        c.execute('''CREATE TABLE mappedBio 1605 
                (objname, mappingddate, objhash, author, creator, creationdate, moddate, biobytes, 1606 
mappedbytesindex)''') 1607 
 1608 
    # Insert a row of data 1609 
    c.execute("INSERT INTO mappedBio VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?);", (insertDB)) 1610 
 1611 
    # Save (commit) the changes 1612 
    conn.commit() 1613 
 1614 
    # We can also close the connection if we are done with it. 1615 
    # Just be sure any changes have been committed or they will be lost. 1616 
    conn.close() 1617 
 1618 
 1619 
# computing hash value of the object, in order to use it for comparison later when we want to make sure 1620 
that the 1621 
# object has not been modified after we have created the record 1622 
def gethash(user_object): 1623 
    #print "Calculating", user_object, "hash..." 1624 





    hashx = [hashlib.md5(open(user_object, 'rb').read()).hexdigest()] 1627 
    return hashx 1628 
 1629 
 1630 
# this function return object's bytes as a list 1631 
def byte_target(user_object): 1632 
    #print "Loading", user_object, "bytes..." 1633 
    with open(user_object, "rb") as f: 1634 
        # defining the list that we want to store the object's bytes in 1635 
        tlist = [] 1636 
        while True: 1637 
            # [1] means to read the object byte by byte 1638 
            b = f.read(1) 1639 
            # get file bytes 1640 
            t = "%s" % (binascii.hexlify(b)) 1641 
            # when reached the end of the object it breaks 1642 
            if not b: 1643 
                break 1644 
            # add this byte to the list 1645 
            tlist.append(t) 1646 
 1647 
    #print tlist 1648 
    return tlist 1649 
 1650 
def obj_char(user_object): 1651 
    with open(user_object) as f: 1652 
            line = f.read().split() 1653 
 1654 
            char_list = [c for c in line[0]] 1655 
             1656 
    return char_list 1657 
 1658 
 1659 
# this function return Bio source file bytes as a list 1660 
def bio(bioSource): 1661 
    with open(bioSource) as f: 1662 
        #print "Loading", bioSource, "bytes..." 1663 
        # defining the list that we want to store the object's bytes in 1664 
        biolist = [] 1665 
        while True: 1666 
            # [1] means to read the object byte by byte 1667 
            b = f.read(1) 1668 
            # get file bytes 1669 
            t = "%s" % (binascii.hexlify(b)) 1670 
            # when reached the end of the object it breaks 1671 
            if not b: 1672 
                break 1673 
            # add this byte to the list 1674 
            biolist.append(t) 1675 
            # print b 1676 
    #print biolist 1677 
    return biolist 1678 
 1679 
 1680 
def bio_char(bioSource): 1681 
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    with open(bioSource) as f: 1682 
            line = f.read().split() 1683 
 1684 
            char_list = [c for c in line[0]] 1685 
             1686 
    return char_list 1687 
 1688 
 1689 
# def bio(bioSource): 1690 
#     with open(bioSource, "rb") as f: 1691 
#         #print "Loading", bioSource, "bytes..." 1692 
#         # defining the list that we want to store the object's bytes in 1693 
#         biolist = [] 1694 
#         while True: 1695 
#             # [1] means to read the object byte by byte 1696 
#             b = f.read(1) 1697 
#             # get file bytes 1698 
#             t = ' '.join(format(ord(x), 'b') for x in b) 1699 
#             # when reached the end of the object it breaks 1700 
#             if not b: 1701 
#                 break 1702 
#             # add this byte to the list 1703 
#             biolist.append(t) 1704 
#             # print b 1705 
#     return biolist 1706 
 1707 
 1708 
# this function compares objects bytes with  Bio source file bytes and returns matched objects bytes' 1709 
index as list 1710 
def mapping_1st_match(user_object, bioSource): 1711 
    #print "Mapping", bioSource, "with", user_object, "..." 1712 
    #print "Mapping..." 1713 
    # defining the list that we want to store the matched objects bytes in 1714 
    m = [] 1715 
    # for each byte in the bio byte list 1716 
    for z in bio_byte_final: 1717 
        # for each byte in the object byte list 1718 
        for index, i in enumerate(byte_target_final): 1719 
            #if bytes are equal 1720 
            if i == z: 1721 
                # add the index to the list 1722 
                tostr = byte_target_final.index(i) 1723 
 1724 
                m.append(str(tostr)) 1725 
 1726 
                break 1727 
    # to make sure that all bio bytes are mapped 1728 
    # if the length of the mapped list = the length of the bio source bytes list, that means all the bio bytes 1729 
has matched bytes in the object 1730 
    if len(m) == len(bio_byte_final): 1731 
        print("bytes mapping succeeded :)") 1732 
    # else, there is a shortage in the object bytes which they are 'lendiff' 1733 
    else: 1734 
        lendiff = len(bio_byte_final) - len(m) 1735 
        print("bytes mapping NOT succeeded,", lendiff, "bytes is needed!") 1736 
 1737 
    return m 1738 





# this function compares objects bytes with Bio source file bytes and returns matched objects bytes' index 1741 
as list 1742 
def nLocations(object_, bioSource): 1743 
    #print "Mapping", bioSource, "with", user_object, "..." 1744 
    #print "Mapping..." 1745 
    # defining the list that we want to store the matched objects bytes in 1746 
  1747 
    # for each byte in the bio byte list 1748 
 1749 
    c = 0 1750 
    m = [] 1751 
 1752 
    for z in tqdm(bioSource, desc='mapping', leave=True): 1753 
        # 1754 
        # if z == '101100': 1755 
        #     m.append([","]) 1756 
        # elif z == '101110': 1757 
        #     m.append(["."]) 1758 
 1759 
        # for each byte in the object byte list 1760 
        indexes = [i for i, x in enumerate(object_) if x == z] 1761 




    # to make sure that all bio bytes are mapped 1766 
    # if the length of the mapped list = the length of the bio source bytes list, that means all the bio bytes 1767 
has matched bytes in the object 1768 
    if len(m) == len(bioSource): 1769 
 1770 
        print("bytes mapping succeeded :)") 1771 
    # else, there is a shortage in the object bytes which they are 'lendiff' 1772 
    else: 1773 
        lendiff = len(bioSource) - len(m) 1774 
        print("bytes mapping NOT succeeded,", lendiff, "bytes is needed!") 1775 
 1776 
    return m 1777 
 1778 
 1779 
# this function return metadata info when the object is a PDF document 1780 
def pdfMetadata(user_object): 1781 
    # load pdf 1782 
    pdf = PdfFileReader(open(user_object, 'rb')) 1783 
    # retrieve pdf metadata 1784 
    docinfo = pdf.getDocumentInfo() 1785 
    # get author 1786 
    docAuthor = docinfo.author 1787 
    # if there is  no author, make it 'None' 1788 
    if docAuthor == "": 1789 
        docAuthor = 'None' 1790 
    else: 1791 
        docAuthor = docinfo.author 1792 
    # get creator name 1793 
    docCreator = docinfo.creator 1794 
    # get creation date 1795 
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    docCreationDate = docinfo['/CreationDate'] 1796 
    # get modified date 1797 
    docModDate = docinfo['/ModDate'] 1798 
    # creat a list 1799 
    MetaData = [docAuthor, docCreator, docCreationDate, docModDate] 1800 
    return MetaData 1801 
 1802 
 1803 
# this function return metadata info when the object is an office document include, docx, xlsx, and 1804 
pptx(not tested yet) 1805 
def docxMetadata(user_object): 1806 
    # load document 1807 
    doc = openxmllib.openXmlDocument(path=user_object) 1808 
    # load function 1809 
    doc2 = doc.coreProperties 1810 
    # get creator 1811 
    docCreator = doc2['creator'] 1812 
    # get the name of the person who is the last modified it 1813 
    doclastmodBy = doc2['lastModifiedBy'] 1814 
    # get creation date 1815 
    docCreationDate = doc2['created'] 1816 
    # get modified date 1817 
    docModDate = doc2['modified'] 1818 
    # create a list 1819 
    MetaData = [docCreator, doclastmodBy, docCreationDate, docModDate] 1820 
    return MetaData 1821 
 1822 
 1823 
def finalrecord(): 1824 
    if user_object[-3:] == "pdf": 1825 
        # the record is stored as a list right now (in a database later on), the list item order as follow: 1826 
        # object title, current system time, object hash value, metadata(docAuthor, docCreator, 1827 
docCreationDate, docModDate), bio bytes(spaceless), matched index 1828 
        record = filenameAsText + ttime + gethash(user_object) + pdfMetadata(user_object) + Biobits + 1829 
convertedtodb 1830 
        # to print the first 7 items in the list 1831 
        #print "Object Record:", record[:7] 1832 
    elif user_object[-4:] == "docx" or user_object[-4:] == "xlsx" or user_object[-4:] == "pptx": 1833 
        # object title, current system time, object hash value, metadata(docCreator, doclastmodBy, 1834 
docCreationDate, docModDate) , bio bytes(spaceless), matched index 1835 
        record = filenameAsText + ttime + gethash(user_object) + docxMetadata(user_object) + Biobits + 1836 
convertedtodb 1837 
        # to print the first 7 items in the list 1838 
        #print "Object Recored:", record[:7] 1839 
    else: 1840 
        # object title, current system time, object hash value, bio bytes(spaceless), matched index 1841 
        record = filenameAsText + ttime + gethash(user_object) + nonelist + Biobits + convertedtodb 1842 
        # to print the first 4 items in the list 1843 
        #print "Object Record:", record[:7] 1844 
    return record 1845 
 1846 
 1847 
def extract_bio(byte_target_final, mappedBio): 1848 
    #print "Extracting", bioSource, "from", user_object, "..." 1849 
    # defining the list that we want to store the matched objects bytes in 1850 
    m = [] 1851 
 1852 
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    #m =  [i for index, i in enumerate(byte_target_final) for j in mappedBio if index == j] 1853 
 1854 
    #for each byte index in the bio 1855 
    for z in mappedBio: 1856 
 1857 
        # for each byte index in the object 1858 
        for index, i in enumerate(byte_target_final): 1859 
 1860 
            # if indexes are equal 1861 
            if index == z: 1862 
                # add the byte to the list 1863 
                m.append(i) 1864 
                break 1865 
    return m 1866 
 1867 
 1868 
def validation(featureVector, byte_target_final, bioSource): 1869 
    #this function checks how many imprints can be retiereved 1870 
    counter = [] #conut number of success retireved 1871 
    lengtbar = len(featureVector) 1872 
 1873 
 1874 
    for index, i in tqdm(enumerate(featureVector), desc='Number of imprints',total=lengtbar, leave=True): 1875 
 1876 
        if str(extract_bio(byte_target_final, i)) == bioSource: 1877 
        # when the retived values are equall add 1 to the counter 1878 
 1879 
            counter.append(index) 1880 
 1881 
 1882 
    print("") 1883 
    print("%s out of %s retrieved" % (len(counter), len(featureVector))) 1884 
    #the function returns the number of success retreived 1885 
    return [len(counter),len(featureVector)] 1886 
    # return 1887 
 1888 
def validationFrequncy(featureVector, byte_target_final, bioSource): 1889 
    m = [] 1890 
 1891 
    #m =  [i for index, i in enumerate(byte_target_final) for j in mappedBio if index == j] 1892 
 1893 






        # for each byte index in the object 1900 
    #     for index, i in enumerate(byte_target_final): 1901 
    # 1902 
    #         # if indexes are equal 1903 
    #         if index == z: 1904 
    #             # add the byte to the list 1905 
    #             m.append(i) 1906 
    #             break 1907 
    return m 1908 
 1909 




def Vm(attack, bio_byte_final): 1911 
 n = 1 1912 
 retrivedImprints = [] 1913 
 allelipsidtime = [] 1914 
 totalimprints = [] 1915 
 #path = "images/modified/dataset" 1916 
 1917 
 path = "TLSH_FILES/"+attack+'/' 1918 
 for filename in os.listdir(path): 1919 
     if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 1920 
  continue 1921 
 1922 
     filenameWithoutJpg = os.path.splitext(filename)[0] 1923 
     path2 = "imprints/original/"+filenameWithoutJpg+".p" 1924 
 1925 
     byte_target_final = obj_char('TLSH_FILES/'+attack+'/'+str(filename)) 1926 
     featureVector = pickle.load(open(path2, "rb")) 1927 
 1928 
     print(n) 1929 
     start = timer() 1930 
     valditionreturn = validation(featureVector, byte_target_final, str(bio_byte_final)) 1931 
     retrivedImprints.append(valditionreturn) 1932 
     end = timer() 1933 
     elipsidtime = end - start 1934 
     allelipsidtime.append(elipsidtime) 1935 
     totalimprints.append(valditionreturn[1]) 1936 
 1937 
     n += 1 1938 
 1939 
 print(sum(allelipsidtime)) 1940 
 print(sum(totalimprints)) 1941 
 print((sum(allelipsidtime)/sum(totalimprints))) 1942 
 1943 





 shutil.rmtree('TLSH_FILES/'+attack) 1949 
 1950 
def result(attack): 1951 
 zero_mapped, total_retrived, total_mapped,lost, total_document_retrived, 1952 
total_document_retrived_perentage = [], [], [], [], [], [] 1953 
 for file in range(1, 2): 1954 
  1955 
  featureVector = pickle.load(open('result/retrivel/'+attack+'.p', "rb")) 1956 
  1957 
  n = 0 1958 
 1959 
  m, x, y = [], [], [] 1960 
  #print(featureVector) 1961 
  for i in featureVector: 1962 
      #print(i[0]) 1963 
      #print(i[1]) 1964 
      try: 1965 
       i01 = float(i[0]) / float(i[1]) 1966 
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       m.append(i01*100) 1967 
      except ZeroDivisionError: 1968 
   n += 1 1969 
      x.append(i[0]) 1970 
      y.append(i[1]) 1971 
 1972 
 1973 
  null = [] 1974 
  for i in m: 1975 
   if i == 0.0: 1976 
    null.append(i) 1977 
 1978 
  zero_mapped.append(n) 1979 
  total_retrived.append(sum(x)) 1980 
  total_mapped.append(sum(y)) 1981 
  lost.append(len(null)) 1982 
  total_document_retrived.append(len(featureVector)-len(null)) 1983 
   1984 
 1985 
 result_dict = ({'zero_mapped':zero_mapped, 'total_retrived':total_retrived, 1986 
'total_mapped':total_mapped, 'lost':lost, 'total_document_retrived':total_document_retrived}) 1987 
 1988 
 result_df = pd.DataFrame.from_dict(result_dict) 1989 
 result_df.index = np.arange(1,len(result_df)+1) 1990 
 result_df['total_document_retrived_perentage'] = ((6000-result_df['lost'])/6000)*100 1991 
 1992 
 result_df.to_csv('result/retrivel/'+attack+'.csv') 1993 
 1994 
 1995 
def readText(path, folder): 1996 
        text = pd.read_csv('hash/delWordsInc/'+folder+'.txt', header=None) 1997 
        for index, row in text.iterrows(): 1998 
     if not os.path.exists('TLSH_FILES/delWordsInc/'+folder+'/'): 1999 
  os.makedirs('TLSH_FILES/delWordsInc/'+folder+'/') 2000 
 2001 
            with open('TLSH_FILES/delWordsInc/'+folder+'/'+str(int(row[0][0:4]) - 1).zfill(4) + '.txt', 'w') as 2002 
f: 2003 
                f.write(row[0][6:]) 2004 
 2005 
def readText_sigleHashFile(attack): 2006 
        text = pd.read_csv('hash/'+attack+'.txt', header=None) 2007 
        for index, row in text.iterrows(): 2008 
     if not os.path.exists('TLSH_FILES/'+attack+'/'): 2009 
  os.makedirs('TLSH_FILES/'+attack+'/') 2010 
 2011 
            with open('TLSH_FILES/'+attack+'/'+str(int(row[0][0:4]) - 1).zfill(4) + '.txt', 'w') as f: 2012 




#         for k in range(35, 90): 2017 
#             print k 2018 
#             if not os.path.exists('TLSH_FILES/delWordsInc_70/' + str(k).zfill(2)): 2019 
#                 os.makedirs('TLSH_FILES/delWordsInc_70/' + str(k).zfill(2)) 2020 
#             text = pd.read_csv('result/hash/delWordsInc_70/'+str(k).zfill(2)+'.txt', header=None) 2021 
#             for index, row in text.iterrows(): 2022 
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#                 dest = 'TLSH_FILES/delWordsInc_70/' + str(k).zfill(2) + '/' + str(int(row[0][0:4]) - 1).zfill(4) 2023 
+ '.txt' 2024 
#                 with open(dest, 'w') as f: 2025 
#                     f.write(row[0][6:]) 2026 
 2027 
if __name__ == '__main__': 2028 
    # define a time object in order to calculate process time 2029 
    t0 = time.clock() 2030 
    now = datetime.datetime.now() 2031 
 2032 
    if len(sys.argv) < 1 or len(sys.argv) > 4 or sys.argv == "-help" or sys.argv == "-h": 2033 
        print("") 2034 
        print("Usage: python binariesMapping.py <mapping method> <object path> <Biometric feature 2035 
vector file>") 2036 
        print("e.g: Usage: python binariesMapping.py --nL objects/obj.jpg objects/fv.txt") 2037 
        print("Supported mapping methods:") 2038 
        print("  -fT    :first matched location only") 2039 
        print("  -nL    :mappes every feature to n-locations for one object") 2040 
        print("  -nLm   :mappes every feature to n-locations for list of objects") 2041 
        print("  -V     :retireves mapped imprints from a given object") 2042 
        print("  -Vm    :retireves mapped imprints from list of object") 2043 
        print("  -nT    :mappes feature vector n-times throughout object") 2044 
 2045 
        # define the target file which is the user object that we want to hide Bio inside 2046 
        sys.exit() 2047 
 2048 
    user_object = sys.argv[2] 2049 
 2050 
    # define Bio source file, for this experiment I just assumed that we got the model file from function 2051 
    bioSource = sys.argv[3] 2052 
 2053 
    # load functions into variables are 10x faster than using functions directly 2054 
    # define variables 2055 
    # object bytes list 2056 
    byte_target_final = byte_target(user_object) 2057 
    # bio bytes list 2058 
    #bio_byte_final = bio(bioSource) 2059 
     2060 
    bio_byte_final = bio_char(bioSource) 2061 
    # get object name to be used in the record 2062 
    filenameAsText = [user_object] 2063 
 2064 
    # replacing bio bytes list into spaceless to be used the record for comparison later on 2065 
    Biobits = [''.join(bio_byte_final)] 2066 
 2067 
    # formatting time 2068 
    currenttime = now.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S") 2069 
    # defining time object to be stored in the record 2070 
    ttime = [currenttime] 2071 
    nonelist = ['None', 'None', 'None', 'None'] 2072 
    # because object extension may vary, I use this condition to make sure we get the right meta data 2073 
 2074 
    if sys.argv[1] == ("-fT"): 2075 
        cvrtmappied = mapping_1st_match(byte_target_final, bio_byte_final) 2076 
        #in order to isert the mapped indexes into the db, I converted ',' into smt else such as '-' to be inserted 2077 
into 'mappedbytesindex' colunm 2078 
        print(cvrtmappied) 2079 




        convertedtodb = ['-'.join(cvrtmappied)] 2081 
        # to remove '-' sign 2082 
        print(convertedtodb) 2083 
 2084 
 2085 
    elif sys.argv[1] == '-nL': 2086 
        # this argument will imprints a given objects 2087 
        cvrtmappied = nLocations(byte_target_final, bio_byte_final) 2088 
 2089 
        print(cvrtmappied) 2090 
 2091 
        featureVector = map(list, zip(*cvrtmappied)) 2092 
        #this generates the imprints from each character list 2093 
 2094 
 2095 
        print("") 2096 
        #print featureVector 2097 
        print(featureVector) 2098 
        print(len(featureVector), "imprints generated") 2099 
 2100 
        pickle.dump(featureVector, open("imprints.p", "wb")) 2101 




    elif sys.argv[1] == '-nLm': 2106 
        # this argument will imprints list of given objects 2107 
        #variable = "dataset" 2108 
        # this where the objects are located 2109 
        path = "TLSH_FILES/original/" 2110 
        n = 0 2111 
        imprints = [] 2112 
        allimprint = [] 2113 
        allelipsidtime = [] 2114 
        totalimprints = [] 2115 
 2116 
        for filename in os.listdir(path): 2117 
            #for each object on the givin directory 2118 
            if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 2119 
                #ignor any object other than specified 2120 
                continue 2121 
 2122 
            #byte_target_final = byte_target(path+filename) 2123 
            #  this variable stores object's Hex as a list 2124 
            byte_target_final = obj_char(path+filename) 2125 
             2126 
 2127 
            start = timer() 2128 
 2129 
            cvrtmappied = nLocations(byte_target_final, bio_byte_final) 2130 
            #  this variable stores mapped indexes 2131 
     #print(cvrtmappied) 2132 
 2133 
            end = timer() 2134 
 2135 
            elipsidtime = end - start 2136 
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            allelipsidtime.append(elipsidtime) 2137 
            featureVector = map(list, zip(*cvrtmappied)) 2138 
     #print(featureVector) 2139 
            #this generates the imprints from each character list 2140 
            totalimprints.append(len(featureVector)) 2141 
            print(n,"object:", filename, len(featureVector), "imprints generated") 2142 
            filenameWithoutJpg = os.path.splitext(filename)[0] 2143 
            path2 = "imprints/original/"+filenameWithoutJpg+".p" 2144 
 2145 
            pickle.dump(featureVector, open(path2, "wb")) 2146 
 2147 
 2148 
            n+=1 2149 
            imprints.append(len(featureVector)) 2150 
            allimprint.append(featureVector) 2151 
        print(sum(allelipsidtime)) 2152 
        print(sum(totalimprints)) 2153 
        print((sum(allelipsidtime)/sum(totalimprints))) 2154 
        pickle.dump(imprints, open("result/original.p", "wb")) 2155 
        # to write each obect imprints into a file 2156 
        pickle.dump(allimprint, open("result/original_All.p", "wb")) 2157 
        # to write all the imprints into a single file 2158 
 2159 
    elif sys.argv[1] == '-V': 2160 
        featureVector = pickle.load(open("imprints.p", "rb")) 2161 
        validation(featureVector, byte_target_final, str(bio_byte_final)) 2162 
 2163 
    elif sys.argv[1] == '-Vm': 2164 
 2165 
        n = 1 2166 
        retrivedImprints = [] 2167 
        allelipsidtime = [] 2168 
        totalimprints = [] 2169 
        #path = "images/modified/dataset" 2170 
        folder = 'delWordsInc' 2171 
        path = "TLSH_FILES/"+folder+"/" 2172 
        for filename in os.listdir(path): 2173 
            if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 2174 
                continue 2175 
 2176 
            filenameWithoutJpg = os.path.splitext(filename)[0] 2177 
            path2 = "imprints/delWordsInc/"+filenameWithoutJpg+".p" 2178 
 2179 
            byte_target_final = obj_char("TLSH_FILES/"+folder+"/"+str(filename)) 2180 
            featureVector = pickle.load(open(path2, "rb")) 2181 
 2182 
            print(n) 2183 
            start = timer() 2184 
            valditionreturn = validation(featureVector, byte_target_final, str(bio_byte_final)) 2185 
            retrivedImprints.append(valditionreturn) 2186 
            end = timer() 2187 
            elipsidtime = end - start 2188 
            allelipsidtime.append(elipsidtime) 2189 
            totalimprints.append(valditionreturn[1]) 2190 
 2191 
            n += 1 2192 
 2193 
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        print(sum(allelipsidtime)) 2194 
        print(sum(totalimprints)) 2195 
        print((sum(allelipsidtime)/sum(totalimprints))) 2196 
 2197 
        pickle.dump(retrivedImprints, open("result/retrivel/"+folder+".p", "wb")) 2198 
        # for k in range(34, 90): 2199 
        #     n = 1 2200 
        #     retrivedImprints = [] 2201 
        #     allelipsidtime = [] 2202 
        #     totalimprints = [] 2203 
        #     # path = "images/modified/dataset" 2204 
        #     folder = 'delWordsInc_70/'+str(k).zfill(2) 2205 
        #     path = "TLSH_FILES/" + folder + "/" 2206 
        #     for filename in os.listdir(path): 2207 
        #         if not (filename.endswith('.txt')): 2208 
        #             continue 2209 
        # 2210 
        #         filenameWithoutJpg = os.path.splitext(filename)[0] 2211 
        #         path2 = "imprints/original/" + filenameWithoutJpg + ".p" 2212 
        # 2213 
        #         byte_target_final = byte_target("TLSH_FILES/" + folder + "/" + str(filename)) 2214 
        #         featureVector = pickle.load(open(path2, "rb")) 2215 
        # 2216 
        #         print n 2217 
        #         start = timer() 2218 
        #         valditionreturn = validation(featureVector, byte_target_final, str(bio_byte_final)) 2219 
        #         retrivedImprints.append(valditionreturn) 2220 
        #         end = timer() 2221 
        #         elipsidtime = end - start 2222 
        #         allelipsidtime.append(elipsidtime) 2223 
        #         totalimprints.append(valditionreturn[1]) 2224 
        # 2225 
        #         n += 1 2226 
        # 2227 
        #     print sum(allelipsidtime) 2228 
        #     print sum(totalimprints) 2229 
        #     print (sum(allelipsidtime) / sum(totalimprints)) 2230 
        # 2231 
        #     pickle.dump(retrivedImprints, open("result/result/" + folder + ".p", "wb")) 2232 
 2233 
    elif sys.argv[1] == '-nF': 2234 
        cvrtmappied = nLocations(byte_target_final, bio_byte_final) 2235 
        pickle.dump(cvrtmappied, open("imprints.p", "wb")) 2236 
 2237 
 2238 
    elif sys.argv[1] == '-Vf': 2239 
        cvrtmappied = pickle.load(open("imprints.p", "rb")) 2240 
 2241 
 2242 
        #print cvrtmappied 2243 
        m = [] 2244 
        for i in cvrtmappied: 2245 
           counter = collections.Counter(extract_bio(byte_target_final, i)) 2246 
 2247 
           print(counter) 2248 
 2249 
           print("") 2250 
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           print("") 2251 
 2252 
    elif sys.argv[1] == '-p': 2253 
 #for folder in range(1,101): 2254 
   2255 
            #readText(sys.argv[2], str(folder).zfill(3)) 2256 
     #Vm(str(folder).zfill(3), bio_byte_final) 2257 
 attack = 'delSentences' 2258 
 readText_sigleHashFile(attack) 2259 
 Vm(attack, bio_byte_final) 2260 
 result(attack) 2261 
 2262 
        #featureVector = map(list, zip(*cvrtmappied)) 2263 
 2264 
        #print len(featureVector), "imprints generated" 2265 
        #pickle.dump(featureVector, open("imprints.p", "wb")) 2266 
 2267 
        # insertDB = finalrecord() 2268 
        # print "inserting data into database" 2269 
        # db(insertDB) 2270 
        # 2271 
        # assert isinstance(t0, object) 2272 
        # print time.clock()2273 






End of Thesis 
